Family and Matrimonial Law

The appellant mother appealed orders from a motion to change, challenging findings on material change in parenting time, child and spousal support variations due to income changes, and credit for matrimonial home expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings, emphasizing deference to factual conclusions and proper application of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

This seven-day trial addressed spousal support, including entitlement, quantum, retroactivity, lump sum, and duration, following a 24-year marriage.

The court found the applicant entitled to compensatory support due to career sacrifices and her primary caregiver role.

It determined the income for both parties, awarded retroactive support from June 1, 2020, and ongoing monthly support of $1,900.

However, the request for a lump sum future support award was denied due to the unpredictable future means and needs of the parties.

Indefinite support was deemed appropriate given the long duration of the marriage.

The respondent brought a motion to change his spousal support obligation due to job loss and financial difficulties.

The applicant brought a cross-motion seeking to stay the respondent's motion until he complied with a prior final order regarding spousal support arrears and joint lines of credit.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to stay, finding the respondent's non-compliance was not deliberate or wilful, and directed the respondent's motion to change to proceed to trial, as oral evidence was necessary to determine if a material change in circumstances warranted variation.

The mother brought an urgent motion seeking in-person access to her infant son, who was placed in the care of the maternal grandparents following serious non-accidental injuries sustained while in parental care.

The child was hospitalized with traumatic brain injuries, including subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and bruising.

The society opposed the motion, seeking to maintain virtual-only access due to COVID-19 pandemic concerns, particularly given the child's medical vulnerability.

The court dismissed the mother's motion and upheld the suspension of in-person access, finding that the child's fragile medical condition and the evolving pandemic risks outweighed the benefits of face-to-face contact at that time.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action against his daughters and their company.

The appellant sought to challenge the validity of a family trust established in connection with an estate freeze in 2007.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis of res judicata, collateral attack, and abuse of process, finding that the appellant could have raised the validity issue in the daughters' prior oppression application but failed to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the doctrine of abuse of process alone warranted striking the claim, as allowing the action to proceed would constitute an attempt to relitigate a matter already decided.

This is a Hague Convention Application brought by the father seeking the return of three children to the United Kingdom.

The children were removed from the UK on August 25, 2018, by their mother without the father's knowledge or consent.

The application was commenced within one year of removal.

The court found that while the children's habitual residence was in the UK and the father held parental responsibility under UK law, he had not actively exercised custody rights at the time of removal.

The father was characterized as an access parent who maintained contact through visits and financial support but did not exercise day-to-day parental responsibility.

The mother was the primary caregiver and exercised custodial rights.

The application was dismissed as the father failed to meet the threshold requirement under Article 3(b) of the Hague Convention that custody rights be "actually exercised" at the time of removal.

A father appealed an order denying him leave to bring a motion to change a custody and access order.

The lower court had imposed a leave requirement after the father defaulted on procedural requirements.

The Court of Appeal found that the case management judge erred in denying leave after the father cured his default, particularly where the temporary order had effectively become final without a determination on the merits.

The court noted that custody and access orders require participation of both parties and consideration of the child's best interests.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was returned for a motion to change before a different judge.

The father brought a motion seeking a temporary order to stay the mother's application to change their son's name from William Jr. Ndze Fuhgeh to William Benjamin Ndze Fuhgeh Bernard.

The father's main application sought to prohibit the mother from changing the child's name without his consent.

The court granted the temporary stay, finding it was not in the child's best interests for the name change application to proceed immediately, as ongoing case-managed matters and the father's main application might clarify relevant issues.

Costs were reserved to the judge overseeing the father's main application.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding.

The father sought costs against both the Children's Aid Society of Toronto and the mother following a protection application.

The father claimed the society failed to involve him for over one year despite having joint custody of two of the children and despite multiple concerning incidents that should have prompted contact.

The court found the society's conduct in failing to notify the father was patently unfair and indefensible, constituting misconduct on substantive issues rather than mere procedural irregularity.

However, the court found that earlier involvement of the father would not necessarily have changed the society's recommendations or outcome.

The court awarded costs against the society as a matter of accountability and to discourage similar conduct, but declined to award costs against the mother due to her serious mental health issues.

The society was ordered to pay $10,000 in costs to the father.

The appellant and respondent appealed from a trial judge's order dealing with child support and spousal support.

The appellant sought to characterize a $75,000 advance as a payment on account of spousal support, while the respondent contended that the trial judge erred in calculating the length of cohabitation as 13 years instead of 16.5 years, which affected the duration of spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding the $75,000 payment and allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the period of cohabitation should be 16 years and 5 months, resulting in an increased duration of spousal support from 11 years to 14 years from the date of separation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of a settlement reached on behalf of two infant plaintiffs, who were claimants under the Family Law Act following their father's car accident.

The court identified several deficiencies in the evidence, including the lack of a breakdown between damages and pre-judgment interest, unclear plans for the settlement funds, conflicting information regarding the family's living situation, and an apparent undervaluation of the infant plaintiffs' claims for loss of care, guidance, and companionship.

The court also noted the absence of recommended neuropsychological and in-home assessment reports.

Consequently, the court was unable to approve the settlement and ordered counsel to appear in court for further directions.

This decision addresses a motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The case involves a non-Indian child (C.C.2) whose mother is a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which contains complex geographical and personal jurisdictional criteria, including conditions restricting certain services pending consultation with other communities.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS has jurisdiction to provide services on First Nation reserves under paragraph 1 of its designation, as the bulk of child protection services were being provided on a reserve.

The transfer was granted, though the court expressed concerns about the superficial evidence presented and the lack of information from respondents.

The appellant father appealed from a motion judge's order arising from a motion to change custody and access arrangements for two children.

The motion was limited by consent order to three specific recommendations from the Office of the Children's Lawyer report.

The motion judge adopted the recommendations providing sole custody to the mother with consultation requirements, maintained the existing access schedule, and modified the geographic restriction to allow the mother to live within 30 km of the father rather than being confined to Kitchener-Waterloo.

The father sought to characterize his access time as "care and control" and sought additional decision-making authority over school and medical decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reviewable error and dismissing the appeal on both merits and costs.

Robert Must, a party previously declared mentally incapable and represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), sought leave to bring a motion in a family law proceeding.

The PGT opposed, citing a prior order that required court leave for Mr. Must to bring motions and arguing the current motion was not in his interest.

The court, respecting previous findings of incapacity and noting Mr. Must's continued "bizarre" and "incomprehensible" conduct, dismissed the motion for leave, affirming that only the PGT could bring motions on his behalf.

This decision addresses costs following a trial where the applicant was largely successful on the issue of retroactive child support but unsuccessful on a restraining order claim.

The applicant, self-represented, sought significant costs including an hourly rate for his own time and legal advice fees.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success and financial hardship.

The court found the applicant largely successful, noted the respondent's unreasonable conduct throughout the litigation, and disallowed the claim for the applicant's own time without evidence of lost income.

Considering the respondent's limited ability to pay, the court awarded the applicant $8,500 in costs.

The respondent brought a motion to continue supervised access to his two children following an order that had set a termination date of February 16, 2014.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought termination of access.

The court reviewed the history of the case, which involved multiple gaps in access spanning nearly five years, the respondent's criminal record including domestic violence convictions and breaches of court orders, his lack of insight into his behavior, and his abandonment of access from May to November 2013.

The court found that while access is generally presumed to be in the best interests of children, the cumulative harm caused by the respondent's pattern of rejection and inconsistency outweighed the benefits of contact.

The motion was dismissed and supervised access was terminated.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking an order requiring the respondent father to undergo a psychosexual assessment, including phallometric testing, based on allegations of sexual abuse of two girls from a prior relationship made over a decade after the alleged incidents.

The father opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the statutory and regulatory prerequisites for ordering such an assessment had not been satisfied, that the motion was premature, and that the proposed assessment lacked sufficient evidentiary foundation and utility in a forensic context.

A costs decision arising from a motion to change a separation agreement regarding child support and shared nanny expenses.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest.

The motion was ultimately withdrawn after court attendances and preparation of materials.

The court awarded costs to the applicant for the wasted attendance at a case conference and the motion hearing, finding that the respondent's counsel unreasonably delayed raising procedural issues and failed to follow proper procedures to minimize costs and delay.