Dickson C.J.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the delegation of federal powers to a provincial minister to set fishing quotas.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court clarified that while provinces cannot regulate commercial fishing through general legislation, they do have jurisdiction to regulate provincially-owned fisheries as an aspect of administering public property, subject to overriding federal legislation.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding the respondent an investment counselling fee following a serious personal injury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant must take the plaintiff as they find them, including their level of intelligence.

A management or investment counselling fee should be awarded if the plaintiff lacks the ability or acumen to manage their affairs or invest funds for future care.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeal's award of $40,000 for investment advice.

The respondents were charged with indictable offences and required to appear for fingerprinting under the Identification of Criminals Act prior to conviction.

They challenged the requirement as a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while mandatory fingerprinting deprives a person of liberty and security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court found that fingerprinting is a minimally intrusive, reliable, and necessary tool for law enforcement that is less serious than the arrest itself.

The appellant mining company sought to claim an investment tax credit for its 1974 taxation year under the Corporations Tax Act, 1972.

Because the credit could only be carried forward if the taxpayer had incurred a 'net loss' in previous years, the appellant attempted to amend its 1971 and 1972 tax returns to create such a loss by claiming capital cost allowance.

The federal authorities accepted the amendments, but the provincial Minister of Revenue refused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant met the qualifying provisions for the tax credit, the Minister was not obliged by statute or regulation to accept the amended returns, despite the federal administrative practice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of her husband, who was driving a car owned by her father.

At the time of the accident, the Married Woman's Property Act barred spouses from suing each other in tort, and the Insurance Act excluded insurer liability for bodily injury to a spouse.

These provisions were repealed by the Family Law Reform Act, 1975 before the action was commenced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repeals affected substantive rights, not merely procedural rules, and therefore did not operate retrospectively.

The appeal by the insurance company was allowed, and the actions against the husband and the insurer were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder.

The trial judge had applied a lesser standard of intent in the jury charge, which was delivered before the principle restricting the requisite mens rea for attempted murder to the intent to kill was enunciated.

The Court of Appeal found the jury had no alternative but to find the requisite intent to kill.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the allocation of losses between beneficiaries after a trustee made unauthorized disbursements from a mingled bank account.

The appellants argued that the 'first-in, first-out' rule in Clayton's Case should apply to determine how the remaining insufficient funds were distributed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the rule should not apply and adopting the reasons of the lower court.

The respondent, a nursing assistant, challenged regulations requiring her to pass a French language test to obtain a professional permit, arguing they were discriminatory and contained an unauthorized subdelegation of power.

The regulations exempted candidates with three years of secondary instruction in French.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the issue was not moot despite legislative amendments, as the government had an interest in the validity of its regulations.

The Court concluded the regulations were not discriminatory under the Charter of human rights and freedoms because they did not impair the right to full equality, and the subdelegation to a testing committee was purely administrative and authorized by statute.

The appellant brought an application to vary the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced on October 9, 1986.

The Court allowed the application and varied the judgment to specify that interest runs until August 9, 1982, in accordance with the pre-trial agreement between the parties.

No costs were awarded on the motion for a re-hearing or on the re-hearing.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision upholding the validity of an insured's assignment of a cause of action against the insurer for failing to properly defend an action.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside his acquittal.

He argued that evidence should be excluded under s. 24 of the Charter because he was not informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel upon his initial detention, breaching s. 10(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that although there was a breach upon initial detention, the evidence was obtained voluntarily after he was informed of his right to counsel.

Therefore, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed a Charter right and should not be excluded.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which allowed an appeal from the appellant's acquittal on charges under the Combines Investigation Act and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of evidence discovered as a result of an unconstitutional search.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer who detected an odour of alcohol and demanded a breath sample for a roadside screening device.

The appellant refused and was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand.

He argued his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a roadside breath demand constitutes a detention under s. 10 of the Charter, triggering the right to counsel.

However, the Court concluded that the limitation on the right to counsel implied by the requirement to provide a sample 'forthwith' is a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter, given the importance of deterring impaired driving.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 234.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the provision was inoperative because it had not been proclaimed in force in all provinces, allegedly violating equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights and s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the non-universal application was justified by a valid federal objective related to provincial law enforcement priorities and resources.

The Court also held that s. 7 of the Charter could not be used to bypass the delayed implementation of equality rights under s. 15.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal from a conviction for attempting to set fire to a dwelling-house.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, finding that the dissent in the Court of Appeal did not raise a question of law.

The respondent son sued his appellant father for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement for the sale of farm land.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the acts of part performance were insufficient to displace the Statute of Frauds and that no oral agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, substituting its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial judge's findings of fact based on credibility unless there is a palpable and overriding error.

As the trial judge made no such error, the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its version of the facts.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Yukon Court of Appeal that allowed a Crown appeal from his acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law in the application of s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on subsequent jurisprudence.

The matter was returned for retrial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences including breaking and entering and using a weapon in a sexual assault.

Following the guilty pleas, the Crown applied to have the appellant declared a dangerous offender under Part XXI of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the dangerous offender provisions violated sections 7, 9, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate the principles of fundamental justice, do not constitute arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment, and that the offender is not entitled to a jury determination of dangerousness.

The Crown appealed a decision holding it liable in nuisance for damage caused to the respondents' orchards by the use of road salt as a de-icing agent on an adjoining highway.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the trial judge's conclusions and reasons, which had been affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents on a solicitor and client basis.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal, set aside their acquittals, and ordered new trials on charges of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision.