Unrepresented

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation and disclosure of real estate transactions regarding a property he previously occupied.

The defendant second mortgagee brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action against it and for a judicial sale of the property.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding damages were an adequate remedy and the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate a prior default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court granted the defendant's motion, dismissing the action against it on the basis of res judicata and ordering a judicial sale of the property.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment to place twin infants into extended society care.

The children, who are of First Nations heritage, were born prematurely with special medical needs due to the mother's substance abuse.

The mother did not participate in the proceedings.

The father opposed the motion, seeking to have the children placed in his care.

The court found that the father lacked suitable housing, failed to acknowledge the children's medical needs, and exhibited concerning behaviours indicative of unaddressed mental health issues.

The First Nations bands supported the society's plan, which included ongoing contact with a maternal aunt.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial and concluding that extended society care was in the children's best interests.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that the child be placed in extended society care with no access.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the child's need for protection and placement in extended care, noting the mother's history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and failure to engage in services.

However, the court found that material facts were in dispute regarding the quality of access visits and ordered a focused hearing to determine the issue of access.

Following the consent resolution of competing guardianship applications, the parties sought costs.

The applicants sought costs against each other, and alternatively against the incapable person's estate.

The court ordered that the incapable person's estate pay the costs of her section 3 counsel, but declined to order costs against the estate for the competing applicants, finding the incapable person derived no benefit from the family dispute.

The court made no order as to costs between the competing applicants, requiring each to bear their own.

The applicant father brought a motion to change an interjurisdictional child support order, seeking to terminate support for his two adult children effective April 1, 2012, on the basis that they were no longer enrolled in full-time post-secondary education.

The respondent mother, who resides in New Brunswick, was noted in default.

The court confirmed it had jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to vary the New Brunswick order registered in Ontario.

Given the lack of evidence of the children's ongoing enrollment and the respondent's failure to respond, the court ordered the termination of child support effective April 1, 2012.

Following a successful motion for child and spousal support where income was imputed to the respondent husband, the applicant wife sought costs.

The court applied the Family Law Rules costs framework, noting the husband's unreasonable delay in disclosure and his failure to make a reasonable settlement offer.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $7,500 against the husband and $500 against the husband's brother, who had intervened unnecessarily.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim spousal and child support.

The core issue was determining the respondent husband's income, as he is a lawyer who deducted personal legal fees and other unreasonable expenses from his business income.

The court imputed the husband's income at $248,356 by adding back these deductions and grossing them up.

The court ordered the husband to pay interim spousal support of $2,300 per month and interim child support of $459 per month, leaving retroactive claims and final determinations for trial.

The applicant payor brought a motion for a refraining order against the Family Responsibility Office and a motion to change a final child support order.

During the hearing, it was revealed that the applicant's signature on his affidavit and financial statement had been forged, likely by his counsel.

Despite the procedural irregularities, the court found that the children were no longer eligible for support as of 2010 and the applicant had actually overpaid.

Relying on the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, the court dispensed with service on the recipient and assignee, granted the refraining order, and terminated the child support order retroactively.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against four non-party respondents, alleging they harassed the plaintiff's proposed expert witness by writing to her university employers and publishing a defamatory blog.

The court found that one respondent's letters, while misguided, did not constitute contempt and dismissed the motion against him.

The court ordered two other respondents to cease and desist all communications with the expert's current and prospective employers, finding their use of pseudonyms and links to a denigrating blog was an improper attempt to discourage her from testifying.

The court declined to make a contempt finding at this stage and adjourned the request to take down the blog to allow for full argument on freedom of expression defenses.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant previously succeeded in an application for conversion and unjust enrichment against the respondents, including a principal towing company and its agent.

The court subsequently increased the damages award against the principal by 13% to account for taxes payable on the deemed forced sale of the converted vehicles.

The sole remaining issue was whether the agent was also liable for this 13% increase.

The court held that there was no principled basis to separate the agent's liability from that of the principal, finding the agent equally responsible for the full amount owing to the applicant.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking findings that four children were in need of protection and seeking final disposition orders.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues for trial regarding protection and disposition.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding the children were in need of protection due to the mother's unstable housing, domestic violence, and inability to meet the children's needs, particularly one child's complex medical needs.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the medically fragile child, sole custody to the father for another child, and a six-month Society wardship for the two older children.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against the defendants after alleging misrepresentations in the sale of a business.

The defendants moved to set aside the injunction, arguing the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to compel further financial disclosure, arguing the defendants had not complied with the initial order.

The court stayed the defendants' motion until they provided full financial disclosure, noting that the failure to disclose material facts on an ex parte motion does not automatically require dissolution of the injunction, and the court must balance the interests of both parties.

The plaintiff's motion for further disclosure was granted.

Following a finding of liability for conversion and unjust enrichment, one of the respondents retained new counsel and indicated an intention to move to re-open the application under Rule 59.06.

The court requested written submissions on its jurisdiction to hear the intended motion.

The court held that because no formal order had yet been taken out, it was not functus officio and retained broad jurisdiction to change its judgment.

The court directed the respondent to schedule the motion to re-open before the same judge.

Following a reference to determine the amount owing under a second mortgage and the sale of the property, the court determined the costs of the proceeding.

The second mortgagee was awarded $20,000 in partial indemnity costs against the mortgagors and the third mortgagee, exhausting the remaining surplus funds.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs against the third mortgagee for unnecessarily causing the second mortgagee and a former counsel to prepare for a costs hearing on claims that were abandoned at the last minute.

The court declined to determine the validity of the third mortgage as no surplus funds remained.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for want of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs, an inventor and his company, sued multiple foreign corporate and individual defendants for breach of a Non-Disclosure Agreement and intellectual property claims.

The court found that the Non-Disclosure Agreement contained a clear forum selection clause designating Massachusetts.

Furthermore, applying the Van Breda test, the court held it lacked jurisdiction simpliciter as none of the presumptive connecting factors were present in Ontario.

The action was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion to continue an order suspending the applicant mother's access to the children and restraining her from communicating with them.

The court found that the mother had engaged in a prolonged campaign of emotional abuse, manipulation, and denigration of the father, which had destabilized the children.

Since the suspension of access, the children had thrived in the father's care.

The court held that it was in the children's best interests to continue the access suspension and restraining orders, with a provision for limited, supervised communication in the future.

The plaintiff vendor and defendant purchaser entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The purchaser paid an $80,000 deposit.

On the closing date, the purchaser's lawyer emailed the vendor's lawyer stating the purchaser did not have financing and could not close.

The vendor's lawyer responded with a letter accepting the anticipatory breach, stating the deposit was forfeited and the vendor would sue for damages.

The purchaser argued the acceptance was not clear and unequivocal because the vendor had discussions with a real estate agent about extending the closing.

The court found the vendor's lawyer's letter was a clear and unequivocal acceptance of the anticipatory breach and the discussions did not constitute a waiver.

The court ordered the $80,000 deposit paid to the vendor as damages and dismissed the purchaser's counterclaim.

The plaintiff, Darren John, brought an undefended action against Steve Kiefer and Wee Rent It for assault and other claims.

The defendants had never defended the action.

The court found Mr. Kiefer liable for assault based on deemed admissions under Rule 19.06 and the plaintiff's oral evidence.

All other causes of action against Mr. Kiefer and the entire action against Wee Rent It were dismissed due to insufficient pleading or lack of evidence.

The plaintiff was awarded $100 in general damages for the assault and $780 in special damages for lost wages immediately following the incident.

Claims for damages related to subsequent criminal charges against the plaintiff (legal fees, lost wages for trial attendance, anxiety from charges) were dismissed as they did not arise from Kiefer's assault and were not substantiated or properly pleaded as malicious prosecution.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order of Crown wardship for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over two years.

The mother opposed the motion but filed no responding materials, while the father was noted in default.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing struggles with alcohol addiction and failure to complete recommended treatment programs.

The motion was granted, and Crown wardship was ordered with access provided to the mother on a regular basis, including attendance at cultural events.

The plaintiff proceeded with an undefended claim against the defendant.

The court found that the defendant breached its contract with the plaintiff, was unjustly enriched, and improperly used the plaintiff's trade name, Kerkuk Café.

The plaintiff was directed to provide a draft judgment summarizing the losses and damages.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis fixed at $25,000.