Aitken

The accused was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his 15-year-old cousin.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court conditionally stayed several counts and proceeded to sentence the accused on five counts of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching.

The court considered the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the devastating impact on her and her family as aggravating factors.

The accused was sentenced to a global term of 3.5 years in penitentiary, along with DNA, SOIRA, non-communication, and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual exploitation against his daughter.

The offences occurred when the victim was a teenager and involved inappropriate touching and measuring.

The court considered the accused's low risk of reoffending, lack of criminal record, and the historical nature of the offences, balanced against the significant breach of trust and psychological harm to the victim.

The court imposed a global conditional sentence of two years less a day, along with SOIRA registration, a DNA order, and a weapons prohibition.

The applicants, unit owners at Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 111, sought a declaration that a proposed rule defining 'single family residence' and its grandfathering provisions were unreasonable and inconsistent with the condominium's declaration.

They also sought an oppression remedy against the board and a declaration that the board president breached his duties as a director.

The court found the ten-year grandfathering provision for existing owners to be unreasonable and inconsistent with the declaration, invalidating the rule.

The court dismissed the oppression claim against the board but found that the board president breached his standard of care as a director by actively undermining the board's efforts to enforce the declaration and acting in bad faith.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the care of their mother and her spouse.

The father sought to have the children returned to his care.

The court found the children in need of protection due to exposure to domestic violence, drug trafficking, weapons, and parental alienation by the father.

The court granted joint custody to the mother and her spouse, with no access to the father, finding that the father's anti-social behaviour and refusal to follow court orders posed a significant risk of emotional and physical harm to the children.

The offender, an Aboriginal man, was convicted of second degree murder following a brutal attack on the victim.

The mandatory sentence was life imprisonment, and the sole issue was the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court extensively reviewed the offender's profound intergenerational trauma, including the impact of residential schools on his parents, severe childhood abuse, neglect, and systemic racism, applying the Gladue and Ipeelee principles.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's reduced moral culpability due to these systemic factors, the court set the period of parole ineligibility at 10 years.

The accused, a public servant with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was convicted of multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust for accepting money to provide preferential treatment to immigration applicants.

The court considered the accused's Aboriginal heritage under Gladue principles but found no causal link to the offences.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for breach of trust by a public official, the court sentenced the accused to four years' incarceration concurrently on all counts.

In a mid-trial ruling during a murder trial, the court considered whether the partial defence of provocation should be left with the jury.

The accused had armed himself with a hammer before confronting the victim, anticipating a violent response.

When the victim reached for a sword, the accused attacked him.

The court applied the air of reality test and found no evidence that the victim's reaction was sudden or unexpected by the accused.

Consequently, the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality and was not left with the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion for a mistrial, alleging that defence counsel misled the court and the Crown by failing to disclose an interview with a former co-accused before seeking permission to cross-examine him.

The court found that while defence counsel showed poor judgment in not disclosing the interview, the resulting prejudice to the Crown was minimal and theoretical.

Given the late stage of the trial, the strong forensic evidence, and the Crown's own inappropriate conduct during closing addresses, the court concluded that a mistrial was not justified and dismissed the application.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to call a former co-accused as a witness and cross-examine him.

The co-accused had previously pled guilty to manslaughter, and the Crown had decided not to call him as a witness.

The defence argued that cross-examination was necessary to challenge the co-accused's earlier statements to police, which implicated the accused as the primary attacker.

The court granted the application, finding that restricting the defence to standard rules for challenging one's own witness would undermine the accused's right to make full answer and defence, particularly given the leading nature of the police interview with the co-accused.

During a trial for immigration fraud, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the prior inconsistent statements of a hostile witness, specifically his guilty pleas and an Agreed Statement of Facts from his own related trial.

The witness had been uncooperative and claimed memory loss regarding the respondent's involvement.

The court found that the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability were met on a balance of probabilities.

The application was granted, and the statements were admitted to prove the truth of their contents, although the court ultimately assigned them virtually no weight.

During a criminal trial for immigration-related offences, the Crown brought an application under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act to declare its own witness adverse and hostile.

The witness, a former co-accused who had previously pled guilty, was evasive, repeatedly claimed memory loss, and refused to refresh his memory from his prior Agreed Statement of Facts and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court found the witness to be both adverse under the Act and hostile at common law, noting his clear motive to protect the accused and his refusal to provide helpful evidence.

The Crown was granted leave to cross-examine the witness at large.

The accused, an acting operations supervisor at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was charged with multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust by a public officer.

She participated in a joint enterprise with an immigration consultant to expedite and favorably process immigration applications in exchange for money and benefits.

The court found that the accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of her office by disclosing confidential information, providing preferential treatment, and accepting benefits.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one count of bribery.

The plaintiff, Scotia Mortgage Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment against the mortgagors and the guarantor for default under a first mortgage.

The property had been destroyed by fire, and insurance proceeds were insufficient to cover the mortgage debt due to a rebuilding clause.

The guarantor defended on grounds including non es factum and material alteration of the mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding the guarantor's defences without merit.

A second mortgagee, named as a third party, also moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims that he was liable as a mortgagee in possession.

The court dismissed the second mortgagee's motion, finding that whether he had assumed control of the property was a genuine issue requiring a trial.