Family and Matrimonial Law

This trial concerned decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the parties' child.

The father sought sole decision-making and a reduced parenting schedule for the mother, citing her past drug addiction, criminal charges, and communication failures.

The mother sought joint decision-making and continuation of the existing 2-2-3 alternating parenting schedule.

The court found significant mistrust and antagonism between the parties, impacting their ability to communicate.

The court ordered joint decision-making with final authority split: the mother for healthcare decisions and the father for education decisions, both after meaningful consultation.

The existing 2-2-3 alternating parenting schedule was maintained, rejecting the father's proposal for reduced parenting time for the mother.

The court also addressed child support arrears and ongoing support.

The Applicant brought a motion to find the Respondent in breach of court orders for disclosure and to strike his pleadings under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to persistent failure to provide financial disclosure.

The court found the Respondent in breach, struck his Answer, but allowed a 30-day period for compliance and a subsequent motion for reinstatement, emphasizing the egregious nature of the non-compliance and its impact on the administration of justice.

Costs were awarded to the Applicant on a full-indemnity basis.

The respondent mother brought a motion to adjourn the applicant father's application for the return of their two children, who she had wrongfully retained in Colombia.

The court considered the factors for granting an adjournment, emphasizing the best interests of the children and the need for timely resolution in international child abduction cases.

The court found that the respondent was manufacturing delay and dismissed the motion for adjournment, directing her counsel to proceed with the hearing.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the respondent successfully had an Omani divorce recognized.

The respondent sought over $36,000 in costs, including expert disbursements.

The court rejected the respondent's claim of beating an offer to settle, finding the offer non-severable.

The court also expressed concerns about the utility and reasonableness of expert evidence.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 all-inclusive, payable by the applicant, but payment was deferred until the outcome of the costs of the upcoming trial, allowing for potential set-off.

The respondent wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and related relief.

The parties, married for over 28 years, presented conflicting narratives regarding the wife's financial contributions.

The court found the wife had a prima facie entitlement to support and imputed an income of $3,000 per month to her for a housing benefit received from her parents.

Based on the husband's average annual income of $586,333, the court ordered him to pay $19,839 per month in interim spousal support.

The issue of retroactive support was left for trial, and the wife was made responsible for the mortgage and line of credit on the Hillcrest Property, while the husband was ordered to pay joint Visa balances and maintain the wife on his health plan.

This costs endorsement followed motions concerning custody, access, and child support for the parties' daughter.

The applicant sought regular access and costs, while the respondent sought sole decision-making, child-led access, and child support adjustments.

The court found the applicant to be the more successful party, having obtained an order for gradually increasing access, while the respondent's primary requests were denied.

The respondent's conduct was deemed unreasonable due to unilaterally varying a separation agreement, failing to negotiate, and employing delay tactics.

The court awarded the applicant $10,500 in costs, inclusive of HST, but disallowed disbursements and costs related to earlier litigation stages due to insufficient detail and prior adjudication requirements.

Chappell Partners LLP (CP), counsel for the respondent Miranda Leigh Smith, sought full recovery costs of $5,518.50 against the applicant Peter Brian Cozzi.

Cozzi was the unsuccessful party on a motion heard December 16, 2015, which sought to remove a collateral mortgage secured by CP for fees.

The court found Cozzi's conduct unreasonable, noting he brought a motion for relief already pleaded in another file and made unproven, false allegations of fraud and dishonesty against CP, particularly regarding independent legal advice.

Applying Rule 24(11)(b) of the Family Law Rules and common law principles, the court awarded full recovery costs to CP against Cozzi.

The applicant brought a motion to vary and replace several paragraphs of a previous custody and access order and to obtain an order preventing the respondent from signing children out of school without the applicant's consent.

The court found the respondent had repeatedly breached the existing order by taking children out of school early and keeping them home without justification.

All requested amendments were granted to clarify access times, specify return protocols for sick children, and restrict the respondent's ability to remove children from school outside of scheduled access.

The court determined costs following a trial on custody, access, and child and spousal support, and a motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent, who was legally aided, sought costs for both the motion and the trial.

The applicant, who was self-represented, did not make submissions.

The court fixed costs for the Rule 1(8) motion at $2,800 inclusive of HST, and trial costs at $9,605 inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding the respondent to be the more successful party despite some divided success.

The applicant's obstinacy and "pick and choose" approach to court orders were noted as factors increasing the difficulty of the case.

On an interim parenting motion, the applicant sought sole custody consistent with a s. 30 assessment recommending sole decision‑making authority and expanded access to the respondent.

The respondent sought interim sole custody or, alternatively, a shared parenting arrangement.

The court held that recommendations of an assessor should generally not be implemented on an interim basis absent urgent circumstances and that the status quo had largely been created by unilateral conduct limiting the respondent’s involvement.

Finding both parents capable and loving but engaged in high conflict, the court ordered a temporary 50/50 week‑about parenting schedule with decision‑making authority remaining with the applicant, along with communication and dispute‑resolution provisions including parenting coordination.

A child protection matter where the child suffered severe injuries including liver lacerations and rib fractures of unexplained origin.

The Children’s Aid Society initially commenced a protection application but later sought to withdraw it after concluding the child was not in need of protection.

Investigations indicated the injuries likely occurred within 24 hours prior to hospital admission, but no criminal charges were laid and concerns arose regarding the child’s daycare provider.

The Society reported positive observations of the parents’ caregiving and entered into a three‑month Voluntary Service Agreement permitting supervision and services.

The court found the decision to withdraw the protection application reasonable and accepted the withdrawal.

The respondent spouse opposed a motion by the applicant spouse seeking an interim order for the sale of a residential property pending trial.

The central dispute was whether the property constituted a matrimonial home and whether the court should order its sale before trial.

The court held there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the status of the property and the respondent’s potential entitlement to spousal support and possessory rights under the Family Law Act.

Given the respondent’s vulnerability as a recent immigrant with limited resources and the imminence of trial, the court declined to exercise discretion to order an interim sale.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order that had varied a prior spousal support judgment by terminating support and eliminating arrears after an uncontested hearing.

Although the court found the applicant had been personally served with the motion to vary, it accepted her explanation that she did not attend due to confusion arising from multiple related proceedings, including enforcement proceedings through the Family Responsibility Office and a prior motion to vary requiring financial disclosure.

The court noted the applicant was self-represented, suffered from medical issues, and had been told during related proceedings that she would be re-served.

In these circumstances, the explanation for non-attendance was satisfactory under the Family Law Rules.

The order terminating support and arrears was set aside so the matter could be determined on the merits.

On an interim custody motion following separation, the father sought shared parenting while the mother sought to maintain the existing arrangement that limited the father’s parenting time.

The court considered the principle that interim orders should generally preserve the true status quo unless the child’s best interests require otherwise.

The judge found the relevant status quo was the parenting arrangement prior to the father being required to leave the matrimonial home, where both parents had significant involvement in caregiving.

Given the conflicting affidavit evidence and both parents’ demonstrated commitment to the child, the court ordered an interim shared parenting regime with alternating weeks.

The court also ordered that the child’s daycare not be changed pending further order and that daycare costs be shared equally.

Both parties brought competing motions to change the child support provisions of a 2001 divorce order.

The applicant sought increased and retroactive child support based on the respondent’s increased income and requested contribution toward special expenses including orthodontics and competitive soccer.

The respondent sought termination or reduction of support due to unemployment.

The court found material changes in circumstances, attributed income reflecting severance and employment insurance, and varied support prospectively from the date of effective notice rather than the earlier period sought.

The court also determined that competitive soccer constituted a s.7 special expense and ordered a limited contribution.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent’s pleadings in a long-running family law proceeding involving property division and enforcement of court orders following separation.

The court reviewed numerous prior orders relating to the sale and refinancing of the matrimonial home and a rental property, as well as the respondent’s obligations to account for rental income and comply with court directions.

The evidence demonstrated repeated failures by the respondent to comply with orders, provide proper financial disclosure, vacate property as ordered, and bring a motion previously directed by the court.

The court found that the respondent had intentionally misled the court, obstructed the proceedings, and engaged in conduct amounting to abuse of process.

Applying Rule 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concluded that the breaches were intentional and without reasonable excuse and struck the respondent’s pleadings.

In a child protection proceeding, the parents brought a motion seeking full documentary disclosure from the Children’s Aid Society and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Although the Society ultimately consented to the requested disclosure after the motion commenced, the court considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The court held that while child protection agencies do not have immunity from costs awards, costs should only be ordered where the Society conducts itself unfairly in carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

The court found that the Society’s delayed and piecemeal disclosure required the parents to bring an unnecessary motion and risked delaying the trial in a case involving a child already in care for over a year.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore ordered against the Society.

Following an extensive family law trial involving property division, business ownership, support, and tort claims between former spouses, the court considered competing claims for costs.

The respondent argued he was substantially successful and relied on a prior offer to settle, while the applicant sought substantial indemnity costs alleging misconduct, fraud, and disclosure failures during litigation.

The court found the respondent was largely successful on major issues but had behaved unreasonably during the proceedings, contributing to mistrust and prolonged litigation.

Applying the Family Law Rules, the court held that the respondent should be deprived of costs but that the conduct did not amount to bad faith warranting an award of costs against him.

Given the conduct of both parties and the overall circumstances, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

Following a family law trial involving spousal support, the respondent sought substantial costs on a full recovery basis exceeding $25,000.

The applicant opposed a costs award or proposed a reduced amount.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held the respondent was substantially successful despite a reduction in spousal support and therefore presumptively entitled to costs.

The court rejected full recovery, removed costs for conferences and motions previously addressed by other judges, and considered the parties’ financial circumstances.

A reduced costs award was granted and ordered enforceable as support.

Following a four-day family law trial involving divorce, the validity of a marriage contract, equalization, and spousal support, the court addressed costs.

The respondent had succeeded in setting aside the marriage contract and obtaining both equalization and spousal support, though she failed on claims for damages and to set aside a conveyance of property to the applicant’s sons.

The court rejected both parties’ submissions that substantial indemnity costs were warranted, finding neither the alleged disclosure issues nor purported fraud allegations justified such an award.

Applying partial indemnity principles and considering the respondent’s greater success on the major issues, the court fixed costs in her favour but reduced them to reflect partial success.