Thomas P. Connolly

Following acceptance of an offer before a scheduled trial, the parties sought a judicial determination of costs, pre-judgment interest, and the proper wording of a release.

The court assessed relative success on issues including the quantum of costs previously awarded, the appropriate start date for pre‑judgment interest, and the permissibility of additional confidentiality and derivative action clauses in the release.

The plaintiff was more successful overall, particularly in resisting unilateral additions to the release.

A prior Rule 49 offer did not trigger adverse cost consequences because the judgment exceeded the offer and the proposed release terms had not been agreed upon.

Applying Rule 57 cost factors, the court fixed the plaintiff’s costs of the motion at $9,000 inclusive.

The successful plaintiffs sought costs following a motion in civil litigation.

The court considered the relevant factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including success on the motion, proportionality, complexity of the issues, and the conduct of the parties.

The defendants argued that costs should not be awarded due to alleged deficiencies in disclosure discovered during examinations for discovery.

The court declined to address the disclosure dispute at this stage and left any potential consequences to the trial judge.

Finding the plaintiffs completely successful and the claimed partial indemnity costs reasonable, the court ordered the defendants to pay costs in the amount of $9,500 inclusive of HST.

Following settlement of an environmental claim between the plaintiff and a third party for $30,000 shortly before trial, the parties were unable to agree on the wording of the release and the quantum of costs.

The court considered whether a confidentiality clause and an expanded derivative indemnity enforcement clause should be included despite not being specified in the settlement offer.

The court held that such terms cannot be implied where they were not negotiated as part of the settlement agreement.

The court also determined the appropriate quantum of partial indemnity costs and assessed proportionality and fairness in light of the litigation circumstances.

Costs were fixed at $38,000 with pre‑judgment interest calculated according to the settlement terms.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that a 40‑foot road allowance adjacent to their property constituted a public highway and alternatively claimed ownership of portions of neighbouring land through adverse possession or similar equitable remedies.

The Township and the neighbouring landowner brought motions for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs brought a cross‑motion to amend their statement of claim.

The court granted leave to amend under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the proposed amendments legally tenable and not causing irremediable prejudice.

Summary judgment was granted to the Township because the evidence established the road allowance was a private roadway never dedicated to or accepted by the municipality as a public highway.

However, summary judgment was refused with respect to the neighbouring landowner because significant factual disputes, including inconsistent permission agreements and issues surrounding encroachments and use rights, required a full trial.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions in a civil action while the plaintiffs brought a motion to amend the statement of claim.

During the hearing, the parties did not address whether the defendants intended their summary judgment motions to apply to the relief sought in any amended pleading should the amendment be granted.

The court directed counsel to arrange a brief appearance or provide written submissions addressing this procedural issue.

The endorsement addresses scheduling and clarification of the scope of the summary judgment motions.

The applicant sought a declaration that her homeowner’s insurer owed a duty to defend counterclaims alleging negligent supervision of a child that resulted in injury to her son.

The counterclaims arose after the family sued third parties for injuries sustained by the child, and those defendants sought contribution and indemnity against the applicant.

The insurer denied coverage relying on a policy exclusion for bodily injury to the insured or any person residing in the insured’s household.

The court held that the exclusion, read together with the policy’s liability coverage provisions, clearly removed coverage for claims relating to bodily injury suffered by a household member.

Because the injured child fell within the policy definition of “you”, the insurer had no duty to defend the counterclaims.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking answers to undertakings and refusals arising from examinations for discovery in a civil action alleging assault, battery, and negligence against police officers following a fatal police shooting.

The central dispute concerned the permissible scope of questioning, particularly regarding police training, background information, and documents created after the incident.

The court held that discovery must be focused and proportionate under the amended Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered answers only where the information was directly relevant to the negligence issues.

Questions about police training, operational conduct, and contemporaneous draft notes prepared before official notebook entries were ordered answered, while broad background inquiries and certain privileged materials were refused.

The court also ruled that draft notes prepared and sent to counsel prior to the preparation of official police notes were not protected by privilege and must be produced.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that it owed a duty to defend the respondents.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded under a clause for claims arising from damage to property the insured owns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion clause was written in the present tense and did not apply to property that the respondents formerly owned but no longer owned at the time of the claim.

The respondents were awarded costs on a full indemnity scale.

The applicant union council referred a construction industry grievance to the Board under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging the employer violated the Pipeline Agreement by assigning swamper work to a member of the Teamsters instead of a labourer.

The Teamsters intervened, arguing the grievance was a jurisdictional dispute and that the applicant lacked status to grieve.

The Board found that the applicant was not a party to the Pipeline Agreement, which was strictly between the International union and the employer association.

Because the applicant was merely an affiliated bargaining agent and not a party to the specific collective agreement, it had no status to bring or refer the grievance.

The grievance was dismissed.

The applicants applied to terminate the bargaining rights of the respondent union and its Local 1036.

At the initial hearing, the Board dismissed the application on a motion by the respondents, finding that all affiliated local unions named in the provincial collective agreement were necessary parties and had not been properly named or given sufficient notice.

Upon reconsideration, the Board found that all affiliated locals had in fact received actual notice and were represented at the hearing.

Concluding that it was overly technical to deny an amendment to the title of the proceedings, the Board revoked its earlier dismissal, amended the title nunc pro tunc to include all affiliated locals as respondents, and directed that the application be scheduled for a hearing on the merits.

The complainant union sought an interim order under section 91(8) of the Labour Relations Act regarding a work assignment dispute over the stripping of concrete forms.

The employer had initially assigned the work to a composite crew of labourers and carpenters.

Following a work stoppage by the carpenters, the employer reassigned the work to specific trades.

The respondent union challenged the Board's jurisdiction, arguing a strike was not imminent.

The Board found that the walk-out constituted a strike and that the threat of a strike remained imminent if the composite crew was reinstated.

The Board held it had jurisdiction and issued an interim order directing the employer to resume using a composite crew, emphasizing the policy objective of not rewarding work stoppages in jurisdictional disputes.