A.C.R. Whitten

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the dismissal of a grievor for verbally abusing a client by telling them to 'shut up'.

The Divisional Court found that the arbitrator's conclusion that this single instance constituted 'abuse' under the collective agreement, thereby mandating discharge, was unreasonable.

The court held that while the conduct was rude, it lacked the necessary characteristics of being demeaning, insulting, humiliating, or derogatory to constitute abuse.

The application for judicial review was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to appreciate the medical evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal considered all evidence, correctly applied s. 4(1) of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, and properly determined that the appellant did not have a substantial impairment.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario's Discipline Committee.

The Divisional Court found that the College denied the applicant procedural fairness and due process by failing to properly investigate the complaint and by wrongly striking the reports of her chosen experts.

The application was granted, the rulings were quashed, and the matter was remitted to a newly composed Discipline Committee.

The City of Ottawa sought judicial review of an Arbitration Board decision that reinstated an employee who had been terminated for excessive absenteeism under a Last Chance Agreement.

The Board found that the employee suffered from a disability (an anxio-depressive state) and that the City discriminated against her by counting disability-related absences toward the threshold in the agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the appropriate standard of review was patent unreasonableness and that the Board's findings of disability and prima facie discrimination were supported by the evidence and not patently unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision including a jointly owned life insurance policy in the deceased's estate under s. 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The policy was purchased jointly by the deceased and his spouse to pay down their mortgage, with the survivor receiving the proceeds.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the mere fact of joint ownership of the policy was not enough to trigger s. 72(1)(f), and the policy should be excluded from the estate available for distribution to dependants.

A dissenting opinion would have dismissed the appeal, finding the policy fell within the specific provisions of the Act.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision vacating a land transfer tax assessment against Upper Valley Dodge Chrysler Limited.

The sole shareholder of the corporation had transferred land to the corporation and claimed an exemption under s. 3(1) of Regulation 697, which applies to transfers from an 'individual' to a 'family business corporation'.

The Minister argued the corporation could not be an 'individual' or 'operator' under the strict wording of the regulation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying a purposive approach to statutory interpretation to find that the transfer fell within the intended scope of the family business exemption.

The mother sought leave to appeal a trial judge's decision regarding costs in a lengthy child protection proceeding.

The trial judge had dismissed the Society's application for Crown wardship and returned the child to the mother, but only awarded the mother costs for procedural delays, not substantive issues, despite the mother beating her offer to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably exercised her discretion in balancing the Society's mandate under Rule 24(2) with the offer to settle provisions in Rule 18(14).