William G. Scott

The appellant pedestrian was struck by a motor vehicle and commenced an action against 'John Doe' within the limitation period.

After the limitation period expired, the appellant successfully moved to substitute the respondent's name for 'John Doe' on the basis of misnomer.

The respondent subsequently brought a successful motion for summary judgment dismissing the action on the basis that the limitation period had expired and the appellant had not exercised due diligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where a true defendant would know on reading the statement of claim that they were the intended defendant, due diligence is not required, and the summary judgment motion was an impermissible indirect attack on the misnomer order.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing their personal injury action as abandoned under former Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action arose from a motor vehicle collision and had been dismissed after no defence was filed within the prescribed period.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in Scaini v. Prochnicki and subsequent appellate authority, the court considered the Reid factors, including explanation for delay, intention to proceed, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the plaintiffs’ explanation for delay and the timing of the motion were unsatisfactory, the registrar’s dismissal occurred before the required 45‑day notice period expired, constituting an irregularity.

The court also found no significant prejudice to the defendants and emphasized the policy favouring determination of disputes on their merits.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order dismissing their motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement.

The plaintiff's former lawyer had accepted a $12,500 settlement offer from the TTC, but the plaintiff later claimed she did not give instructions to settle and sued her lawyer.

The motion judge found no settlement existed and refused to enforce it.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the lawyer had ostensible authority to bind his client, the acceptance was clear and unambiguous, and there was no basis for the TTC to know of any lack of instructions.

The settlement was enforced.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge’s order dismissing their summary judgment motion that argued the plaintiff’s tort claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The underlying action arose from a motor vehicle accident and involved whether the plaintiff’s claim was discoverable before the two‑year limitation period expired.

The defendants argued the motion judge misapplied the discoverability test and overlooked medical evidence, including MRI findings and expert assessments, which they claimed demonstrated the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of a threshold injury earlier.

The court held that the motion judge properly applied the discoverability test from Peixeiro v. Haberman and reasonably concluded that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Leave to appeal was denied because there was no conflicting authority, no serious reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, and the proposed appeal raised no issue of broader importance.

The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff had sued a nightclub within the limitation period after falling from an elevated dance floor but only later added the landlord after discovering during examinations for discovery that the landlord participated in the design and construction of the stage.

The court considered the discoverability provisions under s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and the extent of reasonable pre-discovery investigation required of plaintiff’s counsel in occupiers’ liability claims.

The court held that the plaintiff was not required to seek information from adverse parties before discovery where those parties had no obligation to provide it.

The limitation period began when the plaintiff first learned of the landlord’s involvement during discovery, rendering the action timely.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their existing action to add a municipality as a defendant years after a fatal motor vehicle accident, arguing that the limitation period under the Trustee Act applied exclusively and could be extended based on special circumstances.

The court held that the Trustee Act limitation period operates in addition to, not in place of, the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Because the limitation period under the Limitations Act had expired, s. 21 barred the plaintiffs from adding the municipality as a party to the proceeding.

In any event, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate lack of prejudice to the proposed defendant or establish special circumstances justifying relief.

The motion to amend was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 26.01 to add a maintenance contractor as a defendant in a personal injury action arising from an escalator incident at a theatre.

The motion was served more than two years after the accident, requiring the court to determine whether the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002 could extend the limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff had early knowledge of the contractor’s potential involvement through incident reports and communications with insurance adjusters but took no investigative steps to pursue the claim.

The court held that neither the plaintiff nor her counsel demonstrated due diligence sufficient to establish a triable issue on discoverability.

The motion to add the proposed defendant was therefore refused as statute-barred.

During an ongoing civil trial involving dealership market allocation disputes, the defendant sought permission to rely on a second supplemental expert report and to introduce maps and charts derived from previously discovered market study data.

The plaintiff argued the late expert report constituted trial by ambush and violated prior scheduling orders.

The court held that the supplemental expert opinion properly responded to new expert evidence and newly discovered data introduced during the proceedings, and its admission would not cause unfair prejudice.

The court also permitted the introduction of charts and maps derived from historical data for explanatory purposes, while refusing to authorize a new expert report from a non-designated witness responding to the opposing expert.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his motion to set aside a Registrar's Order that had dismissed his personal injury action for delay.

The appellant's former counsel had failed to advance the action, missed deadlines, and ignored the dismissal order for years due to a lack of any system for tracking deadlines.

The Divisional Court found that while the Master made some factual errors regarding prejudice, her overall exercise of discretion was entitled to deference.

The court held that the egregious conduct of the appellant's counsel and the resulting prejudice to the respondent justified refusing to set aside the dismissal order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion asserting that the plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident claim was statute-barred under the two‑year limitation period tied to the discoverability of a threshold injury under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court considered whether it was discoverable before January 23, 2010 that the plaintiff had sustained a permanent and serious impairment meeting the statutory threshold following a 2008 accident.

Although the plaintiff had suffered significant symptoms and had consulted numerous medical professionals, the medical evidence did not clearly establish permanence or seriousness prior to that date.

The court held that the available medical reports created a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding discoverability and the limitation defence.

The defendants’ motion was therefore dismissed, leaving the limitation and threshold issues to be determined at trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a personal injury action for delay.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident and had been dismissed after the plaintiff failed to set the matter down for trial following mediation.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in Scaini v. Prochnicki, the court considered the four Reid criteria, including the explanation for delay, intention to proceed, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although the plaintiff did not fully satisfy the first and third criteria due to significant delay, the court found the delay largely attributable to counsel’s inadvertence and concluded the defendant had not suffered material prejudice.

Balancing the interests of the parties, the court set aside the registrar’s dismissal order and extended the time to set the action down for trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action, which arose from a real estate transaction.

The action was dismissed by the Registrar after the plaintiffs failed to set the matter down for trial in accordance with a court-ordered timetable.

The court applied the four-part test for setting aside a dismissal and found that the plaintiffs' delay was intentional, as they had prioritized an alternative resolution through the Ministry of the Environment over the litigation.

Given the significant delay in bringing the motion and the prejudice to the defendants, the court refused to set aside the dismissal.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of claim under Rule 21.01 based on the expiry of a limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred because a plaintiff is not obligated to plead discoverability until a statement of defence pleading a limitation period is delivered.

The court also clarified that the exception allowing a claim to be struck for a limitation period prior to a defence is confined to cases with no legal or factual complexities.

This was a costs decision following a summary judgment motion by the defendant insurer asserting the plaintiffs' action was statute-barred and a successful cross-motion by the plaintiffs to amend their pleading.

The court had previously granted the cross-motion, dismissed the insurer's summary judgment motion, and declared the action timely.

On costs, the insurer argued the issue was novel and that no costs should be awarded, or alternatively that costs should be capped at $3,500.

The court held that costs were appropriate and fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $7,000 all inclusive on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a judgment assessing damages for an admitted breach, arguing the motion judge applied the wrong test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the correct test and reasonably concluded it was foreseeable the respondent would continue to lend money to the deceased.

The court also upheld the motion judge's analysis regarding section 13 of the Evidence Act.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim for delay under Rule 24.01, and to set aside ex parte orders validating service.

The plaintiff's counsel had inadvertently marked the file as closed, resulting in a delay of over three years in advancing the action.

The court found that while the delay was intentional for a short period, it was not contumelious, inordinate, or inexcusable.

The court also declined to set aside the ex parte service orders, noting the defendants were aware of the action and suffered no actual prejudice.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver.

Eighty-nine days after the accident, the plaintiffs' lawyer notified their insurer of an intent to sue under the uninsured motorist provisions.

The lawyer inadvertently failed to name the insurer as a defendant in the initial action.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the insurer over two years after the initial notice letter.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run when the letter was sent because there was insufficient evidence at that time to determine if the injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The appellants appealed a Master's order refusing to set aside a registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The Divisional Court found that the Master made factual errors regarding the calculation of delay and the alleged prejudice to the respondents concerning document preservation.

Furthermore, the Master failed to conduct a proper contextual analysis of the Reid factors, including the impact of recent amendments to Rule 48.14 extending the time for dismissal.

The appeal was allowed, and the dismissal order was set aside.

This was a costs decision following dismissal of a defence summary judgment motion in a motor vehicle negligence action that alleged the claim was statute-barred.

The successful party sought $9,212.95 in costs, while the opposing parties argued that no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, that costs should be reduced.

The court held there was no reason to depart from the normal rule that partial indemnity costs follow the event.

After reviewing the bill of costs and responding submissions, the court fixed costs at $7,750 all inclusive.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a Registrar’s dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a shooting at a Halloween attraction.

The court held that the delay was attributable to counsel’s serious depression and anxiety rather than the plaintiff, and that the defendants and third parties had not demonstrated meaningful prejudice from restoration of the action.

Applying a contextual approach to the Reid factors, and considering the evolving Rule 48 regime and proportionality, the court reinstated the action.

The court imposed a deadline requiring the action to be set down for trial by December 31, 2015 and awarded the defendants lump-sum motion costs.