Audrey P. Ramsay

The plaintiff former employer brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant former employee from working for a competitor and from using confidential information.

The defendant had previously downloaded files before resigning but had returned them pursuant to an earlier interim order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the defendant had conveyed confidential information to his new employer or that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm.

The court also noted the new employer was not a direct competitor in the same market.

The plaintiff commenced an action for constructive dismissal against her former employer.

The defendants moved to stay the action under Rule 21.01(3) and s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, relying on an arbitration clause in the plaintiff's employment agreement.

The plaintiff argued the arbitration clause was invalid, unconscionable, and contracted out of minimum employment standards.

Applying the competence-competence principle, the court held that the arbitral tribunal must first determine the validity of the arbitration clause.

The action was stayed pending the arbitrator's determination of the jurisdictional challenge.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to strike the defendants’ civil jury notice in a motor vehicle personal injury action, arguing that pandemic-related suspension of jury trials created unacceptable delay and prejudice.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed the request to strike the jury notice, holding that the moving party had not met the substantial onus of showing that justice would be better served by a judge-alone trial.

The court found the evidentiary record deficient on both sides, noted that civil jury trials in Toronto had an anticipated resumption date rather than an indefinite suspension, and accepted that a wait-and-see approach was appropriate in the circumstances.

The dismissal was without prejudice to a future renewed motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause significant delay if the matter proceeded before a jury.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide cogent evidence of prejudice or that the delay in the Toronto Region would be significant once the suspension of civil jury trials was lifted.

The court held that justice to the parties would not be better served by striking the jury notice.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to consent to a Community Treatment Plan and upholding the issuance of a Community Treatment Order.

The court first determined that although the CTO had expired, the appeal was only partially moot and should be heard on the merits.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found no error in the Board's dismissal of preliminary motions regarding the procedural requirements of the CTO.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment, as she was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 61-year-old tenant, tripped and fell on a wooden post protruding from the ground in a poorly lit grassy area at the back of her apartment building.

She sustained a severe fracture to her right arm requiring two surgeries and resulting in permanent impairment.

The court found the defendant landlord liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for failing to maintain the premises and ensure reasonable safety.

The plaintiff was awarded $236,626.36 in total damages, including $150,000 for general damages, despite her pre-existing medical conditions.