Bryan D. Rumble

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment, which had argued that the plaintiff's claim for unpaid legal fees was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court denied leave, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the defendants' undertakings to protect the plaintiff's account likely estopped them from relying on a limitation period defence, and suggested the matter proceed to a summary trial.

The plaintiff moved to amend the statement of claim to substitute the correct corporate defendant after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff intended to sue the elevator maintenance company responsible for servicing the elevator at the time of the accident but had mistakenly named a related corporation with a similar name.

Applying the misnomer doctrine and s. 21(2) of the Limitations Act, the court held that the amendment was permissible because the intended defendant knew it was the party meant to be sued and had received prior notice of the claim.

The court rejected arguments that the amendment would cause non‑compensable prejudice, finding that any evidentiary loss occurred within the limitation period and was unrelated to the amendment.

Delay in bringing the motion was also not excessive once counsel discovered the error.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a single-vehicle accident on a county road.

The municipality argued the claim was barred under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act because the plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim within ten days of the accident and that the delay prejudiced its ability to investigate the roadway conditions.

The plaintiffs argued there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to give timely notice due to the driver’s severe injuries and hospitalization, and that discoverability delayed awareness of the material facts underlying the claim.

The court held that the plaintiff’s medical condition constituted a reasonable excuse and that issues relating to discoverability, alleged roadway design deficiencies, and potential prejudice to the municipality raised genuine issues requiring trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant municipality following a motor vehicle accident.

After the action was set down for trial, the defendant sought leave under Rule 48.04 to bring a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs' failure to provide notice within 10 days as required by the Municipal Act.

The court found no substantial and unexpected change in circumstances, but granted leave on the basis that the summary judgment motion had merit and proceeding with it would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The municipal defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident, and the defendants argued the claim was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after the accident.

The motion judge found a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff, who was severely injured and confused about the accident location, could have discovered the identity of the responsible municipalities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's fact-specific application of the discoverability rule under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs appealed a Divisional Court decision that restored a master's order requiring them to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the standard of review on an appeal from a master is the same as from a judge, as set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen.

The court found no basis to interfere with the master's analysis of the evidence or application of principles regarding security for costs.

The defendant/appellant, The Economical Insurance Group, sought costs totalling $38,285.86 following its successful appeal regarding a motion for security for costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be in the cause or not payable forthwith.

The Divisional Court found the requested amount excessive and awarded the defendant $5,000 plus disbursements for the motion to the master and the appeal to the motions judge, payable in 60 days.

The court also awarded $5,000 inclusive of disbursements for the motion for leave and the appeal to the Divisional Court, payable in any event of the cause, recognizing the state of the relevant jurisprudence.

The defendant appealed a decision of a motions judge that set aside a case management master's order requiring the non-resident plaintiffs to post security for costs.

The Divisional Court resolved conflicting jurisprudence regarding the standard of review for appeals from a master, holding that the standard is the same as for appeals from a judge: correctness for errors of law, and palpable and overriding error for findings of fact.

The court found that the motions judge erred by treating the appeal as a hearing de novo and substituting his own view of the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' impecuniosity.

The master's finding that impecuniosity had not been established was entitled to deference, and her order for security for costs was restored.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim regarding an alleged misrepresentation by the respondent's employees.

The trial judge found that there was no real intention on the part of the prospective purchasers and the appellants to enter into an agreement to purchase the properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, noting it was consistent with the parties' conduct and not unreasonable.

The Court also rejected the argument that missing portions of the trial transcript prejudiced the appellants' ability to challenge the factual finding, as the missing evidence did not relate to the issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding an exclusive supply agreement and awarding damages for its breach.

They argued that the trial judge erred in finding an exclusive supply agreement after concluding there was no consulting agreement, that the pleadings were deficient, and that the arrangement was merely an 'agreement to agree' due to missing terms like price.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreements were not so interrelated as to preclude finding a supply agreement, the pleadings were sufficient, and there was an implied term that raw materials would be provided at a reasonable price.

The court also upheld the trial judge's quantification of damages based on a 12-month period and a 15% profit margin.