Simon Schneiderman

Following a protracted family law trial primarily concerning the equalization of net family property and the valuation of the applicant's business, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the parties had divided success on the central issue of business valuation, and thus each party would bear their own costs for that portion of the trial.

However, the applicant was successful on the remaining issues, including retroactive support and the value of the matrimonial home.

The court concluded that none of the offers to settle triggered Rule 18(14) cost consequences and rejected allegations of bad faith from both sides.

The applicant was awarded costs fixed at $45,950 plus HST for the issues on which she succeeded.

The parties separated after a seven-year marriage.

The core issues at trial involved claims for retroactive child and spousal support, equalization of net family property, and a claim for unequal division under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

A significant portion of the trial focused on determining the fair market value of the applicant's 33.3% interest in a logistics company.

The court preferred the valuation evidence of the respondent's expert, with some modifications, valuing the interest at $358,500.00.

The court dismissed the applicant's claim that equalization would be unconscionable due to a post-separation decline in the company's value.

The court ordered the respondent to pay retroactive child support and reimburse the applicant for an overpayment of spousal support.

Ultimately, the applicant was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $183,589.09 to the respondent.

Following earlier endorsements granting relief to the applicant in an estate dispute, the court determined the issue of costs.

The judge reviewed the parties’ written submissions, including settlement positions, and applied the discretionary factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Considering the expectations of the parties in the event of an unsuccessful outcome, the court held that the applicant was entitled to recover her costs.

The costs were ordered payable out of the estate and fixed in a specified amount including taxes and disbursements.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for oppressive conduct in a joint venture for property development.

The trial judge found the appellants had extracted equity from the properties through unauthorized mortgages and transferred the proceeds to their own companies, ordering an accounting and substantial indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's valuation, cost calculations, or costs award, noting the appellants' conduct was reprehensible.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding an erroneous deduction from their capital allocation was allowed.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal of a Superior Court order directing payment out of court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, finding that the underlying order was temporary and interlocutory under Family Law Rule 2(1) and general jurisprudence, as it did not finally determine the issue of support arrears or the appellant's set-off defence.

The individual defendants, who were architects and a contractor, sought leave to appeal a motions judge's decision refusing to grant summary judgment dismissing the claims against them personally.

The plaintiffs had sued the individuals despite the relevant contracts being with their respective corporations.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the summary judgment test.

The court noted that the motions judge allowed the claims to proceed based on 'just barely some factual basis' rather than requiring a genuine issue for trial, and that the scope of personal liability for corporate directors and employees is a matter of public importance.

The appellants appealed a judgment based on a promissory note and uncontradicted evidence of debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain submissions that contradicted concessions appropriately made by the appellants' counsel before the motion judge.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a Motions Court Judge's decision refusing to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The respondents had claimed a remedial constructive trust based on alleged unconscionable conduct following the termination of a contract.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and vacated the CPL, finding no evidence of unconscionable conduct by the appellants and noting that the respondents' claim was essentially for breach of contract rather than an equitable cause of action.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment issued on a promissory note and the motion judge's refusal to grant a stay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision based on the record before her.

However, based on fresh evidence tendered on appeal, the Court upheld the summary judgment but ordered a stay of the judgment until the respondent provides proof of compliance with its obligations to obtain releases of guarantees under the parties' Shareholder's Agreement and Undertaking and Indemnification Agreement.

The applicants, former employees of the Ministry of Finance, were transferred to the Ontario Property Assessment Corporation (OPAC) when the Ministry's property assessment functions were transferred.

At the time of the transfer, both applicants were eligible to retire under the 'Factor 80' provisions of their respective pension plans and sought to receive their pension benefits while continuing to work for OPAC.

The Superintendent of Financial Services refused to order the pension plan administrators to pay the benefits, finding that under section 80 of the Pension Benefits Act, the transfer constituted a sale of a business and the applicants' employment was deemed not to have been terminated.

The Financial Services Tribunal affirmed the Superintendent's decision, holding that the applicants could not receive pension benefits without actually terminating their employment with the successor employer.