Dickson C.J.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat over a bounced cheque.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a first degree murder conviction can be sustained by combining the mens rea of intending to cause bodily harm likely to cause death (s. 212(a)(ii)) with the requirement of planning and deliberation (s. 214(2)).

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the Crown improperly cross-examined a defence alibi witness using intercepted private communications without first proving the interceptions were lawful under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, an off-duty serviceman in civilian dress, was found in possession of cocaine outside the military base.

He was convicted by a military tribunal for possession of a narcotic under the Narcotic Control Act and the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the basis that the military tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Court Martial Appeal Court that there was no error in the result.

The appellant applied for a re-hearing to vary a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the Social Service Tax.

The Court granted the application and varied the judgment to include prejudgment interest at the District Registrar's rate from the date of the several remittances to March 15, 1984, and postjudgment interest for the period following March 15, 1984.

The appellant was awarded costs of the re-hearing.

The employer, Paccar, terminated its collective agreement with the union and, after negotiations reached an impasse, unilaterally imposed new terms and conditions of employment.

The union complained to the Labour Relations Board, which held that the employer had the authority to unilaterally alter terms after expiry, subject to the duty to bargain in good faith.

The British Columbia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal quashed the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the courts must show curial deference to the specialized tribunal's policy choices.

The Court also held that the Board had standing to make submissions defending the reasonableness of its decision.

The Practice Review Board of the Alberta Association of Architects conducted a hearing into the practices of a bankrupt architectural firm.

The Board issued a report with findings of unprofessional conduct, fines, and suspensions, which were later quashed as ultra vires because the Board lacked disciplinary powers.

The Board then sought to continue the original hearing to consider making recommendations.

The appellants sought an order of prohibition, arguing the Board was functus officio.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the Board's initial disposition was a nullity, it had not exhausted its jurisdiction and was not functus officio.

The Board was permitted to continue the proceedings to dispose of the matter in accordance with its statutory mandate.

The appellant, a young offender just under 18 years of age, was charged with first degree murder.

The Crown applied to transfer him to ordinary court under s. 16 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Youth Court judge dismissed the application, finding a heavy onus on the Crown.

The Court of Queen's Bench affirmed, but the Court of Appeal reversed, ordering the transfer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the party seeking transfer bears a burden of persuasion, it is not a 'heavy' onus.

Furthermore, provincial reviewing courts have an independent discretion under s. 16(9) and (10) to evaluate whether a transfer should be made, based on the facts found by the Youth Court judge.

The Court of Appeal properly applied the relevant factors in ordering the transfer.

The respondent claimed under a surety bond but gave notice of the claim 28 days after the expiry of the 120-day period stipulated in the bond.

The chambers judge granted relief from forfeiture under s. 109 of The Saskatchewan Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling that the court had authority to grant relief.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 109 extends to contractual conditions as well as statutory conditions, and that failure to give timely notice constitutes imperfect compliance rather than non-compliance, allowing the court to grant relief from forfeiture.

The applicants brought a motion for a rehearing of their appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's previous decision dismissing their appeal was rendered per incuriam.

They contended that the Court's findings on the state of the law in force at Confederation regarding school curriculum were based on historical facts reached without reference to the historical record.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that disagreement with the Court's findings and an assertion that the decision was unreasonable based on the record are not grounds for a rehearing.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application for certiorari regarding the jurisdiction, independence, and impartiality of a Justice of the Peace.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant did not challenge the constitutionality of the relevant Criminal Code provisions and failed to provide evidence that the Justice of the Peace infringed his rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The appellants' home was damaged by a fire deliberately set by their 15-year-old son.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claim on the basis of an exclusion clause for loss caused by a criminal or wilful act of the 'Insured'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the son fell within the clear and unambiguous definition of 'Insured' in the policy, which included relatives under 21 living in the household.

The Court found that the exclusion clause barred recovery by the innocent parents, as the son's insurable interest was inseparably connected to the family home.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for first degree murder from the Alberta Court of Appeal.

During the course of the trial, the appellant's initial counsel withdrew, and the trial judge denied an adjournment to obtain new counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that under the particular circumstances of the case, the interests of justice would best be served by ordering a new trial.

The appellants, charged with murder in Ontario, sought to waive their right to a jury trial and be tried by a judge alone.

The Criminal Code required a jury trial for murder in all provinces except Alberta.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an accused can waive the benefit of a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter, this does not create a constitutional right to a non-jury trial that overrides the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the geographic distinction allowing non-jury trials only in Alberta did not violate s. 15 of the Charter, as persons accused of murder outside Alberta do not constitute a disadvantaged group subject to discrimination.

The respondent, a tenured professor, entered into an agreement with the appellant University to resolve ongoing disputes.

The agreement stipulated that the respondent would be assigned academic duties for a year, after which his performance would be assessed by two deans.

If his work met the standard of a full professor, the University would waive a requirement for his early retirement.

The deans assessed his work as below standard, and the University notified him of his retirement.

The respondent sued for wrongful dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the University breached the agreement by failing to assign the respondent sufficient duties, particularly teaching duties, to allow for a proper assessment of his performance as a full professor.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for an assessment of damages.

The respondents proposed to establish an interprovincial law firm in Calgary, consisting of members of the Law Society of Alberta, some of whom resided in Calgary and some in Toronto.

In response, the Law Society of Alberta enacted Rule 154, prohibiting resident members from partnering with non-resident members, and Rule 75B, prohibiting members from being partners in more than one firm.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both rules violated the mobility rights guaranteed by s. 6(2)(b) of the Charter, as they severely restricted the ability of non-residents to gain a livelihood in Alberta.

The Court further held that the rules were not saved by s. 6(3)(a) or s. 1 of the Charter, as they discriminated primarily on the basis of residence and were disproportionate to the Law Society's objectives.

The plaintiff Indian Band brought a trespass action in the Federal Court against the defendant Indian Band regarding the use and occupation of a reserve, alleging the Crown breached its fiduciary and statutory duties.

The defendant Band moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction under section 17(3)(c) of the Federal Court Act, as the dispute involves conflicting claims to an obligation owed by the federal Crown, and the claim is based on 'laws of Canada' including the Indian Act and the federal common law of aboriginal title.

The appellant employee was dismissed without just cause after ten years of service.

He complained to the Director of Labour Standards, who ordered reinstatement and lost wages under s. 67A of the Labour Standards Code.

The Labour Standards Tribunal upheld this decision.

The employer successfully appealed to the Appeal Division, which held that the provisions conferring this power on the Tribunal violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court applied the Residential Tenancies test and held that while the Tribunal exercises a judicial function broadly conformable to that of s. 96 courts at Confederation, it does so as a necessarily incidental aspect of the broader policy goal of providing minimum standards of protection for non-unionized employees.

The appeal was allowed and the legislation was upheld as intra vires the province.

The respondent, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, met all requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except Canadian citizenship.

He challenged the citizenship requirement under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the citizenship requirement infringed s. 15(1) because it discriminated against non-citizens, an analogous group, and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court established the foundational approach to s. 15(1), rejecting the 'similarly situated' test in favour of an approach focusing on enumerated and analogous grounds.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of break, enter and theft.

The trial judge found that the respondents were arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9 of the Charter and excluded the resulting evidence (statements, stolen goods, fingerprints) under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that absent an error of law or unreasonable finding, it should not substitute its opinion for that of the courts below on a s. 24(2) application.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the delegation of federal powers to a provincial minister to set fishing quotas.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court clarified that while provinces cannot regulate commercial fishing through general legislation, they do have jurisdiction to regulate provincially-owned fisheries as an aspect of administering public property, subject to overriding federal legislation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He admitted to forcing the complainant to have sexual intercourse but claimed his drunkenness caused the attack.

The trial judge instructed the jury that drunkenness is no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sexual assault causing bodily harm is an offence of general intent.

The Court affirmed the rule in Leary, holding that evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered by the trier of fact to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, and that this rule does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.