Christopher A. Richard

This appeal concerned a jury award for damages in a motor vehicle accident case, specifically challenging the trial judge's directions on causation and the admissibility of evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the "but for" test for causation by using "material contribution" language and improperly excluded a Statistics Canada report and curtailed re-examination of an expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury, despite the "material contribution" language, would have properly understood the "but for" test.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the Statistics Canada report due to lack of authentication and reliance by the expert, and found no reversible error in the re-examination ruling.

Furthermore, the court affirmed that hypothetical past income loss is to be proven on a "real and substantial possibility" standard, not on a balance of probabilities.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $150,000 in general damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion arguing the claims were barred by the Insurance Act.

The court applied the three-part threshold analysis and found the plaintiff suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical function due to chronic pain and shoulder instability.

The court held that the plaintiff's inability to continue his pre-accident employment as a meat cutter, despite being accommodated with a different minimum-wage role by the same employer, constituted a substantial interference with his regular employment.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle personal injury action where liability was admitted and damages were awarded, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought over $365,000 in fees and disbursements, including substantial indemnity costs after an offer to settle.

The defendant conceded entitlement to costs but argued the claimed fees and some disbursements were excessive.

Applying the principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the absence of a detailed Bill of Costs and the involvement of multiple law firms made it difficult to assess duplication and reasonableness of services.

The court reduced the requested amounts and fixed total costs, including fees, threshold motion costs, and allowable disbursements, at $157,292.57 inclusive of HST.