David L. Corbett

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal that upheld the cancellation of his income support and assessed an overpayment of $25,712.30 for allegedly failing to declare his income and assets.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal fundamentally misapprehended the evidence, including ignoring documentary proof that the appellant had disclosed his real estate partnership to Ontario Works at the outset.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, cancelled the overpayment for the period prior to the sale of the partnership interest, and remitted the remaining calculations back to the Director.

The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff had sued a nightclub within the limitation period after falling from an elevated dance floor but only later added the landlord after discovering during examinations for discovery that the landlord participated in the design and construction of the stage.

The court considered the discoverability provisions under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and the extent of reasonable pre-discovery investigation required of plaintiff’s counsel in occupiers’ liability claims.

The court held that the plaintiff was not required to seek information from adverse parties before discovery where those parties had no obligation to provide it.

The limitation period began when the plaintiff first learned of the landlord’s involvement during discovery, rendering the action timely.

The Attorney General applied for the civil forfeiture of a leisure-use sailboat under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, after the owner was charged with operating the vessel while impaired.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the general forfeiture provisions of the Act were intended to target organized crime and serious criminal offences, not leisure boating.

The Crown failed to establish that it was likely the sailboat would be used for unlawful activity in the future or that such activity would likely result in serious bodily harm.

The appellant contractor's construction lien expired after it failed to set the action down for trial within two years.

The respondent owner brought a motion without notice under section 46 of the Construction Lien Act, resulting in the dismissal of the entire action, including the appellant's breach of contract claims.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the lien claims were properly dismissed, the contract claims should not have been summarily dismissed without notice.

The court varied the order to allow the breach of contract claims to proceed, noting that the Act does not mandate the dismissal of non-lien claims upon the expiry of a lien.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the respondents' action for delay.

The motion judge had set aside the dismissal because he found the respondents were not given notice of the dismissal proceeding.

On appeal, fresh evidence showed notice was sent but returned because the respondents had moved and failed to update their address with the court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the respondents could not use their failure to update their address as an excuse, and reinstated the Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The applicant sought a declaration that its proposed expansion of insurance business would not contravene s. 2(5) of the Architects Act.

The declaration was intended to address a concern raised by the Financial Services Commission of Ontario regarding the applicant’s plan to expand its insurance offerings beyond architects.

The court held that although it had jurisdiction to interpret the statutory provision, the issue arose within a comprehensive regulatory scheme under the Insurance Act assigning decision‑making authority to the Superintendent of Financial Services.

Applying principles of administrative law and deference to specialized tribunals, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction.

The matter should first be determined through the statutory licensing process before the regulator, subject to subsequent review or appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision dismissing her appeal of a municipal by-law regarding proposed hospital lands.

The OMB found she lacked standing because she did not make oral or written submissions to City Council when the by-law was considered, as required by s. 34(19) 2 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court held that the OMB's interpretation of the standing requirement was reasonable and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident where the moving party owned the vehicle driven by her uninsured daughter.

The moving party sought summary judgment on the basis that she did not consent to her daughter driving the vehicle.

The motions judge dismissed the summary judgment motion, refusing to admit discovery evidence and declining to apply the summary judgment framework.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the motions judge's evidentiary rulings and concluding it was a matter of general importance to consider whether the motions judge's approach was consistent with the principles in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order staying his action for non-payment of previous costs awards.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal, and then delayed three months before bringing this motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding it utterly without merit and noting the moving party's long delays and failure to pay costs.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the responding parties in the amount of $8,000.

The appellant appealed a family arbitration award that terminated a previously established education fund for the parties’ children and ordered the remaining funds returned to the parents.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness, an error in determining that the youngest adult child was not a “child of the marriage” due to disability, and a failure to apply constitutional and human rights norms requiring accommodation of disability.

The court held that the arbitrator applied the correct legal principles and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not proven the adult child met the statutory definition of “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act at the relevant time.

The court also found no procedural unfairness in the arbitrator’s summary process and refused to admit fresh evidence regarding the child’s evolving educational plans.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside two default judgments arising from a breach of contract action involving a technology services agreement.

The court applied the established test for setting aside default judgments, considering delay, explanation for the default, and the existence of a triable defence.

The court held that the motion to set aside the first partial default judgment for the liquidated portion of the claim was brought with undue delay and lacked a reasonable explanation or evidence of a meritorious defence.

However, the court accepted a limited explanation regarding the second judgment for the unliquidated portion of damages and found that issues relating to quantum and equitable remedies warranted adjudication on the merits.

The second judgment was set aside on conditions, including payment of the first judgment and costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent monies due under a defaulted mortgage.

The appellants argued the judgment should not have been granted or should have been stayed because of an ongoing 2011 action alleging misappropriation of funds by a financial advisor who allegedly controlled the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence linking the respondent to the defendants in the 2011 action and no triable issues regarding liability under the mortgage.

The court also denied leave to appeal the motion judge's costs award.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the denial of her application for income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The tribunal had found that her impairments, including social phobia and anxiety, were not substantial and she did not meet the definition of a person with a disability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the tribunal's weighing of the evidence to determine if impairments were substantial did not raise an extricable question of law.

The appellants appealed a Master's order severing their civil claims for historic sexual assault against a family member into separate actions.

The court considered the joinder provisions under Rules 5.01 and 5.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including whether the claims arose from the same series of occurrences and whether common issues of fact justified joinder.

The court held that allegations of sexual assault against siblings occurring in the same location and general time period could constitute a series of occurrences and involve common factual issues.

Concerns about similar fact reasoning and potential tailoring of evidence were found to be matters better managed by the trial judge through evidentiary rulings and case management.

The appeal was allowed and the Master's severance order was set aside without prejudice to a future severance motion before the trial judge.

The parties disagreed on the form of the order reflecting the court's appeal decision regarding class certification.

The appellant argued the class should expressly include recipients of both English and French versions of the documents, while the respondent argued it should be restricted to the English version.

The Divisional Court agreed with the appellant, noting no distinction was made during the appeal, and varied the certification order to include both language versions.

The plaintiff supplier moved for summary judgment to recover a liquidated debt for packaging products delivered under purchase orders totaling over US$280,000.

The defendants asserted a counterclaim alleging the plaintiff bribed a purchasing employee to manipulate purchasing practices, causing losses exceeding $1.7 million.

After previously granting the defendants an opportunity to provide evidence of damages, the court found the defendants had failed to produce expert or analytical evidence establishing material damages.

The court held that the evidence supported only a potential claim for unliquidated punitive damages and did not justify delaying payment of the uncontested debt.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the liquidated claim, the defence of set‑off was dismissed, and the counterclaim was permitted to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action arising from an internet article that repeated and endorsed allegations originally published in a national newspaper accusing the plaintiff of fabricating racist material to support human rights complaints.

The defendant republished the article on a website and added commentary portraying the plaintiff as corrupt and engaged in “phony-racism.” The court found the publication clearly defamatory and rejected the defences of fair comment, qualified privilege, and responsible communication, holding that the article primarily asserted defamatory facts and that internet publication to the world was not an occasion of privilege.

The defendant had relied on a previously retracted newspaper article without conducting further verification.

General damages of $10,000 were awarded, and the defendant’s posted retraction and apology were found inadequate to reduce the damages.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board arbitration award that ordered rectification of a collective agreement's recognition clause.

The Board found that exclusionary language regarding office and technical staff had been inserted by mistake.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for an arbitrator's application of the equitable doctrine of rectification is reasonableness.

The Court upheld the Board's decision to rectify the agreement by removing the mistakenly inserted language.

However, the Court found the Board's subsequent interpretation of the rectified clause and its order for the parties to draft new language to be unreasonable, and set aside that portion of the award.

A common elements condominium corporation sought to recover unpaid common expenses and interest from the unit owners of a related condominium corporation.

The court held that the applicable limitation period for the debt claim was two years under the Limitations Act, and claims arising earlier were statute‑barred.

The court further found that expired condominium lien rights could not be revived by recharacterizing arrears as damages under the Condominium Act.

Because the dispute concerned accounting and reasonableness of common expenses under the declaration and by‑laws, the court held the parties were required to pursue mediation and arbitration before litigation.

Most of the claim was dismissed and the remaining issues were directed to mediation/arbitration.

In ongoing case-managed proceedings involving a proposed vexatious litigant declaration under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, the applicant sought the case management judge’s recusal and challenged portions of affidavit evidence as inadmissible hearsay.

The court held that evidentiary questions regarding the scope of cross-examination and admissibility should be determined by the judge hearing the substantive s. 140 application.

The judge concluded that, as the assigned case management judge overseeing all related proceedings, he had jurisdiction to hear the s. 140 application and that doing so was the most practical and proportionate course.

The court rejected arguments that prior interlocutory rulings created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion for recusal was dismissed.