Doug McLeod

The defendant First Associates Investments Inc. moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by the estate trustee of Nancy Wagg, arguing the claim was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period under section 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The action alleged breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty related to unsuitable investments made by Nancy Wagg's son-in-law, Todd Monaghan, an investment advisor and officer of First Associates.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while section 38(1) of the Trustee Act applies to claims for pure economic loss, there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine.

Specifically, triable issues existed concerning whether Monaghan's conduct was unconscionable, First Associates' vicarious liability, and whether critical information about the investments was concealed from Nancy Wagg or her subsequent estate trustees.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim to incorporate findings from a Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) disciplinary panel concerning a salesperson, David Karas, whose conduct was central to the plaintiffs' indemnity claim against the defendant.

The defendant opposed the amendments, arguing irrelevance, improper pleading of similar fact evidence, and inadmissibility of the panel's findings.

The Master found the proposed amendments relevant and determined they did not improperly plead similar fact evidence.

The Master allowed most of the amendments, permitting the pleading of the MFDA panel's conclusions regarding specific rule breaches and the imposed penalty, but disallowed the pleading of the panel's "reasons" or characterizations of Karas's conduct.

The decision clarified that the admissibility and weight of such regulatory findings in the civil action would be determined by the trial judge.

Following dismissal of an employee’s action alleging multiple breaches of an employment agreement, the employer sought costs of the action.

The employer relied on earlier offers to settle and argued it should receive substantial indemnity costs after the first refused offer.

The court held that elevated costs outside Rule 49.10 require reprehensible or egregious conduct by the opposing party.

Finding no such conduct and noting the action was hard fought but not frivolous, the court declined substantial indemnity costs and instead awarded a reduced amount under Rule 57.01.

The parties disagreed on the form of the order reflecting the court's appeal decision regarding class certification.

The appellant argued the class should expressly include recipients of both English and French versions of the documents, while the respondent argued it should be restricted to the English version.

The Divisional Court agreed with the appellant, noting no distinction was made during the appeal, and varied the certification order to include both language versions.

The plaintiff, a successful retail stockbroker, sued his former employer for breach of contract, alleging he was owed a 10% finder's fee on several large corporate finance transactions under an April 11, 2006 agreement.

The court found that the agreement was exclusively a retail document and did not apply to transactions involving the employer's Capital Markets group.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligent overpayment of his assistant, unjust enrichment, bad faith, and entitlement to unvested deferred stock units.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The Divisional Court issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant was awarded $50,000 inclusive for the appeal and leave motion.

The costs of the underlying certification motion were remitted to the motion judge, who had extensive experience with the matter, to determine a fair and reasonable amount.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to certify a negligent misrepresentation claim as a class proceeding.

The proposed class consisted of investors in the defendant's investment fund who received an information folder containing an allegedly misleading statement about replicating a stock index.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that a class action was the preferable procedure because it would overcome economic barriers to access to justice for tens of thousands of potential class members and would promote judicial economy by resolving common issues.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge had found that the appellant was an independent contractor, not an employee, and that the respondents were entitled to terminate the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or fact in the motion judge's careful and thorough reasons.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing its action under Rule 34.15(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for its representative's refusal to answer questions during an examination for discovery.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in law and fact by concluding that the plaintiff's conduct was an egregious breach that prejudiced the defendants such that a dismissal was warranted.

The court held that the defendants' prejudice could be remedied by ordering the plaintiff's representative to re-attend the examination and answer proper questions, rather than imposing the draconian sanction of dismissing the action.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a claim alleging wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, unpaid commissions, discrimination, and various aggravated damages arising from the termination of a financial services associate relationship.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor and whether the termination was valid under the governing agreement.

Applying the legal test for employment relationships and considering the contractual terms and surrounding evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff operated as an independent contractor.

The court further held that the agreement permitted termination where minimum commission levels were not maintained and that the evidentiary record showed the plaintiff earned insufficient commissions.

Claims for unpaid commissions and other damages, including emotional distress and discrimination, were unsupported by evidence.

The appellant appealed an order striking out claims for breach of contract based on representations in an information folder regarding the Can-Am Fund.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was plain and obvious no cause of action existed for breach of contract, given the governing statutory scheme and warnings in the materials.

The application for leave to appeal the costs order was also dismissed.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

In a pretrial ruling in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause on the basis of potential race‑based bias and requested that the court adopt a multiple‑choice formulation of the challenge question derived from prior jurisprudence.

The Crown opposed the request and argued that the traditional Parks question should be used.

The court held that a question permitting prospective jurors to answer in their own words better assists the triers in evaluating sincerity and bias than a structured multiple‑choice response.

The application to conduct a challenge for cause was allowed, but the court declined to adopt the proposed multiple‑choice wording and instead directed that the traditional Parks formulation, or a modified version used in prior authority, be employed.

The court further held that the question would not be provided in writing to jurors in the witness box.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary motion in a homicide prosecution, the accused sought to exclude several items of proposed Crown evidence on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing admissibility and considered whether the evidence would undermine trial fairness or invite improper jury reasoning.

Several graphic autopsy photographs and circumstantial forensic evidence were permitted where they illustrated the nature of the injuries or were relevant to the location and manner of the assault.

Evidence consisting of a written message on a pacifier package was excluded from the Crown’s case due to minimal probative value and risk of prejudice, though it could be used in cross‑examination if the accused testified.

A baseball bat potentially linked to the killing and a partial fingerprint found at the scene were admitted, with concerns about evidentiary weight left for the jury.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a pretrial application to admit the videotaped police interviews of the eight-year-old brother of the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The child had returned to Jamaica and his mother refused to permit him to testify.

While the necessity requirement was met, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability due to material inconsistencies, the child's tendency to guess or make assumptions, and the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.

The Crown's application to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought certification of a proposed class action against an insurer relating to the performance of the Can‑Am segregated fund offered through multiple insurance contracts.

The plaintiff alleged breach of express or implied contractual terms requiring the fund to replicate the S&P 500 on a best‑efforts basis, as well as negligent misrepresentation in pre‑contract information folders.

The court held that only five insurance contracts contained an express “best‑efforts” term capable of supporting a breach of contract claim, and claims based on implied terms or collateral contracts were legally untenable due to statutory entire‑agreement provisions and the non‑contractual status of information folders.

Although negligent misrepresentation disclosed a cause of action, the court found that individual reliance, causation, and damages issues overwhelmed the common issues such that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

Certification was therefore granted only for breach of express contractual terms for the five specified policy forms, subject to exclusion of statute‑barred claims.

A mining corporation sought an interlocutory injunction preventing major shareholders from voting their shares or soliciting proxies in an upcoming shareholder meeting, alleging breach of a confidentiality agreement and misuse of confidential information obtained during a site visit.

The dissident shareholders also sought declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the conduct of the shareholder meeting under the Business Corporations Act.

The court applied the RJR‑MacDonald test and held that while the corporation established a strong prima facie case that confidential information had been received, it demonstrated only a weak case that the information had been misused.

The balance of convenience favoured allowing the proxy contest to proceed.

The court also declined to interfere in advance with the conduct of the shareholders’ meeting, emphasizing corporate autonomy absent demonstrated impropriety.