Dan J. Shields

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, and ethnic origin against multiple former employers.

A summary hearing was held to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant provided only bald allegations of discrimination based on unsupported suspicion and speculation, with no direct or circumstantial evidence linking her terminations or lack of promotion to a protected ground.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The respondent requested that the human rights application be deferred pending the completion of grievance and arbitration proceedings under the collective agreement.

The applicant's bargaining agent sought to intervene and supported the deferral request.

The Tribunal granted the union leave to intervene and deferred the application, noting that the grievance raised the same issues and labour arbitrators have jurisdiction to apply the Human Rights Code.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondent requested that the application be deferred because of ongoing union grievances regarding the same subject matter.

The Tribunal found that the grievances had not been referred to arbitration despite the passage of time and had been held in abeyance.

Consequently, the Tribunal declined to defer the application, finding that proceeding with the application was the most fair, just, and expeditious outcome.

Following a successful appeal by the defendants regarding a representation order, the parties sought a determination on the costs of the original motions before the motion judge, which had been reserved.

The motion judge had originally awarded $9,000 globally to the plaintiff for success on three motions.

The Divisional Court suggested an arbitrary reduction of the costs award to $6,000 to reflect the defendants' success on appeal regarding one of the motions, and referred the matter back to the motion judge if the parties could not agree.

The plaintiff, an elderly man, was severely beaten by individuals on a union picket line.

He sued the defendants in their personal capacity and, after the two-year limitation period expired, sought a Representation Order under Rule 12.07 to bind all union members.

The motions judge granted the order based on the common law 'special circumstances' doctrine.

However, subsequent Court of Appeal decisions eliminated this doctrine.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that a Representation Order effectively adds new parties to the action.

Consequently, the expiration of the limitation period was fatal to the application, and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision awarding a wrongfully dismissed employee damages for the loss of pension benefits that would have accrued during his 22-month notice period.

The employer argued that the terms of the pension plan limited accrual of benefits to periods of active employment and explicitly denied the right to damages for lost benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the employee had a common law right to damages for breach of contract, and the language of the pension plan was not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to limit or take away that right.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award concerning the interpretation of a collective agreement and an employee's status under the Employment Standards Act.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review.

The court found the arbitrator's analysis of the collective agreement and the employee's status to be reasonable and dismissed the application with costs.

The trial judge cited senior detention centre officials for contempt of court due to persistent delays in bringing the accused to trial.

An independent prosecutor was appointed to take carriage of the contempt proceedings, and the trial judge ordered the Crown to remunerate him at his normal private sector rate of $375 per hour, plus $210 per hour for junior counsel.

The Crown appealed the rates.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that an independent prosecutor performing a public service paid from public funds should not expect private sector rates.

The rates were reduced to $250 per hour for lead counsel and $140 per hour for junior counsel.