Adam J. Stephens

The appellants, who engaged in 'assessment farming' on lands zoned for employment and commercial uses, applied to the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board for an exemption from a municipal zoning by-law under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998.

The Board granted the exemption, but the Divisional Court set aside the decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the Act protects normal farm practices on agricultural lands but does not grant the Board jurisdiction to override municipal zoning by-laws that prohibit farming as a land use.

The respondent was largely successful on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The respondent and the appellant entered into an oral agreement to share ownership of a carrageenan business, with the respondent holding a 40 per cent interest.

The business was incorporated, but no shares were ever issued to the respondent.

After a falling out, the respondent brought an application for an oppression remedy and wrongful dismissal.

The application judge found the respondent was a beneficial owner and awarded substantial compensation and damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability, confirming that the respondent was a proper complainant under the Business Corporations Act, but slightly reduced the compensation award.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent municipality could not recover approximately $2 million in unbilled property taxes from 2001 to 2007.

The municipality discovered calculation errors during a s. 331 review and sought to collect the back taxes.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 359 of the Municipal Act, 2001 applies to limit the municipality's recovery of undercharged taxes to the current and previous tax years, even for 'eligible properties' undergoing a s. 331 review.

The corporate appellants owned a commercial property that was severed in 2000.

In 2001, amendments to the Municipal Act imposed a new taxation scheme on 'eligible properties', including those that were subdivided or subject to a severance.

The appellants sought a declaration that the amendments did not apply retrospectively to their 2000 severance, arguing they had vested rights to the previous favourable tax treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'eligible property' operates retrospectively to ensure tax fairness and that the appellants had no vested right to the continuance of the previous tax scheme.

The appellant financed the purchase of two trucks and perfected its purchase money security interests under the PPSA.

The trucks were leased to third parties, insured by the respondent, and subsequently stolen.

The respondent paid the actual cash value of the trucks to the insureds and claimed salvage rights under statutory condition 6(7) of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's perfected security interests had priority over the respondent's salvage rights.

Section 4(1)(c) of the PPSA and statutory condition 6(7) do not operate to extinguish a prior perfected security interest, and the transfer of title to the insurer was not a sale in the ordinary course of business.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an undisclosed easement materially affected the respondent's use of the purchased property.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the conclusion that the easement significantly compromised the respondent's specific plans to construct a drive shed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that corrected an error in the assessment roll regarding a severed property.

The property had been inadvertently omitted from the roll, and the Board used its discretion under s. 44(1) of the Assessment Act to rectify the error, triggering s. 33 to assess the omitted property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error of law and confirming that the limitation period for complaints under s. 40(2) does not apply to properties erroneously left off the assessment roll.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction granted by Lederman J., which included the re-instatement of the plaintiff's employment based on a finding of a serious issue of oppression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and noting that the re-instatement of employment, while rare, was within the judge's discretion under the oppression remedy.

The court also held that the failure to provide an undertaking did not automatically preclude the injunction and that no principle of broad importance was involved to justify granting leave.

The appellant, a former owner of a Toronto property, retained an interest in the property's surplus density through a Density Agreement registered on title.

The property was subsequently sold to a company that later sought creditor protection under the CCAA.

A court-approved Settlement Order vested the property in the respondent 'free and clear' of claims.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to discharge the Density Agreement from title.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Settlement Order only applied to assets the debtor company actually owned, which did not include the surplus density.

The appeal was allowed and the Density Agreement remained on title.