Martin Prost

The defendant brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte by the plaintiff.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, including that the original Agreement of Purchase and Sale had lapsed, that the defendant had not initialed key changes, and that the defendant's lawyer had explicitly denied the existence of a binding agreement.

The court concluded that the material non-disclosure alone warranted discharging the certificate, and further found that the evidence did not establish the plaintiff had an interest in the land.

The motion was granted and the certificate was discharged.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without access under the Child and Family Services Act.

The agency relied on extensive findings from earlier proceedings in which four older siblings had been removed from the parents due to serious protection concerns, including inflicted injuries, failure to thrive, and inability of the father to protect the children.

The parents relied primarily on a psychological assessment suggesting some potential for improvement but did not provide evidence of rehabilitation, counselling, or parenting programs.

The court held that the report did not raise a triable issue capable of rebutting the strong prima facie case arising from the parents’ past conduct.

The child was found to be in need of protection and made a Crown ward without access, as the parents failed to demonstrate that access would be beneficial and meaningful or consistent with the child’s permanency planning.

On an amended temporary care motion in a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought to vary an existing temporary order and place two children in its care pending trial.

The matter involved concerns about unexplained injuries to a child, repeated medical issues affecting the children, domestic violence between caregivers, and unsafe living conditions including drug paraphernalia and unsanitary housing.

The court considered the statutory framework under s. 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act and rejected the necessity of a strict two‑stage “material change in circumstances” analysis, emphasizing the court’s ongoing obligation to assess risk of harm to the children.

The court found that the cumulative events and health concerns established that the children faced risks that could not be adequately addressed by supervision alone.

The temporary order was varied to place the twins in the society’s care, while another child remained in kinship placement with supervised parental access.