Bryan D. Rumble

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence claims against their former lawyer, John Cardill, following a summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had determined that Cardill was retained only to assess the accounts of their previous lawyer, Donald Good, and therefore owed no duty of care regarding a potential negligence action against Good.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by narrowly focusing on the written retainer agreement without examining all surrounding circumstances.

The court held that where a lawyer's duty of care is alleged to extend beyond the retainer, the court must meticulously examine all relevant circumstances, including the nature of instructions and client sophistication.

The appeal was allowed and the action was directed to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a Director's Delegate upholding an arbitration decision that denied him Loss of Earning Capacity Benefits (LECBs) under the 1994 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued the Delegate's interpretation of s. 20.1 was unreasonable and that the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable and that the applicant did not have a vested right to LECBs.

The Court also upheld the Delegate's finding that s. 20.1 did not create a discriminatory distinction based on age.

The appellant settled a tort claim arising from a motor vehicle accident on the advice of her former lawyer.

Years later, after retaining new counsel for her statutory accident benefits claim, she obtained a psychiatric report indicating her injuries met the catastrophic impairment threshold.

Her new counsel advised her to sue her former lawyer for recommending an improvident settlement.

The former lawyer successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discoverable until the appellant received legal advice that the settlement was improvident, as her former lawyer had never advised her of any error.

The appellant, who was four years old at the time of a 1996 motor vehicle accident, appealed an arbitrator's decision that section 20.1 of the SABS-1994 precluded him from claiming Loss of Earning Capacity Benefits (LECBs).

The appellant also challenged the constitutionality of section 20.1 under section 15(1) of the Charter, arguing it discriminated based on age.

The Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that section 20.1 unambiguously barred the claim because the appellant had not commenced a proceeding regarding educational disability benefits before March 1, 2006.

The Delegate also agreed that section 20.1 did not violate the Charter, as it did not create a distinction based on age but rather on the circumstances existing as of February 28, 2006.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their legal malpractice action against the respondent lawyers.

The action alleged the respondents delayed applying for catastrophic impairment benefits and failed to advance Family Law Act claims for the injured party's brothers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to put their best foot forward by providing evidence of damages not compensated by the underlying $1.4 million settlement.

Following the defendants' successful motion for summary judgment which dismissed the action, the parties made submissions on costs.

The parties had previously agreed that the successful party on the motion would receive $10,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court found this agreement did not preclude the defendants from seeking additional costs for the dismissal of the action.

The court awarded the defendants an additional $15,000 in fees plus $3,873.92 in disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment, which had argued that the plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal fees was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court denied leave, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the defendants' undertakings to protect the plaintiff's account likely estopped them from relying on a limitation period defence, and suggested the matter proceed to a summary trial.

The applicant, who was four years old at the time of a 1996 motor vehicle accident, sought Loss of Earning Capacity Benefits (LECBs) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued that section 20.1 of the Schedule, introduced in 2006, barred the claim because the applicant had not met the prerequisite conditions before March 1, 2006.

The applicant argued that section 20.1 was merely procedural or, alternatively, that it violated his section 15 Charter rights by discriminating on the basis of age, as he was too young to have met the prerequisites.

The arbitrator held that section 20.1 substantively eliminated the right to LECBs for those who did not meet the conditions and found no Charter violation, concluding that the provision's effect was based on the circumstances existing as of February 28, 2006, rather than age, and did not perpetuate prejudice or stereotyping.

The plaintiff moved to amend the statement of claim to substitute the correct corporate defendant after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff intended to sue the elevator maintenance company responsible for servicing the elevator at the time of the accident but had mistakenly named a related corporation with a similar name.

Applying the misnomer doctrine and s. 21(2) of the Limitations Act, the court held that the amendment was permissible because the intended defendant knew it was the party meant to be sued and had received prior notice of the claim.

The court rejected arguments that the amendment would cause non‑compensable prejudice, finding that any evidentiary loss occurred within the limitation period and was unrelated to the amendment.

Delay in bringing the motion was also not excessive once counsel discovered the error.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a single-vehicle accident on a county road.

The municipality argued the claim was barred under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act because the plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim within ten days of the accident and that the delay prejudiced its ability to investigate the roadway conditions.

The plaintiffs argued there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to give timely notice due to the driver’s severe injuries and hospitalization, and that discoverability delayed awareness of the material facts underlying the claim.

The court held that the plaintiff’s medical condition constituted a reasonable excuse and that issues relating to discoverability, alleged roadway design deficiencies, and potential prejudice to the municipality raised genuine issues requiring trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant municipality following a motor vehicle accident.

After the action was set down for trial, the defendant sought leave under Rule 48.04 to bring a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs' failure to provide notice within 10 days as required by the Municipal Act.

The court found no substantial and unexpected change in circumstances, but granted leave on the basis that the summary judgment motion had merit and proceeding with it would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The municipal defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident, and the defendants argued the claim was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after the accident.

The motion judge found a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff, who was severely injured and confused about the accident location, could have discovered the identity of the responsible municipalities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's fact-specific application of the discoverability rule under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs appealed a Divisional Court decision that restored a master's order requiring them to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the standard of review on an appeal from a master is the same as from a judge, as set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen.

The court found no basis to interfere with the master's analysis of the evidence or application of principles regarding security for costs.

The defendant/appellant, The Economical Insurance Group, sought costs totalling $38,285.86 following its successful appeal regarding a motion for security for costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be in the cause or not payable forthwith.

The Divisional Court found the requested amount excessive and awarded the defendant $5,000 plus disbursements for the motion to the master and the appeal to the motions judge, payable in 60 days.

The court also awarded $5,000 inclusive of disbursements for the motion for leave and the appeal to the Divisional Court, payable in any event of the cause, recognizing the state of the relevant jurisprudence.

The defendant appealed a decision of a motions judge that set aside a case management master's order requiring the non-resident plaintiffs to post security for costs.

The Divisional Court resolved conflicting jurisprudence regarding the standard of review for appeals from a master, holding that the standard is the same as for appeals from a judge: correctness for errors of law, and palpable and overriding error for findings of fact.

The court found that the motions judge erred by treating the appeal as a hearing de novo and substituting his own view of the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' impecuniosity.

The master's finding that impecuniosity had not been established was entitled to deference, and her order for security for costs was restored.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim regarding an alleged misrepresentation by the respondent's employees.

The trial judge found that there was no real intention on the part of the prospective purchasers and the appellants to enter into an agreement to purchase the properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, noting it was consistent with the parties' conduct and not unreasonable.

The Court also rejected the argument that missing portions of the trial transcript prejudiced the appellants' ability to challenge the factual finding, as the missing evidence did not relate to the issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident and subsequently applied for arbitration.

After failing to attend a pre-hearing and failing to respond to his representative or the Commission, the representative was granted leave to withdraw.

The insurer moved to dismiss the arbitration.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had abandoned the proceeding without notifying the insurer or the Commission, causing unnecessary expense.

The arbitration was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious pursuant to Rule 68.1 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

At a pre-hearing discussion, the applicant's representative sought to be removed from the record due to a breakdown in the relationship, as the applicant failed to respond to numerous attempts at contact.

The arbitrator granted the representative's motion to withdraw without conditions.

Additionally, as the applicant appeared to have abandoned the arbitration, the arbitrator gave notice of the intention to dismiss the arbitration without a hearing on the grounds that the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, or commenced in bad faith.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding an exclusive supply agreement and awarding damages for its breach.

They argued that the trial judge erred in finding an exclusive supply agreement after concluding there was no consulting agreement, that the pleadings were deficient, and that the arrangement was merely an 'agreement to agree' due to missing terms like price.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreements were not so interrelated as to preclude finding a supply agreement, the pleadings were sufficient, and there was an implied term that raw materials would be provided at a reasonable price.

The court also upheld the trial judge's quantification of damages based on a 12-month period and a 15% profit margin.