Donohue

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal regarding insurance coverage for stolen marijuana plants, the respondent insurer sought costs.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, noting that while the respondent was entirely successful, the legal issues were novel and there was no guiding precedent.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, reflecting a modest allowance for junior counsel.

The applicant, an economic development corporation, sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner finding it to be an 'institution' under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

The Commissioner ordered the applicant to respond to a freedom of information request.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's original decision, finding it was reasonable to interpret the relevant regulation as capturing the applicant, despite the repeal of the underlying statutory provision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed an order vacating the setting down for trial of its construction lien action.

The motion judge had held that because the plaintiff had not delivered a defence to counterclaim when it set the action down, the pleadings were not closed, rendering the setting down invalid and causing the lien to expire under s. 37 of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the failure to include the defence to counterclaim in the trial record was an irregularity that could be cured under Rule 2.01 by granting leave to file an amended trial record, rather than a nullity that resulted in the expiry of the lien.

The tenant appealed an eviction order of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court found that the Board applied an incorrect or incomplete legal test by only considering the discretionary provision under s. 83(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, and failing to consider the mandatory provision under s. 83(3).

The Board had explicitly found that the landlord substantially interfered with the tenant's reasonable enjoyment, which could constitute a serious breach under s. 83(3).

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the same board member for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their appeal of the Chief Building Official's refusal to issue a building permit for a single-family home.

The property had been inadvertently rezoned to permit such a home due to a clerical error, which the Town subsequently corrected with an amending by-law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Chief Building Official correctly considered the pending, more restrictive amending by-law as 'applicable law' under the Building Code Act when making her decision, as it would have retroactive effect once appeals were exhausted.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over a claim involving a Band Council and declaratory relief.

During the appeal, the parties agreed to reconcile most of their difficulties and issue a new Statement of Claim focusing on unjust dismissal.

The Divisional Court declined to decide the remaining issue of whether a Band Council member can sue the Band Council, leaving it to be raised against the new pleading if necessary.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Registrar to refuse his registration as a motor vehicle salesperson.

The Tribunal found that the appellant owed considerable unremitted retail sales tax from a previous dealership and had failed to disclose a pending fraud charge on his application.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal made no legal errors and its findings of fact were not clearly wrong.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant father appealed a motion judge's decision varying child support, arguing the judge erred by refusing to impute income to the respondent mother, refusing to make the support increase and extraordinary expenses retroactive, and denying his claims regarding an educational fund.

The father also sought to introduce new evidence of the mother's income tax return.

The Divisional Court admitted the new evidence but found it would not have changed the motion judge's decision.

The court held that the motion judge made no error in fact or law and applied the correct standard of review, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal that found he had illegally locked out the respondent tenants and failed to accommodate a tenant's disability.

The landlord argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal waived the 10-day notice requirement and refused his request for an adjournment to obtain police records.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment denied the landlord a meaningful opportunity to be heard and constituted a fundamental error in law.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing.

The tenant brought a motion to dismiss the landlord's appeal for delay, arguing the landlord failed to serve and file proof that the transcript of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal proceedings was ordered within the prescribed time.

The landlord had delayed the appeal for nearly two years and only recently ordered the transcript.

The Divisional Court balanced the interests of the parties, noted the substantial change in circumstances including the loss of the residence by fire and change of ownership, and found the landlord responsible for the excessive delay.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant applied for compensation after a child under 12 injured another child with a slingshot.

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dismissed the claim, finding no crime of violence occurred because the child lacked criminal intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 16(2) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act deemed the child to have intent, overriding s. 13 of the Criminal Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 13 creates a blanket prohibition against criminal accountability for children under 12, which s. 16(2) does not displace.

Following a successful appeal that reduced a costs award from $40,000 to $25,000, the appellants sought substantial indemnity costs for the appeal.

They argued this was justified because the respondents' former counsel made an arithmetic error that misled the motion judge and refused to correct it.

The Divisional Court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting the offers to settle did not meet Rule 49 requirements and the amount claimed for costs ($25,820.47) exceeded the amount at stake in the appeal, violating the principle of proportionality.

The court awarded the appellants costs fixed at $10,000 plus disbursements.

The applicant veterinarian sought judicial review to prevent the College of Veterinarians of Ontario from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing regarding his medical records.

The applicant argued that the College's reliance on records he voluntarily provided during a separate investigation constituted an abuse of process, and that the College was estopped because his practice was being monitored at the time without complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the College's decision to proceed was not patently unreasonable and did not violate principles of fundamental justice or constitute an abuse of process.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Service Manager's decision refusing to extend the time to apply for special priority status for rent-geared-to-income housing assistance.

The applicant, a victim of past abuse, missed the deadline due to her immigration status at the time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Service Manager reasonably exercised his discretion by prioritizing applicants who were at risk of further abuse.

The court noted that deference is owed to polycentric decisions involving the allocation of limited public resources.

The appellant municipality appealed a costs order made against it after it sought to enforce a support assignment through the Family Responsibility Office.

The support obligation had previously ceased, but the assignor had falsely certified it was active.

The Divisional Court found that while the lower court had jurisdiction to award costs against the appellant because it became a party by filing a Notice of Financial Interest, the costs order was unjustified on the merits.

The appellant had no reason to doubt the assignment's validity and its failure to attend the motion was not unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and the costs order against the appellant was set aside.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim for unpaid services against Tricaster, the shareholding company of the co-defendant Nucleus, and awarding costs of $15,339.44 to the respondents.

The appellant had obtained default judgment against Nucleus but could not collect because Tricaster seized Nucleus' assets under a General Security Agreement.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was insufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil or find an implied partnership.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the trial costs award to $7,500, finding the original amount disproportionately high given the modest amount at stake and the circumstances.

The appellant appealed a $40,000 substantial indemnity costs award made against it following the dismissal of its summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred by relying on the respondents' counsel's misrepresentation that there was no arithmetical error in the bill of costs, which had inflated the claim by $8,500.

The Court also found errors in awarding costs for appearances where no costs were ordered and for excessive preparation time.

The appeal was allowed and the costs award was reduced to $25,000.