Breanna Needham

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction (asset freezing order) against several defendants, alleging a complex commercial fraud involving misappropriated funds, illicit acquisition fees, and kickbacks across multiple real estate development projects.

While the court found a strong prima facie case of fraud against the defendant Lee regarding his receipt of concealed acquisition fees, it found no such case against the other responding defendants.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the motion against all defendants because the plaintiffs failed to establish a real risk of asset dissipation, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the extraordinary remedy.

Judgment creditors of a bankrupt company obtained an assignment of the company's claim against its former director for breach of fiduciary duties and failure to supervise.

The creditors commenced an action against the director more than two years after the company's liability was established by judgment.

The central issue was whether the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that while the creditors lacked capacity to sue in the company's name until after bankruptcy, the company itself had discovered the claim when its shareholders received the trial judgment establishing the director's wrongdoing.

The limitation period ran from that earlier date, making the action time-barred.

The plaintiff consultant brought a motion to enforce a contractual indemnification provision for the advance payment of legal fees by the defendant companies.

The motion was brought before the close of pleadings.

The court found that the corporate indemnity provisions of the CBCA and OBCA did not apply because the consultant was a corporation, not an individual officer or director.

However, the court dismissed the motion, concluding that the relief sought effectively amounted to a partial summary judgment or a mandatory injunction, and the plaintiff had not complied with the requirements for either.

The trustee in bankruptcy brought a motion for a declaration that the bankrupt's interest in two properties, held in joint tenancy with his wife, were assets of the estate.

The bankrupt and his wife claimed the properties were held in trust for their children, relying on trust documents allegedly created in 1995 and 2004.

The trustee introduced uncontradicted expert evidence proving the fonts used in the documents did not exist on the dates they were allegedly signed.

The court found the trust documents were backdated and the trusts were shams, or alternatively fraudulent conveyances, designed to defeat creditors.

The declarations sought by the trustee were granted.

The defendants, BNT Canada, L.P., BNT Canada GP, Inc., and Bechtel Power Corporation (collectively "Bechtel"), brought a motion to transfer the action from Walkerton (Central West Region) to the Toronto Region under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs, Bruce Power L.P. and Bruce Power Inc. (collectively "Bruce Power"), opposed the motion.

The court applied a holistic approach to the factors enumerated in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b), finding that the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and the court, along with advantages for securing a just, expeditious, and least expensive determination, and the availability of judges and court facilities, favored Toronto.

The court concluded that Bechtel had met the onus of demonstrating that Toronto was "significantly better" and that the transfer was in the interest of justice.

The motion to transfer the action to Toronto was granted.

In a proposed pharmaceutical products liability class proceeding, the defendants moved for summary judgment before certification.

The plaintiffs alleged that a testosterone gel caused serious cardiovascular events, was improperly marketed for age-related low testosterone, and generated claims in negligence, failure to warn, unjust enrichment, waiver of tort, and pure economic loss.

The court held that although the evidence established an association and biological plausibility, it did not establish general causation on a balance of probabilities.

The court further held that an association may trigger a duty to warn, but any failure-to-warn claim still failed because causation was not proven.

The claims for unjust enrichment, waiver of tort, and pure economic loss also failed factually and legally, and the action was dismissed.