Carl Lem

The offender was sentenced for multiple counts of sexual assault, choking with intent to commit an indictable offence, and uttering threats against three vulnerable women over a twelve-year period.

The court weighed the profound physical and psychological harm to the victims, the brutal nature of the assaults, and the offender's high risk to re-offend against mitigating factors including his difficult upbringing, severe drug addiction, and pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the totality principle and granting credit for pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a total sentence of 18 years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were taken 'as soon as practicable' and improperly took judicial notice of police procedures regarding meetings between arresting officers and breathalyzer technicians.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law, properly took tacit judicial notice based on common experience, and reasonably concluded the police acted with reasonable promptness.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the respondent's s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) rights.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the findings of a s. 10(a) breach and an informational s. 10(b) breach, but found the trial judge erred in finding an implementational s. 10(b) breach.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the appeal court concluded the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, allowed the appeal, and entered a conviction.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand because she mistakenly arrested him for 'over 80' instead of 'impaired driving', and that the trial judge erred in admitting the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to make the breath demand based on the totality of the circumstances, and that the trial judge correctly admitted the evidence despite the minor s. 9 Charter breach.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) were breached and that the admission of breath samples tainted the trial judge's finding of impairment.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the impaired driving charge was amply supported by overwhelming civilian and paramedic evidence, independent of the breath samples.

The court held it was unnecessary to address the alleged Charter breaches given the strength of the other evidence.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender following his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and robbery.

The offender broke into the victims' home, stabbed one victim 18 times, and slashed the other victim's throat three times while she was tied to a chair.

The court found that the offender's behaviour was of an extremely brutal nature and that he constitutes a threat to the life and safety of others.

The court designated the offender as a dangerous offender and imposed a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period.

The offender, suffering from schizo-affective disorder and psychotic delusions, fatally stabbed a fellow resident in a rooming house.

Following an unsuccessful NCR defence, a jury found him guilty of manslaughter.

The court sentenced the offender to 8 years imprisonment, less 4 years credit for pre-trial custody, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and public protection through psychiatric treatment within the federal penitentiary system.

The offender, who suffers from severe schizo-affective disorder, was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing a fellow rooming house tenant.

The court weighed the principles of general deterrence and public protection against the offender's mental illness and need for rehabilitation.

The offender was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, less 4 years' credit for pre-trial custody, with a strong recommendation for treatment at a Regional Treatment Centre.

The offender, an Aboriginal man, was convicted of second degree murder following a brutal attack on the victim.

The mandatory sentence was life imprisonment, and the sole issue was the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court extensively reviewed the offender's profound intergenerational trauma, including the impact of residential schools on his parents, severe childhood abuse, neglect, and systemic racism, applying the Gladue and Ipeelee principles.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's reduced moral culpability due to these systemic factors, the court set the period of parole ineligibility at 10 years.

The accused, a public servant with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was convicted of multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust for accepting money to provide preferential treatment to immigration applicants.

The court considered the accused's Aboriginal heritage under Gladue principles but found no causal link to the offences.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for breach of trust by a public official, the court sentenced the accused to four years' incarceration concurrently on all counts.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion for a mistrial, alleging that defence counsel misled the court and the Crown by failing to disclose an interview with a former co-accused before seeking permission to cross-examine him.

The court found that while defence counsel showed poor judgment in not disclosing the interview, the resulting prejudice to the Crown was minimal and theoretical.

Given the late stage of the trial, the strong forensic evidence, and the Crown's own inappropriate conduct during closing addresses, the court concluded that a mistrial was not justified and dismissed the application.

In a mid-trial ruling during a murder trial, the court considered whether the partial defence of provocation should be left with the jury.

The accused had armed himself with a hammer before confronting the victim, anticipating a violent response.

When the victim reached for a sword, the accused attacked him.

The court applied the air of reality test and found no evidence that the victim's reaction was sudden or unexpected by the accused.

Consequently, the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality and was not left with the jury.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to call a former co-accused as a witness and cross-examine him.

The co-accused had previously pled guilty to manslaughter, and the Crown had decided not to call him as a witness.

The defence argued that cross-examination was necessary to challenge the co-accused's earlier statements to police, which implicated the accused as the primary attacker.

The court granted the application, finding that restricting the defence to standard rules for challenging one's own witness would undermine the accused's right to make full answer and defence, particularly given the leading nature of the police interview with the co-accused.

During a trial for immigration fraud, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the prior inconsistent statements of a hostile witness, specifically his guilty pleas and an Agreed Statement of Facts from his own related trial.

The witness had been uncooperative and claimed memory loss regarding the respondent's involvement.

The court found that the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability were met on a balance of probabilities.

The application was granted, and the statements were admitted to prove the truth of their contents, although the court ultimately assigned them virtually no weight.

During a criminal trial for immigration-related offences, the Crown brought an application under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act to declare its own witness adverse and hostile.

The witness, a former co-accused who had previously pled guilty, was evasive, repeatedly claimed memory loss, and refused to refresh his memory from his prior Agreed Statement of Facts and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court found the witness to be both adverse under the Act and hostile at common law, noting his clear motive to protect the accused and his refusal to provide helpful evidence.

The Crown was granted leave to cross-examine the witness at large.

The accused, an acting operations supervisor at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was charged with multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust by a public officer.

She participated in a joint enterprise with an immigration consultant to expedite and favorably process immigration applications in exchange for money and benefits.

The court found that the accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of her office by disclosing confidential information, providing preferential treatment, and accepting benefits.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one count of bribery.