Ellen B. Murray

The young person faced multiple charges including assault, uttering threats, and failure to comply with a recognizance, arising from a romantic relationship with the complainant.

The young person pleaded guilty to uttering threats and breach of recognizance at the outset.

Following a trial on the assault charges, the court applied the W. (D.) test to assess credibility, rejecting the young person's blanket denials due to internal inconsistencies and corroborating evidence from other witnesses.

The court found the young person guilty of three counts of simple assault, but acquitted on one count due to reasonable doubt regarding the timeframe and details.

The applicant sought an order removing a Notice of Security Interest registered on title to her residential property in relation to a rented hot water system.

She also sought orders compelling the respondent to sell or rent the system and other related relief.

The court held that the respondent was entitled under the Personal Property Security Act to register the notice of security interest and that the applicant had not satisfied the statutory requirements for discharge.

Material facts regarding the contractual relationship were in dispute, making the matter unsuitable for determination by application rather than action.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to order removal of the notice absent payment into court or fulfillment of statutory grounds.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision regarding the equalization of net family properties.

The primary issue was whether the trial judge erred in law by failing to deduct a line of credit, secured by a collateral mortgage on the matrimonial home, from the respondent husband's date of marriage assets.

The Divisional Court held that under the Family Law Act and the test in Collier v. Torbar, a debt must be incurred to acquire, maintain, or improve the matrimonial home to be exempt from deduction.

The court adjusted the equalization payment to account for this error, as well as omitted assets including a vehicle and a generator, increasing the payment owed to the appellant to $96,462.41.

The appellants, having been successful in their appeal which struck the respondent's counterclaim and third-party claim, sought their costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court fixed the costs for both appellants but declined to include any fees or disbursements related to a voluntary mediation.

The court held that voluntary mediation is not a step authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a matter of policy, the costs of voluntary mediation should be borne equally by the parties to encourage settlement efforts without fear of increased costs if unsuccessful.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motions under Rules 20 and 21 to strike the respondent's claims for constructive dismissal and related torts as statute-barred.

The motion judge had found that the claims could have been discovered before the respondent resigned, potentially triggering the six-year limitation period under the transitional provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a cause of action for constructive dismissal arises only when the employee resigns.

As the resignation occurred in May 2004, the two-year limitation period applied and the claims were statute-barred.

The court also held that the motion judge erred in linking the Rule 20 and Rule 21 motions, and found no triable issue regarding promissory estoppel or acknowledgment of liability.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The action, arising from alleged dog attacks in 1996 and 1997, had been delayed for 11 years since the events.

The Divisional Court found that the plaintiff failed to provide an explanation for the delay and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's action was dismissed for delay.

The appellant appealed an order of a motions judge that reversed a master's interlocutory order permitting the appellant to file a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations were completed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in law by failing to apply the deferential standard of palpable and overriding error to the master's discretionary decision.

The court reinstated the master's order, holding that the supplementary affidavit was highly relevant, adequately explained, and caused no non-compensable prejudice.

The cross-appellant lawyer appealed a 12-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Appeal Panel for professional misconduct involving sexual harassment.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the impact of the proceedings on his life.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it of limited value.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on penalty, finding the 12-month suspension unreasonable given the historical context of the misconduct (1988-1993), comparable cases, and mitigating factors.

The penalty was reduced to a three-month suspension.

The applicant sought judicial review of an OMERS Appeal Sub-Committee decision that found the respondent was the common-law spouse of the deceased and entitled to his pension death benefits.

The applicant argued the tribunal breached procedural fairness and that its decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court held that while the tribunal's pre-hearing procedures were fair, its written reasons were too brief and conclusory to allow for meaningful review.

The court could not determine if the tribunal properly applied the legal test for common-law status or correctly placed the burden of proof.

The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory injunction that prohibited them from publishing any material identifying the plaintiffs on the internet and ordered them to delete all references to the plaintiffs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the injunction was overly broad and an unwarranted restraint on freedom of expression.

The court also held that two of the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief because they failed to file affidavit evidence of irreparable harm, failed to provide an undertaking as to damages, and refused to attend examinations.

The injunction was set aside, replaced only by a narrow consent order regarding one specific article concerning one plaintiff.

The $35,000 costs award against the defendants was also set aside.

Following a successful motion to quash a judicial review application, the moving party sought costs of $15,000 plus disbursements, as well as costs for other respondents.

The responding party opposed the quantum.

The Divisional Court found the motion was straightforward and essentially undefended, making the claimed counsel fee unwarranted.

The court fixed costs at $8,379.38 inclusive of GST and disbursements, and denied the request for costs for the other respondents due to a lack of evidence.

Following a successful appeal to the Divisional Court that revoked a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, the appellant police officers sought costs against the respondent.

The court applied the principles from Boucher v. Public Accountants Council, fixing costs on a partial indemnity basis at $7,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and GST.

The applicant, a university professor, filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination and reprisal by his employer.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaints to the Tribunal and upheld this decision on reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the decisions were unreasonable, procedurally unfair, and delayed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Commission's decisions were rational, the investigation was adequate, and there was no procedural unfairness.

Although the six-year delay was inordinate, it did not amount to an abuse of process given the complexity of the case and lack of prejudice.

No costs were awarded due to the delay.

The respondents requested an adjournment of an appeal of a costs order due to the death of one of the co-respondents.

The majority of the Divisional Court denied the adjournment, noting that the deceased's estate had no interest in the litigation, the request was for an indefinite period, and the case had been pending for a considerable time.

Molloy J. dissented, stating she would have granted the adjournment to ensure the rights of the deceased's estate were protected.

The applicant brought a motion to limit the involvement of the Ontario Human Rights Commission in the proceedings and to appoint an amicus curiae.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no justification to limit the Commission's involvement or to appoint an amicus curiae, noting that the Commission was the only party in a position to assist the court.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was represented by pro bono counsel, the appellant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued that costs should not be awarded as there was no expectation the impecunious appellant would pay costs if unsuccessful.

Applying Court of Appeal precedent, the Divisional Court held that pro bono counsel are entitled to costs awards to promote access to justice and deter abuse of the system.

The court awarded the appellant $3,500 in fees and $1,295.23 in disbursements.

The appellant lived with her grandmother in a Toronto Community Housing Corporation unit for 12 years.

When her grandmother died, the appellant sought to be recognized as a tenant.

The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal dismissed her application and granted the landlord's eviction application without allowing the appellant to present evidence or make full submissions, finding she was merely an unauthorized occupant.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Tribunal breached the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness by engaging in a 'trial by ambush' and demonstrating bias.

The Tribunal's decisions were set aside and the matters remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

Two police officers appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which had revoked a Hearing Officer's decision exonerating them of unlawfully exercising authority.

The officers had arrested a disruptive individual in a courtroom during a trial.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Commission erred by ignoring the Hearing Officer's credibility findings and by incorrectly concluding that a Justice of the Peace's contempt power superseded a police officer's power to arrest for a criminal offence in the courtroom.

The Hearing Officer's decision was restored.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decisions not to refer his racial discrimination complaint against his employer to the Human Rights Tribunal, and to uphold that decision upon reconsideration.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness during the investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission met the requirements of procedural fairness and that its decisions were not patently unreasonable.

The complainant alleged that a funeral home lost his late wife's diamond earrings.

The Complaints Committee of the Board of Funeral Services declined to refer the matter to discipline and stated it lacked jurisdiction to order compensation.

On appeal, the Licence Appeal Tribunal ordered the funeral home to pay $4,800 in compensation.

The Registrar appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that neither the Complaints Committee nor the Tribunal had statutory authority under the Funeral Directors and Establishments Act to award monetary compensation to a complainant.