Shannon Leigh Curry

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct in a domestic violence case involving charges of assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, sexual assault with a weapon, and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

The defence opposed, arguing the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court applied the test for admissibility of prior discreditable conduct, finding three of the four proposed instances relevant and admissible to provide narrative context and demonstrate animus, with limiting instructions to the jury.

One instance, the "bathtub incident" was excluded due to its highly inflammatory nature and potential for reasoning prejudice.

The applicant sought a stay of her 18-month driving prohibition pending the appeal of her convictions for dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay under s. 261(1) of the Criminal Code.

While the court found the appeal had arguable merit and the applicant would suffer hardship due to her self-employment, it concluded she failed to demonstrate she was not a danger to the public given her erratic driving on a busy highway.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and weapons dangerous following a late-night altercation outside a nightclub.

The victims, who were highly intoxicated, instigated the confrontation and chased the accused and his friend when they attempted to flee.

The accused, fearing for his life, used a pocket knife to stab at least one of the pursuers.

The court found the accused acted in lawful self-defence and that his possession of the knife was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The Crown brought a motion under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code seeking an order to allow the complainant to testify by closed-circuit television (CCTV) or, alternatively, behind a screen.

The complainant, now 19 years old, was allegedly sexually assaulted by the defendant between 2008 and 2009 when the complainant was 9 to 11 years old and the defendant was 15 to 17 years old.

The complainant expressed fear of the defendant and stated he would be unable to testify if in the same room.

The court denied the application, finding insufficient evidence to establish that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account of the evidence.

The Crown applied to admit expert opinion evidence from a dog track handler (Sgt. deRuiter) and a forensic toxicologist (Dr. Langille) in a criminal trial for impaired driving causing bodily harm and fail to remain.

The respondent objected to the scope and admissibility of the expert evidence.

The court applied the two-step inquiry for expert evidence admissibility, considering the Mohan criteria and the cost-benefit analysis from R. v. Abbey.

The court found both expert opinions relevant, necessary, and not subject to exclusionary rules, with qualified experts.

The probative value of the evidence, particularly given the lack of eyewitnesses and the injured party's memory loss, was deemed to outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The Crown's application was granted for both experts.

The accused, charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his jury trial.

The accused argued that sitting in the dock would prejudice his right to a fair trial, erode the presumption of innocence, and limit his ability to instruct counsel.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security, sight-lines, and the lack of exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, applying the principles from R. v. Gervais, and found that the accused failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances necessitating a departure from the customary practice of sitting in the dock.

Richard Dowdell pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

The court determined the parole ineligibility period, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, the home invasion, and the brutal nature of the attack, alongside mitigating factors including the offender's immediate admissions, guilty plea, remorse, and long-standing mental illness (Bipolar disorder with psychosis).

The court balanced denunciation, deterrence, and the offender's mental state, ultimately imposing a life sentence with parole ineligibility for 12 years, rejecting the Crown's request for 14 years.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in the death of an elderly woman.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the killing was planned and deliberate, while the defence argued the evidence supported only second degree murder.

The Crown's case relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's statements to a neighbour approximately two hours before the killing that God had commanded him to kill a female customer in the retirement community.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial on the first degree murder charge, distinguishing the case from precedents where planning and deliberation could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence.

The applicant sought judicial screening under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code for a jury hearing to reduce the 25‑year parole ineligibility period imposed following a conviction for first‑degree murder.

The court considered both the statutory filing deadlines under s. 745.6 and the substantive criteria under s. 745.63(1), including the applicant’s character, institutional conduct, nature of the offence, victim impact statements, and risk of recidivism.

The application was found to be filed outside the statutory time limits and therefore procedurally barred.

In any event, the court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that a jury would reduce the parole ineligibility period given the brutal sexually motivated murder, prior sexual violence, limited rehabilitation efforts, denial of responsibility, and ongoing risk factors.

The application was dismissed at the screening stage and the applicant was prohibited from making another application under s. 745.6(1).

The accused was charged with care or control with excess blood alcohol and impaired care or control following a motor vehicle incident.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence of erratic driving, manifest signs of impairment, and breath analysis results.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging police misconduct including improper handcuffing, an allegedly planted drug baggie, failure to preserve cell video evidence, and an improperly conducted strip search.

The court found that while some police conduct was disrespectful and the Crown breached its disclosure obligation regarding the video, these breaches did not warrant a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg contrary to the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had found breaches of the appellant’s Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 arising from an unlawful roadside screening demand but admitted the breath test evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in the application of the Grant framework by minimizing the seriousness of the police conduct, failing to properly assess the impact of the Charter breaches, and failing to adequately balance the factors governing exclusion of evidence.

The court concluded that the unlawful demand and resulting detention significantly infringed Charter‑protected interests and that the trial judge’s analysis contained legal errors affecting the result.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control and care or control with excess blood alcohol following an incident on July 29, 2011.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings to establish the over 80 charge.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and whether the Crown could prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court found that while the police proceeded "as soon as practicable" in obtaining breath samples, the Crown failed to prove that the first sample was taken within two hours of the last observed care or control.

The court also found that the Crown proved the absence of bolus drinking based on circumstantial evidence.

The over 80 charge was dismissed due to the Crown's inability to establish the two-hour requirement for the presumption of identity.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and uttering threats to cause death or injury to children, arising from an incident on March 25, 2011 during a custody transfer.

The Crown alleged that the accused made threatening statements to the complainant regarding her children after she refused to allow him to pick up their daughter at her home.

The court found the accused not guilty on both charges.

While the court accepted the complainant's credible testimony that the accused made the alleged statement, it found that the threat did not constitute a threat of bodily harm as defined in the Criminal Code, as there was insufficient proof of substantial interference with the psychological integrity of the children.

Additionally, the harassment charge failed because it required proof of repeated following on more than one occasion, and only a single incident of following was established.

The accused was charged with forcible confinement, threatening bodily harm, assault, and criminal harassment arising from events on March 20, 2011, involving his former romantic partner.

The Crown's case consisted primarily of the victim's testimony.

The assault charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's case for lack of prima facie case.

Following trial, the accused was acquitted on all remaining charges.

The court found reasonable doubt on the confinement charge regarding whether the victim's presence in the vehicle was unwilling, on the threat charge regarding whether the words conveyed a genuine threat in context, and on the harassment charge regarding whether the conduct caused the victim to reasonably fear for her safety.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial proceeded with a blended Charter application challenging the validity of the breath sample evidence.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) the demand under s. 254(2) Criminal Code was not made "forthwith" as required, with a 22-minute delay from formation of suspicion to commencement of testing; (2) the accused's s. 10(a)(b) Charter rights were not provided immediately after the roadside test failure.

Under s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the court excluded the Certificate of Analysis evidence as the breaches were multiple, protracted, and contrary to the officer's training, warranting disassociation by the justice system.

The accused was acquitted.