Angela Assuras

The plaintiff contractor brought a construction lien action for unpaid invoices relating to the installation of epoxy flooring at a commercial property.

The defendant owner counterclaimed for the cost of replacing the floor, alleging the contractor installed the wrong product and left deficiencies.

The court found that the owner fundamentally breached the contract by unilaterally ordering a stop to the work and hiring a replacement contractor without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to correct deficiencies.

Although the plaintiff had installed an unspecified, inferior epoxy product, this breach was rendered immaterial by the owner's prior repudiation.

The court awarded the plaintiff its unpaid invoices and extras, subject to a quantum meruit set-off for the cost difference between the specified and installed epoxy products.

The owner's counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement after the defendant failed to pay the required interest on the settlement amount.

The settlement included a provision that failure to cure a default within 10 days would result in a consent judgment for the full original lien claim of $611,061.10, less any principal paid.

The defendant argued for relief from forfeiture, claiming the penalty was unconscionable.

The court rejected this argument, finding the consent judgment was not disproportionate to the original claim and that the defendant had not been taken advantage of.

The motion was granted, and judgment was ordered for the net amount of $286,061.10.

In an oppression remedy application, both the applicant minority shareholders and respondent majority shareholders brought motions regarding procedural delays.

The respondents sought to vary a previous consent order restricting corporate disbursements and to set a firm timetable.

The applicants sought reinstatement of interim compensation and an order for outstanding document productions.

The court granted both motions, removing the disbursement restriction, setting a firm timetable for the application, reinstating the applicant's monthly compensation, and ordering the respondents to provide specific financial records and authorizations.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a construction lien action against the defendant general contractor after its subcontract was terminated.

The general contractor counterclaimed for completion costs and back-charges.

The court found that the subcontractor had repudiated the contract through excessive payment demands, a production slowdown, and uncorrected deficiencies, justifying the termination.

The subcontractor's claims were dismissed, and it was ordered to pay the general contractor $516,458.18 in damages for back-charges.

A sub-subcontractor was awarded $84,002.92 in basic holdback from the general contractor.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order requiring the defendants to respond to written requests for information pursuant to section 39 of the Construction Act.

The defendants argued that the requests were improperly served by fax and opposed costs.

The court validated the service by fax under Rule 16.08, finding the documents came to the defendants' notice, and ordered the defendants to provide the requested information and pay the plaintiff's costs of the motion.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking answers to six questions refused during the defendant's examination for discovery in a slip and fall case.

The court found all questions relevant to the pleadings, which included allegations regarding the defendant's duty to remove leaves, enforcement of by-laws, operational negligence of street sweepers, training of field inspectors, and the hazardous nature of leaves on sidewalks.

The motion was granted for all refused questions, and the plaintiffs were awarded costs.

ABCO brought a motion for the production of documents from an ongoing arbitration involving Pomerleau and the TTC.

After the motion was adjourned, ABCO abandoned it, citing timing issues for the upcoming trial.

Pomerleau sought costs thrown away on a full indemnity basis.

The Master found that ABCO's motion was brought too late, lacked sufficient evidence of necessity, and appeared to be a fishing expedition.

Pomerleau was awarded $12,000 in costs.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved divided success, the court tentatively awarded the appellants $5,000 in costs.

The respondents sought to reverse this tentative decision based on an offer to settle, which proposed dismissing the appeal without costs.

The court found the offer to settle was not relevant to the disposition of costs, as the appellants achieved a better result than the offer.

The court increased the costs awarded to the appellants to $7,500 due to the additional time and effort required to respond to the respondents' submissions.

The defendant, Pomerleau Inc., brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled 18-day trial on the basis that a pending contested bankruptcy motion against the plaintiff, ABCO One Corporation, would likely result in bankruptcy, rendering trial preparation a waste of money.

The court granted leave for the motion under the Construction Lien Act but dismissed the motion to adjourn.

The court relied on expert evidence that a bankruptcy judge would likely stay any bankruptcy order to allow the trial to proceed, and noted that adjourning the trial might improperly influence the bankruptcy judge.

The court awarded costs of $1,000 to the plaintiff, reduced because the matter could have been handled more efficiently via a case conference.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision in which the respondents successfully recovered funds they had lent to Glocap Management Inc. The appellants argued that they could not be held liable due to their failure to obtain necessary approvals, and raised issues regarding guarantees and material alteration of risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellants could not rely on their own failures to avoid their obligations, that there was no evidence of unilateral alteration of risk, and that the appellants failed to meet their burden of establishing the quantum of credit they sought.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order allowing certain paragraphs in the defendants' Statement of Defence.

The plaintiffs argued the paragraphs improperly pleaded evidence rather than material facts, contrary to Rule 25.06.

The court upheld the Master's decision regarding paragraphs quoting emails and detailing facts for a fair comment defence.

However, the court struck a paragraph that quoted extensively from expert reports, finding it improperly pleaded evidence, and granted leave to amend.

The respondents brought a motion for a stay of execution of a prior judgment by Justice Akhtar, which ordered the removal of illegal construction at their properties due to flagrant violations of building codes and zoning bylaws.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion, finding their conduct to be a continuation of prior violations and their arguments specious.

The court applied a higher test for staying a final judgment, requiring proof that enforcement would be oppressive, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and would not cause injustice to the plaintiff.

The court found that the City's enforcement was not oppressive and that the public interest in safety outweighed the respondents' claims.

Costs were awarded to the City.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, or parts thereof, primarily concerning the identity of the parties to the governing contract.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding which party the plaintiff had contracted with, particularly due to ambiguities in agency representation and inconsistent documentation.

The Master declined to exercise discretionary powers to resolve this issue outside of the scheduled lien trial, determining that it would be more cost-effective and proportionate to address it within the context of the full trial.

Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding moral damages of $60,000 for breach of the implied contractual obligation of good faith in the manner of dismissal, along with general damages of ten months' salary in lieu of notice and $25,000 for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code.

The appellants contended the moral damages award should be reduced to $20,000, arguing the trial judge considered irrelevant factors and that the award duplicated the sexual harassment damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the manner of dismissal holistically, including pre- and post-termination conduct that constituted bad faith.

The court held that moral damages and Human Rights Code damages serve different purposes and do not constitute double recovery.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial where the plaintiff was awarded approximately $150,000 in damages, the court determined the costs of the action.

The plaintiff sought over $600,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, while the corporate defendants argued no costs should be awarded due to proportionality and settlement offers.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $424,584.33, finding that the defendants' 'hardball' litigation tactics and pursuit of a baseless after-acquired cause defence unnecessarily prolonged the trial.

The court also denied costs to the successful individual defendant, finding her conduct was the fundamental reason the trial was necessary.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add Imad Rachid as a defendant and amend her statement of claim in an action arising from a residential construction contract with the corporate defendant.

The proposed defendant opposed being added, arguing there was no tenable basis for personal liability against him as a corporate officer.

The court granted leave to add the proposed defendant and make certain amendments related to breach of contract and negligence.

However, the court refused amendments alleging intentional interference with economic relations and negligent misrepresentation, finding the plaintiff failed to plead the necessary elements or allege that the proposed defendant acted outside his role as a directing mind of the corporation.

The third-party Wasylko Architect Inc. brought a motion to transfer an action from Milton to London, which the plaintiff opposed.

The action concerned property damages in London due to construction work.

The court applied Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) holistically, considering factors such as where events occurred, damages were sustained, the subject matter's location, local community interest, convenience of parties and witnesses, and court facility availability.

The court found London to be a significantly better venue due to the strong factual connection to London and Milton's inability to accommodate a lengthy trial, which would cause significant delays.

The motion was granted, transferring the main action and related third-party actions to London.

The appellant estate appealed a decision finding that the joint tenancy of a matrimonial home had not been severed before the deceased's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that, despite the deteriorating relationship between the parties, there was no mutual intention to treat their interests as a tenancy in common.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed, as it did not materially change the evidence regarding mutual intention.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The respondent contractor hired the appellant for epoxy flooring based on a sketch with inaccurate elevations.

When the appellant discovered the error and sought a price increase, the respondent refused, leading to a breach of contract claim and a counterclaim for lost profits.

The trial judge found for the appellant, but the Divisional Court overturned the decision on its own initiative, applying the doctrine of common mistake.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by deciding the case on unpleaded grounds and misapplying the doctrine of common mistake, as the mistake was the respondent's fault.

The moving party sought to set aside a noting in default in a construction lien action, arguing improper service of the statement of claim and lack of awareness of the proceeding.

The court held that service by mail was valid under the Rules of Civil Procedure after the process server attended at the corporation’s recorded address and could not effect personal service.

The moving party failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to deliver a defence, failed to demonstrate a continuous intention to defend, and provided no evidence supporting a meritorious defence as required under the Construction Lien Act.

Bare denials in a proposed statement of defence were insufficient.

The court therefore declined to grant relief from default.