Unrepresented

Three siblings challenged the validity of their father’s will on the basis of alleged undue influence by their youngest brother.

The court first determined that the will had been duly executed in compliance with the Succession Law Reform Act and that the testator had knowledge and approval of its contents.

The applicants argued that the youngest brother manipulated the parents and poisoned their relationship with the other children, leading to their disinheritance.

The court held that the burden of proving undue influence rested on the challengers and found that the evidence did not establish coercion or fraud sufficient to invalidate the will.

Instead, the court concluded that longstanding estrangement between the parents and the applicants explained the testamentary disposition.

The respondent father brought a motion to change seeking rescission of child support arrears, termination of child support, and credit for alleged overpayment of daycare expenses after the child turned 12.

The court held that the father failed to meet the legal criteria for retroactive rescission of arrears, emphasizing delay, lack of disclosure, and conduct inconsistent with relief.

The court imputed income after adjusting business deductions and fixed income at $30,000 for support purposes.

Child support was reduced prospectively to guideline support effective December 1, 2012, daycare expenses were terminated from that date, and orthodontic expenses were ordered as a shared s.7 expense.

The court held that a child participating in an international exchange remained a “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act and declined to terminate support during the exchange period.

The parties proceeded to trial on the issues of child and spousal support following an eight-year cohabitation.

The applicant father is the sole shareholder of a successful engineering company, while the respondent mother is employed at a modest income and has re-partnered.

The court imputed $90,000 of the corporation's pre-tax income to the father under s. 18 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, setting his income at $201,537.

Child support was determined based on a shared custody set-off, with a deduction for the biological father's actual support payments.

The mother was awarded compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support of $2,250 per month for a fixed duration of six years, with a retroactive award adjusted for notional tax consequences.

The children's aid society brought a summary judgment motion in a Status Review application, seeking an order making the child a Crown ward without access for the purposes of adoption.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking to have the matter remitted to trial.

The court held that the two-part test for Status Review applications established by the Supreme Court of Canada continues to apply despite legislative amendments.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the child's continued need for protection, the appropriate disposition of Crown wardship, or the termination of access, given the mother's longstanding inability to meet the child's physical and emotional needs and manage his behaviour.

The motion was granted and the child was made a Crown ward without access.

The appellant insurer appealed an interlocutory order adding it as a Statutory Third Party rather than as an intervenor under Rule 13.01 in an action arising from an allegedly staged motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued that as a Statutory Third Party, it could not take a position contrary to its insured, preventing it from fully contesting liability based on fraud.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding that the insurer should be added as a party Defendant to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and to allow it to properly defend against the alleged fraud.

The applicant sought an order for joint custody of the parties' child and a writ of possession for his solely owned residence, which the respondent had refused to vacate following their separation.

The respondent did not attend the uncontested hearing.

The court formalized the status quo joint custody arrangement.

Finding that section 104 of the Courts of Justice Act did not apply to real property, the court relied on its equitable jurisdiction and the tort of trespass to order a writ of possession in favour of the applicant.

The court also ordered the respondent to reimburse the applicant for a utility bill but declined to order occupation rent.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Dismissal Order that was issued over four years prior, due to his former counsel's chronic delay and failure to comply with court orders.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that while there was no prejudice to the defendant, the delay was inexcusable, not prompt, and counsel's conduct amounted to deliberate dereliction rather than mere inadvertence.

The motion was dismissed and the dismissal order was upheld, with costs awarded to the defendant.

The applicant brought a motion to change to terminate or vary spousal support payable under a separation agreement, and to seek reimbursement for their son's post-secondary education expenses.

The court found that the respondent was not cohabiting with her new partner, but imputed an income of $3,000 per month to her due to underemployment, which triggered a termination clause in the agreement.

The court also found a material change in circumstances due to the failure of the applicant's business.

Spousal support was terminated retroactively to January 1, 2011.

The applicant's claim for education expenses was dismissed because he failed to consult the respondent before incurring them.

A children’s aid society appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion seeking Crown wardship without access in a child protection proceeding.

The motions judge had refused the order due to concerns about hearsay evidence and insufficient detail addressing statutory requirements under the Child and Family Services Act, including the plan of care and efforts to assist the parent.

The appeal court held that summary judgment is available in child protection cases where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the affidavit evidence was sufficient in context, particularly given the absence of opposition and the parent’s consent.

The court also accepted fresh evidence regarding the child’s placement and adoptability.

The appeal was allowed and the court substituted an order finding the child in need of protection and granting Crown wardship without access.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection.

The older child had disclosed physical abuse by the mother, which was corroborated by medical evidence and a criminal conviction.

The mother denied the abuse and exhibited concerning behaviour during access visits, including speaking a language the child did not understand and disparaging the foster parents.

A parenting capacity assessment concluded the mother was at high risk for physical abusiveness and lacked empathy.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the need for protection.

The older child was made a Crown ward, and the younger child was placed in the custody of her father via a deemed custody order, with supervised access for the mother.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty to truancy under s. 30(5) of the Education Act.

The sentencing court had suspended sentence and imposed a period of probation.

The appellant sought to have the sentence set aside and requested an absolute discharge due to concerns that the conviction record could negatively affect future opportunities.

The Superior Court found that the matter had been commenced under the Provincial Offences Act and should have been tried in Provincial Offences Court rather than Youth Criminal Justice Court.

The court set aside both the conviction and sentence and directed that the matter be sent to Provincial Offences Court.

In a supplementary endorsement following an earlier decision, the court addressed an outstanding request by the plaintiff lender for possession of the corporate defendant’s assets pursuant to a General Security Agreement.

The court granted the request and ordered possession of the corporation’s assets, property, and undertaking.

The endorsement also clarified the commencement date and statutory basis for pre‑judgment interest under the Courts of Justice Act, confirming it would run from the date pleaded in the statement of claim.

The plaintiff was further entitled to post‑judgment interest in accordance with the statute.