Brian John Eric Brock

An employee of the appellant's subsidiary was injured at work and settled a claim for $1,350,000.

The appellant sued its excess insurer for the $350,000 amount above its primary coverage.

The appellant argued the umbrella policy provided 'claims made' coverage, while the insurer argued an endorsement limited it to an 'occurrence' basis.

The trial judge found the endorsement superseded the general policy provisions and required an occurrence during the policy period.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, finding the endorsement operated as a coverage trigger rather than an exclusion, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, an orthopaedic surgeon, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for medical malpractice based on a lack of informed consent.

The respondent suffered permanent sciatic nerve damage (foot drop) following a Ganz pelvic osteotomy, eventually requiring a below-the-knee amputation.

The trial judge found the surgery was performed competently but the appellant failed to adequately disclose the risk of permanent nerve damage, and that a reasonable person in the respondent's position would have refused the surgery if properly informed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the modified objective test for causation or her factual findings regarding the disclosure of risks.

The appellants brought an action under the Occupier's Liability Act against the owners of a strip mall and a nightclub after a random shooting outside the club resulted in two deaths and one injury.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no liability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the respondents owed a duty of care to patrons in the parking lot, the trial judge did not err in finding that the standard of care did not require hiring security guards to patrol outside at closing time.

Furthermore, the Court found that causation was not established, as the shooting was unprovoked and indiscriminate, and the presence of security guards would not have prevented it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer issued a comprehensive general liability policy to the respondent insured.

The insured was sued for wrongful dismissal, including allegations of intentional racial and age discrimination.

The insurer sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend the discrimination claims.

The application judge ruled the insurer was required to provide a defence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the fortuity principle of insurance law dictates that liability policies only cover accidental or fortuitous losses.

Because the underlying claims alleged intentional discrimination, they fell outside the scope of the policy, and the insurer had no duty to defend.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a case management master's order that denied full documentary production prior to a motion to stay the action for arbitration.

The Divisional Court clarified the standard of review for orders of case management masters, holding that discretionary decisions and interlocutory matters of law not vital to the disposition of the lawsuit are subject to a standard of deference and should not be interfered with unless clearly wrong.

Finding that the master's decision on documentary production was not vital to the disposition of the lawsuit, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action against the respondent family physician.

The appellants alleged the respondent over-prescribed narcotics, causing the appellant husband's addiction.

The motions judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the one-year limitation period in the Regulated Health Professions Act, finding the appellants knew the material facts when they complained to the College of Physicians and Surgeons over two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the discoverability rule did not postpone the limitation period as the appellants were aware of the material facts and did not require an independent medical opinion to commence the action.

The plaintiff's husband died after receiving emergency medical care from provincial attendants.

The plaintiff sent a letter to the Ministry of Health expressing concerns about the care, which prompted an investigation.

The Province later moved to dismiss the plaintiff's subsequent wrongful death action, arguing the letter did not constitute formal notice of a claim under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the letter provided sufficient particulars to identify the occasion and allow the Crown to investigate, thereby satisfying the statutory notice requirement.

The appellant, a Minnesota resident injured in an Ontario motor vehicle accident, sued her Minnesota insurer in Ontario for statutory accident benefits.

The appeal turned on the effect of a power of attorney and undertaking signed under the reciprocal interjurisdictional automobile insurance scheme.

The Court of Appeal held that the undertaking required the insurer to accept service and appear in Ontario, and that the motions judge erred by failing to give effect to that agreement when granting a stay on forum non conveniens grounds.

Because a stay could deprive the appellant of the juridical advantage of Ontario statutory accident benefits, the stay was set aside and the appeal allowed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their contractual claim under the S.E.F. 44 Family Protection Endorsement after they had agreed to limit recovery against the tortfeasor to the tortfeasor's policy limits.

The Court of Appeal held that, in a direct action against the insurer, the phrase 'legally entitled to recover' requires proof only that the inadequately insured motorist was at fault and that damages exceed the available limits.

The continued enforceability of the claim against the tortfeasor was held to be a non-issue, consistent with prior authority recognizing a direct contractual cause of action against the insurer.

The appeal was allowed, the Rule 21 answer was changed to 'No', and costs of the motion and appeal were awarded to the appellants.