Family and Matrimonial Law

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default order that required the sale of the matrimonial home and a $400,000 equalization payment to the respondent.

The appellant argued the default order was temporary, not final, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order was in substance a final determination of equalization entitlement and that the appellant's failure to provide timely instructions undermined his ineffective assistance claim.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family properties, specifically challenging the valuation of foreign lands in Iran and the calculation of the respondent's net family property.

Prior to the hearing, the appellant brought motions to preclude the respondent from making submissions due to an alleged breach of costs orders and to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motions, finding no breach of the costs orders and that the fresh evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The substantive appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in valuation and was entitled to draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to provide a property valuation.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision upholding the validity of a marriage contract, arguing it should be set aside due to lack of financial disclosure and unconscionability.

The trial judge had set aside only the spousal support waiver and ordered a further hearing on support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding trial costs was also dismissed.

The appellants, the biological parents of a child, appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld a trial judge's order making the child a Crown ward with no access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, bias, or palpable and overriding error in the lower courts' decisions.

The Court emphasized the child's need for permanency and stability after being in the care of the respondent for over five years, concluding that the child should be placed for adoption without further delay.

The appellant appealed an order retroactively reducing the respondent's child and spousal support obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the respondent's job loss and subsequent re-employment at a lower salary constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred by retroactively varying support without conducting the proper legal analysis under the D.B.S. framework.

The matter was remitted to the motion judge to determine whether retroactive change is warranted, the date of retroactivity, and the quantum of support.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to stay an order requiring a mother to return her two children to Germany pursuant to the Hague Convention, pending an anticipated application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The father opposed the stay and challenged the OCL's standing.

The court assumed standing but dismissed the stay motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm to the children, and that the balance of convenience favoured their prompt return to Germany to have custody determined in their habitual residence.

The appellant appealed a final family law order regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, child and spousal support, and section 7 expenses.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, exhibiting bias, and making unconscionable substantive findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal of an adjournment or in her substantive findings, and rejecting the allegations of bias.

A minor transposition error regarding the proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses was corrected.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support, spousal support, and custody arrangements.

The father had declared bankruptcy after failing to pay an equalization payment and costs to the respondent mother.

The motion judge had ordered the father to pay lump sum spousal support equal to the unpaid equalization payment and imposed a charging order on his assets.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the lump sum spousal support and charging order because the motion judge failed to properly consider the implications of the father's bankruptcy and the principles governing lump sum support.

The Court also ordered the mother to pay prospective child support for the daughter residing with the father.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her appeal from a trial judgment that made her child a Crown ward without access.

She argued the Children's Aid Society breached its statutory duty to provide services and that the trial judge erred by not extending the period of CAS wardship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the CAS made numerous attempts to assist the mother, which were frustrated by her own conduct, and that an extension of wardship was not justified given the child's best interests.

The appellant estate appealed a decision finding that the joint tenancy of a matrimonial home had not been severed before the deceased's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that, despite the deteriorating relationship between the parties, there was no mutual intention to treat their interests as a tenancy in common.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed, as it did not materially change the evidence regarding mutual intention.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for the return of a 50% interest in a property transferred to the respondent upon her marriage.

The appellants argued the transfer was a conditional dowry (mahr) under Iranian tradition, requiring return upon marriage breakdown, and was obtained through undue influence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the transfer was an irrevocable, unconditional gift, noting the Deed of Gift contained no conditions and the Statute of Frauds barred reliance on an alleged oral promise to reconvey the property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of Crown wardship and, in the alternative, sought an order for access to the child.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the appeal against the Crown wardship order, limiting the appeal to the issue of access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the Crown wardship order as abandoned so that the child could be immediately placed for adoption.

The Court reserved its decision on the issue of access.

The appellant mother removed her two children from Egypt to Ontario and sought custody under the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA).

The trial judge declined jurisdiction, finding the mother had attorned to the Egyptian courts and should not be rewarded for abducting the children.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the children's psychological distress and allowed the appeal.

The Court held the trial judge erred in his approach to jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the CLRA, noting that the best interests of the children must prevail over discouraging abduction when there is a risk of serious harm.

The Ontario court assumed jurisdiction and granted interim custody to the mother.

The moving party, a self-represented father, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a motion judge's order that refused to rescind his accumulated child support arrears.

The father had initially appealed to the Divisional Court, which quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the father failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, that the proposed appeal lacked merit as there was no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's finding of deliberate underemployment, and that granting the extension would cause undue prejudice to the responding mother, particularly given the father's history of unpaid costs awards.

On an interim mobility motion, the moving party sought permission to relocate with three children to Perth to live with her mother.

The court held that where custody and access remained genuinely in issue for trial, it should be reluctant to disrupt the existing parallel-parenting status quo.

Applying the best-interests framework from Gordon v. Goertz, the court found the proposed move would significantly disrupt the children's schooling, daycare, friendships, and community stability at a time of parental breakup.

The motion was denied, and no costs were ordered.

On an urgent family motion, the court held that the matter could proceed before a case conference under rule 14(4.2) because the respondent alleged she had fled an abusive relationship and there was sufficient corroboration of ongoing safety concerns.

Applying the best interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court granted the respondent temporary care and control of the parties' one-year-old child.

The court also permitted the respondent to relocate temporarily to Sioux Lookout, emphasizing her role as primary caregiver, the child's ongoing breastfeeding, objective medical evidence, and the need for family and therapeutic supports.

Facilitated access was ordered for the applicant on specified dates pending the case conference.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings on certain issues for non-compliance with various disclosure orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, noting ample evidence that the appellant remained in default and that the default was wilful.

The motion judge had mitigated the drastic remedy by allowing the appellant to move to reinstate his pleadings on proper evidence, which he failed to pursue in a timely fashion.

The appeal was dismissed.

On a family law motion, the applicant sought distribution of sale proceeds from jointly owned property, an order striking the respondent's pleadings for repeated non-compliance with disclosure and payment orders, and costs for two prior 14(b) motions.

The court found extensive non-compliance with disclosure obligations and prior payment orders, and directed that sale proceeds be distributed to satisfy support-related costs, prior order obligations, reimbursement for a credit card payment, and the outstanding Visa balance.

Applying the Rule 1(8) framework and the appellate caution that pleadings should be struck only in exceptional circumstances, the court declined at this time to strike the respondent's pleadings because other remedies were available and merits adjudication remained preferable.

The applicant was awarded $6,000 in costs for the two 14(b) motions.

The applicant sought a refraining order preventing the Family Responsibility Office from suspending his driver's licence and initiating a federal passport denial application in relation to alleged spousal support arrears.

The motion arose in unusual circumstances because the applicant asserted that signed Minutes of Settlement finally resolved support and extinguished arrears, and alternatively sought retroactive variation based on a substantial post-order income decline and credit for prior undisclosed payments.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to grant relief in relation to both the provincial licence suspension regime and the federal passport denial regime, rejecting the position that the federal statute barred such an order.

On the evidence, the applicant established a prima facie case, demonstrated that loss of his licence and passport would impair his ability to earn income and care for the children residing with him, and obtained the refraining order subject to continued support payments under the Minutes of Settlement.

In this family law costs decision following a custody and child support trial, the successful responding party sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle.

The court held that the offer did not satisfy Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules because the trial result was not as favourable as or more favourable than the offer.

However, the responding party was entitled to partial indemnity costs because she succeeded on the major issues, including residence of the children and guideline child support.

The court fixed fair and reasonable costs after considering the reasonableness of counsel's rate and time, the importance of the issues, and the unsuccessful party's ability to pay.