3 total
Human rights application dismissed for delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.
The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and family status against multiple police services, a children's aid society, and the Family Responsibility Office.
At a preliminary hearing, the Tribunal found that the three timely allegations—concerning police responses to child access disputes, child support enforcement policies, and a children's aid society's decision not to investigate a report—had no reasonable prospect of success, as there was no evidence of adverse treatment linked to a protected ground.
The Tribunal further dismissed the remaining untimely allegations, some dating back nine years, finding the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation to establish that the delay was incurred in good faith.
Costs awarded against FRO for unreasonable enforcement and failure to communicate despite pending motion to change.
The applicant payor sought costs against the Director of the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) following a successful motion for a refraining order to prevent the suspension of his driver's licence.
The payor and recipient had agreed to terminate child support after the children moved in with the payor, but FRO continued aggressive enforcement actions, including garnishment and licence suspension notices, despite being informed of the pending motion to change.
The court found that FRO exercised its discretion unreasonably by continuing enforcement when there was a real and substantial dispute pending before the court, and by failing to provide timely and meaningful responses to the payor's counsel.
Costs of $7,500 were awarded against the Director.
Committal warrant stands absent disclosure, material change, or arguable defence.
The respondent/payor moved to set aside a warrant of committal issued after persistent non-payment of child and spousal support and repeated non-compliance with disclosure and enforcement orders.
The court held that rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure could apply to a motion to set aside a warrant, but only within the limited scope permitted by s. 41(15) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, requiring evidence of a material change in circumstances affecting ability to pay.
Applying the established three-part test for setting aside default orders, the court found the motion was brought promptly but the payor had no reasonable explanation for his non-attendance and no arguable case on the merits.
There was no evidence of a material change, no current financial disclosure, and no payment plan.
The motion was dismissed.
