Sylvia M. Samuel

The applicant sought a review of an IIROC hearing panel decision that ordered his merits hearing to proceed electronically by videoconference due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant argued that IIROC lacked jurisdiction to change the hearing mode over his objection and that the IIROC Rules entitled him to an in-person oral hearing.

The Ontario Securities Commission upheld the IIROC decision, finding that the IIROC Rules permit a hearing panel to choose the hearing mode and that a videoconference hearing satisfies a respondent's entitlement to attend and be heard 'in person'.

The applicant, the deceased's spouse of 25 years, brought an application for dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased had left the applicant 11 months before his death, moved in with the respondent, and changed his will and beneficiary designations to name the respondent as sole beneficiary.

The court found the applicant was a dependant and the deceased failed to make adequate provision for her support.

Applying the statutory factors, the court ordered that the applicant receive the life insurance proceeds paid to the respondent, half of a joint bank account, the deceased's RRSP funds, shares, and his interest in a business.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision dismissing his human rights application under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had filed a civil action based on the same factual situation, which could give rise to a remedy for discrimination, even though a breach of the Code was not specifically pleaded.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) is intended to preclude duplicate proceedings and dismissed the reconsideration request.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging racial discrimination by the respondent police services board and officers.

The applicant had also commenced a civil action against the respondents alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and breach of Charter and human rights arising from the same factual context.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code bars an application where a civil proceeding seeking remedies for the same alleged Code infringement is ongoing.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision refusing their request for a stay of the Ontario proceedings.

The motions judge had concluded that Ontario, not New Brunswick, was the appropriate forum based on the contract's attornment clause and a forum non conveniens analysis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's order.

The appellant appealed and the respondents cross-appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the appellant based on negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal found that negligent misrepresentation was not pleaded and the trial judge's findings regarding non-disclosure of a commission were contradicted by the appellant's own admission.

Furthermore, there was no evidence of reliance.

The appeal was dismissed, the cross-appeal was allowed, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendants appealed an order striking paragraph 54 of their statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the allegations could not succeed as a defence or partial defence to the claims.

The Court noted that a fiduciary is not responsible for all damages suffered by a complaining party regardless of their cause, distinguishing the case from Plaza Fiberglass.

The appeal was allowed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a costs award of $30,825.42 made in a construction lien action where the plaintiff claimed $15,242.15.

The Master found the owners acted in bad faith by failing to retain statutory holdback funds and continuing spurious defences.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle that would justify granting leave, given the owners' unprincipled conduct and the blameless conduct of the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their solicitor's negligence claim and awarding substantial indemnity costs to the respondents.

They also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias and negligence grounds, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported by the evidence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award to $35,000, while maintaining the substantial indemnity scale due to the nature of the allegations made by the appellants.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with no costs of the appeal.