A. Grady

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, firearms offences, and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The murder involved a targeted public shooting with two firearms, resulting in one death and injuries to two others.

The court considered the offender's youth, guilty plea, and social context evidence of anti-Black racism, but found the aggravating factors, including elements of planning and deliberation, required a significant period of parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, and a concurrent 13-year sentence for the firearms and drug offences.

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and related weapons offences after shooting a victim during a drug robbery.

The Crown sought a 13-year global sentence, while the defence argued for significant mitigation due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and the offender's lived experience with anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 years, reduced to 13 years for totality, and further mitigated to 11 years to account for Duncan and Morris factors.

After applying Summers credit for pre-sentence custody, the offender was sentenced to 51 months in a federal penitentiary.

In a criminal trial involving human trafficking and sex work offences, the trial judge issued a preliminary ruling on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Chouhan.

The court held that counsel, rather than the trial judge, would pose the challenge for cause questions to prospective jurors individually, without providing the questions in advance.

The court also permitted offence-based questions regarding the victim's race and occupation as a sex trade worker, and outlined the procedure for exercising the stand-by power under section 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused applied for an order permitting him to re-elect his mode of trial to judge and jury, dispensing with the requirement for the Crown's consent under s. 561(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued his previous re-election to judge alone was not informed or voluntary.

The court found the accused's re-election to judge alone was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that there was no evidence of a miscarriage of justice or Crown abuse of process.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment for repeatedly communicating with his former roommate between August 2015 and June 2016.

Despite the complainant explicitly telling the accused to stop contacting her and refusing to let him live with her again, the accused sent a barrage of unpredictable, aggressive, and sometimes threatening emails.

The court found that the accused's conduct caused the complainant to be harassed and to reasonably fear for her safety.

The accused was found guilty of criminal harassment under s. 264(1) and (2)(b) of the Criminal Code.