Donald Dudar

This decision concerns a judicial interim release hearing for Christopher Manning, 19, who faces charges of assault with a weapon, assault, and obstruct police.

These alleged offences occurred while he was on release for two prior sets of charges, placing the burden on him to show cause for release under s. 515(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The defence proposed release with conditions, arguing that further detention was contrary to the interests of justice given the likelihood of a time-served sentence upon conviction and highlighting the accused's status as a member of a visible minority and potential mental health challenges under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court, while acknowledging the importance of considering systemic factors for vulnerable populations, found the proposed release plan insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk of re-offence, particularly due to a history of non-compliance and a lack of detailed information regarding the accused's background and effective community supports.

Consequently, the accused failed to meet the burden for release and was detained.

The defendant brought an oral motion to bar proceedings initiated by the City of Hamilton, arguing they were outside the limitation period set by s.36(8) of the Building Code Act, 1992.

The alleged offence involved construction without a permit, observed in 2021, with proceedings commenced in early 2023.

The court granted the motion, finding the proceedings were indeed barred by the limitation period, applying the "discovery" rule as interpreted in recent case law, and dismissing the "continuing offence" argument as a distraction.

The accused, Scottie Ryerson, sought release on charges after being arrested for an alleged breach of a prior release order.

The Crown applied under s. 524 of the Criminal Code to vacate his earlier release.

The court considered Ryerson's lengthy criminal record, including multiple breach convictions, and the proposed surety, Mr. Phillips.

The court found that Mr. Phillips was not a suitable surety due to his lack of diligence and cooperation with police, and that Ryerson had not met his burden to demonstrate he could be released.

The court ordered Ryerson's detention on secondary grounds, concluding he was unwilling or unable to abide by bail conditions.

The applicant, Ms. Drmic, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in her provincial offences matter for careless driving.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled trial date exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that delay was attributable to issues with service, lack of judicial resources, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no evidence to support defence-attributable delay or to sufficiently explain how lack of judicial resources or the pandemic specifically caused the delay in this case, emphasizing the Crown's burden to prove reasonable steps were taken to avoid delay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

Scott Watson was convicted of careless driving causing death (s. 130(3) HTA) and careless driving simpliciter (s. 130(1) HTA) after a trial.

The court considered sentencing principles, legislative intent behind the new careless driving provisions, and the proportionality of the sentence.

Despite the defendant's health issues and belated expression of remorse, the court found his driving behaviour severely lacking and imposed a custodial sentence and a lengthy driving suspension, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The defendant, Scott Watson, was found guilty of careless driving causing death and careless driving causing bodily harm under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial, conducted via Zoom, involved a collision where the defendant's motorcycle struck two elderly pedestrians, one fatally, who were jaywalking.

The court found the defendant was speeding, failed to maintain proper situational awareness, and did not react prudently, concluding his actions constituted a lack of reasonable care and attention, despite the unexpected nature of the pedestrians' crossing.

The defendant, Edward Milligan, applied for multiple extensions of time to pay fines for various Highway Traffic Act and Provincial Offences Act convictions, including driving suspended and other licence infractions.

The application was rejected by the Clerk of the Court due to a lack of good faith efforts to pay.

The Justice of the Peace upheld the Clerk's decision, noting the absence of a realistic payment plan and the defendant's history of disregarding driving responsibilities, treating driving as a right rather than a privilege.

The court emphasized the principles of specific and general deterrence.

The defendant, charged with speeding, brought two motions: a recusal motion against the judge and a Charter motion seeking disclosure of the investigating officer's training and qualifications, specific tests performed on the speed measurement device, and police standing orders governing speed enforcement, along with a stay of proceedings.

The recusal motion was dismissed as no reasonable apprehension of bias was established.

The court granted the disclosure aspect of the Charter motion, finding the requested information relevant to assess the reliability of the speed measurement evidence, particularly in light of the principles from York (Regional Municipality) v. McGuigan.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was not fully determined at this stage.

The defendant was charged with driving a motorized personal mobility device (described as a Segway-type device) on a roadway in contravention of City of Hamilton Bylaw 01-215, which prohibits riding on toy vehicles or similar devices on roadways.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that the bylaw does not apply to motorized devices because municipalities lack authority to regulate motor vehicles without express provincial authorization.

The device did not conform to definitions in provincial pilot project regulations for low-speed vehicles or electric kick-scooters, and the bylaw's enumerated devices were all non-motorized, indicating the city's limited jurisdiction over motor vehicles.

The Crown brought a motion to adjourn a trial scheduled for June 27, 2019, in a careless driving charge under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown had previously indicated it would call four witnesses but at trial advised it would only call two witnesses—one police officer and one civilian witness who had not been served with a summons.

The Crown had made limited efforts to contact the civilian witness only within the three weeks prior to trial.

The defence opposed the adjournment, arguing it was ready to proceed and had relied on the Crown's representation regarding the number of witnesses.

The court denied the adjournment motion, finding the Crown had failed to demonstrate reasonable efforts to secure witness attendance and that granting the adjournment would disrespect the resources committed to trial preparation.

The Municipality of Halton Hills and the Province sought orders regarding Charlie, a Rottweiler owned by Robert Berry and Victoria Mary Sciberras.

The dog had bitten another dog (Houston) on June 8, 2016, and a young person (JA) on October 31, 2016, causing serious injury.

The court found that Charlie's behaviour constituted a menace to public safety but declined to order destruction.

Instead, the court ordered the defendants to surrender Charlie to either the Ontario Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals or a suitable rescue shelter, and prohibited the defendants from owning any dog for three years.

The court also addressed Charter delay arguments and found no breach of s.11(b) rights.

The defendant corporation was charged with using a property zoned for residential use as a commercial business in violation of the City of Hamilton Zoning By-law.

The court found that the defendant established a legal non-conforming use defense based on continuous commercial use since the property's original construction in the late 1940s.

The court also found ambiguity in the applicable zoning by-law as of the alleged offense date and determined the defendant acted with due diligence in responding to prior enforcement notices.

The charge was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought an ex parte application for a warrant to apprehend three children under section 40(2) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Society had been involved with the family for over three and a half years.

Following a consent custody order granting joint custody and a voluntary service agreement, concerns arose regarding the father's parenting, including allegations of inappropriate discipline and possible assaultive behaviour toward the children.

The Society sought apprehension to temporarily disrupt the joint custody order and establish sole custody with the mother pending further court proceedings.

The court granted the warrant to apprehend.

The defendant was charged with "Young Driver – Blood Alcohol Above Zero" contrary to section 44.1(5) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant's right to be advised of her right to retain and instruct counsel was infringed under section 10(b).

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

With the breath sample evidence excluded and no other admissible evidence of blood alcohol concentration, the court dismissed the charge, finding the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of the offence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his driver's licence was suspended, operating a motor vehicle without proper number plates, and failing to surrender proof of insurance.

The central issue was the identity of the person who operated the vehicle.

The investigating officer identified the defendant based on a name provided at the scene and CPIC information.

The defence called a corroborating witness who testified that he, not the defendant, was the person encountered by police and that he had falsely identified himself using the defendant's name to avoid charges due to his own suspended licence.

The defendant testified he was not in Norfolk County at the time of the alleged offences.

The court found that the defence evidence, while suspect, raised a reasonable doubt as to the Crown's case, particularly regarding identity.

The charges were dismissed.

An ex parte application by the Children's Aid Society of Brant for a warrant to apprehend two young children under section 40(2) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Society had involvement with the mother for approximately one year due to concerns regarding prenatal care, physical abuse, inadequate housing, and the mother's lack of cooperation with the Society.

The Justice of the Peace denied the warrant, finding that the affidavit failed to address why less restrictive alternatives, particularly placement with the respective grandmothers who had been involved in the children's care, were not available or adequate.

The defendant was convicted in absentia of three counts under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act: failing to comply with prescribed standards of care by not providing adequate food and water to animals, and permitting an animal to be in distress.

The defendant owned two snakes, one of which was found dead and infested with maggots, while the other was alive but lethargic, without food or water.

The defendant admitted to owning the snakes and stated they had stopped feeding and he did not seek veterinary care.

The court imposed fines, a prohibition order on owning snakes, and a restitution order.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

An investigating officer observed the defendant operating a tractor-trailer and believed he saw the defendant holding a cell phone.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer photographed a Motorola device in the cab.

The defendant testified he was holding a water bottle and that the device in question was a scanner used to record delivery details for his employer, not a communication device capable of making phone calls.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was holding a hand-held communications device or another object, and dismissed the charge.

The Crown sought to establish a peace bond under section 810 of the Criminal Code against the defendant following a separation dispute.

The complainant alleged threats and concerning behaviour during property division proceedings.

The defence brought a motion for non-suit or directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case, arguing insufficient evidence of reasonable grounds for fear.

The court found that while the complainant harboured fear at the time the information was sworn, the evidence did not establish reasonable grounds for such fear at the time of hearing, approximately ten months later.

The court granted the defence motion, finding that the passage of time, absence of contact between parties, and lack of acrimony in subsequent interactions undermined the reasonableness of the fear.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving with a suspended license and operating a motor vehicle without insurance.

The Crown sought statutory minimum fines of $2,000 and $5,000 respectively.

The court imposed reduced fines of $1,200 and $750, exercising discretion under s.59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to depart from minimum penalties where exceptional circumstances exist.

The court considered Gladue principles applicable to Aboriginal offenders, the defendant's systemic disadvantages, poverty, and lack of access to court processes, while maintaining that public safety and deterrence remain essential sentencing objectives.