Adam J. Stephens

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that corrected an error in the assessment roll regarding a severed property.

The property had been inadvertently omitted from the roll, and the Board used its discretion under s. 44(1) of the Assessment Act to rectify the error, triggering s. 33 to assess the omitted property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error of law and confirming that the limitation period for complaints under s. 40(2) does not apply to properties erroneously left off the assessment roll.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction granted by Lederman J., which included the re-instatement of the plaintiff's employment based on a finding of a serious issue of oppression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and noting that the re-instatement of employment, while rare, was within the judge's discretion under the oppression remedy.

The court also held that the failure to provide an undertaking did not automatically preclude the injunction and that no principle of broad importance was involved to justify granting leave.

The appellant, a former owner of a Toronto property, retained an interest in the property's surplus density through a Density Agreement registered on title.

The property was subsequently sold to a company that later sought creditor protection under the CCAA.

A court-approved Settlement Order vested the property in the respondent 'free and clear' of claims.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to discharge the Density Agreement from title.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Settlement Order only applied to assets the debtor company actually owned, which did not include the surplus density.

The appeal was allowed and the Density Agreement remained on title.