Timothy M. Duggan

Following a motion for summary judgment, the court raised the question of whether to make an order declaring a litigant vexatious under section 140(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, given a previous family court order limiting such a declaration to specific proceedings.

The court received submissions from the defendants and the Attorney General.

The court ultimately declined to answer the question, as the Attorney General indicated an intention to commence a formal application to declare the litigant vexatious, rendering the court's question moot.

The plaintiffs, former residential tenants, sued the landlord and property managers for conversion, alleging wrongful disposal of their personal property following an eviction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

A proposed intervenor, claiming to be a subtenant, brought a motion for leave to intervene.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene, finding the proposed intervenor lacked credibility and was likely the same person as the plaintiff.

The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the landlord had complied with section 41 of the Residential Tenancies Act regarding abandoned property, which barred the action.

The court also dismissed claims related to swearing false affidavits, noting no such civil cause of action exists.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants.

The applicant, a condominium corporation, sought to compel the Director of Titles to register an agreement with a commercial owner involving common elements, land transfers, and altered easements.

The Director of Titles opposed, arguing the condominium board failed to follow the required 80% unit holder vote under section 124 of the Condominium Act, 1998, instead relying on section 107.

The court, exercising its broad discretion under section 134 of the Act, found section 124 was the preferable procedure but regularized the process by deeming prior consents as votes in favour, with conditions for notice to unit holders.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order against the respondent unit owner due to persistent disruptive behaviour by the respondent and her daughter, violating condominium rules and the Condominium Act.

Despite multiple warnings and prior court orders, the respondent failed to appear or address the issues.

The court ordered the respondent to vacate and sell her unit, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the applicant.

A condominium unit owner brought an application challenging the termination of her parking space lease, the registration of two condominium liens, and administrative fines imposed by the condominium corporation.

The court found that the condominium corporation improperly terminated the parking lease before the expiry of the notice period and wrongfully registered liens that included amounts not properly lienable under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The court further held that bylaw provisions allowing the board to impose arbitrary administrative fees were ultra vires and that the board’s refusal to engage in required mediation and arbitration, along with its conduct toward the owner, constituted oppressive conduct.

However, the applicant failed to prove that most of her alleged damages were causally connected to the misconduct.

The court ordered repayment of amounts paid under the invalid liens and awarded nominal damages for oppression.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion for default judgment and injunctive relief enforcing a restrictive covenant preventing a former employee from working for a competing medical spa or weight loss centre within a specified geographic radius for two years.

The court held that the non‑competition clause was unreasonable due to its excessive temporal restriction and ambiguity in its geographic scope.

The plaintiff also failed to establish irreparable harm and provided only speculative evidence of client or employee solicitation.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendant because enforcing the covenant would effectively prevent the defendant from working in her field.

The motion for injunctive relief was denied.