Anne C. Trousdale

The Estate Trustee sought court directions regarding the validity of three potential holograph codicils and the disposition of life insurance proceeds from the estate of Franklin Walter Briggs.

The court found two documents (July 29, 2013, and August 8, 2014) to be valid holograph codicils, but a third document, the "Notes Document," was deemed a planning document and not a valid testamentary instrument due to lack of signature, date, and formal language.

The court also ruled that the July 29, 2013 document, despite being a valid codicil, did not constitute a valid declaration under the Insurance Act to change the beneficiary of life insurance policies, as it failed to specifically identify the insurance contract or fund.

Consequently, the life insurance proceeds belonged to the estate, not a specific beneficiary.

The defendants Laari Construction Ltd. and SMS Rents brought a motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff Carpenters Union's construction lien had expired due to non-compliance with Section 34(5) of the Construction Lien Act.

The defendants argued that the lien was improperly registered because it did not contain the names and addresses of the individual Carpenters Union members who performed the work.

The Carpenters Union contended that naming the trustee as agent for affected members was sufficient, especially given the practical difficulties in identifying individual workers and their specific entitlements at the time of registration.

The court found that the Carpenters Union had sufficiently identified the lien claimants by naming the trustee as agent for the affected members and complied with Section 34(5) of the Act.

Consequently, the motion brought by Laari and SMS Rents was dismissed.

A fatal motor vehicle collision occurred after a driver borrowed the vehicle owner’s car earlier in the day and later drove it while intoxicated, causing the death of a young driver.

The plaintiffs and the vehicle owner’s insurer disputed whether the owner or the insurer was responsible for paying an agreed amount of damages.

The court considered whether the driver had possession of the vehicle with the owner’s consent under s.192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Applying appellate authority emphasizing that consent to possession—not consent to operation—governs vicarious liability, the court found the driver remained in possession of the vehicle with the owner’s consent throughout the day.

The owner was therefore vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence and the claim against the insurer was dismissed.

The applicant sought to vary a separation agreement child support obligation under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, reducing support from $650 per month for two children to $200 per month on the basis of alleged undue hardship arising from debts and visitation expenses.

The respondent opposed the application, asserting the applicant had failed to provide required annual income disclosure, had not paid support since 2010, and had accumulated significant arrears.

The court found the evidentiary record insufficient to determine the variation request and required additional financial disclosure including tax returns, employment history, and proof of claimed expenses.

The matter was adjourned pending receipt of the requested information and a response from the respondent.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking a declaration that a child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without access.

The court reviewed evidence of prenatal drug exposure, the mother’s history of opioid addiction, relapse following treatment, inconsistent engagement with counselling services, unstable housing conditions, and the resumption of a relationship with a partner associated with substance abuse and domestic violence concerns.

The court also considered the mother’s past parenting history, including a prior child protection proceeding resulting in Crown wardship of another child.

Finding that the responding parent filed no updated affidavit evidence and that the agency’s evidence was largely uncontradicted, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The child was declared in need of protection and made a Crown ward for the purposes of adoption with no access.

Following a lengthy family law trial after the parties’ separation, the court addressed divorce, custody and access, child and spousal support (including retroactive amounts), equalization of net family property, section 7 expenses, life insurance security for support, and various adjustment claims.

Joint custody with primary residence to the mother was ordered along with structured access.

The court determined the parties’ net family property and ordered a pension division at source rather than through equalization.

Retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support were fixed based on imputed and actual incomes, and the father was ordered to contribute to section 7 expenses.

Claims for occupation rent and reimbursement of certain expenses were dismissed, and improperly obtained private emails were ordered removed from the record.

The responding father brought a motion under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction seeking the return of the parties’ child from Ontario to Florida.

The court determined that the child had been habitually resident in Florida immediately prior to the mother’s unilateral removal of the child to Ontario.

The father had custodial rights under Florida law and was exercising those rights at the time of the removal, making the removal wrongful within the meaning of the Convention.

The mother failed to establish any Article 13 defences, including acquiescence, non‑exercise of custody rights, or grave risk of harm.

The court ordered that the child be returned to Florida so that custody and access issues could be determined by the Florida court with jurisdiction.