Sevag Yeghoyan

The accused pleaded guilty to simple possession of hydromorphone.

He was originally prescribed the drug for chronic pain from workplace injuries and a car accident, which led to an addiction.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the accused sought a suspended sentence.

The court considered the accused's lack of a prior criminal record, his steady employment, and his significant rehabilitative efforts, including 18 years of treatment for opiate dependency and recent success in tapering his methadone dose.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 24 months of probation, finding a custodial sentence unwarranted.

A young person applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of approximately 15 months to trial was unreasonable.

The applicant conceded that the delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan but relied on R. v. J.M. to argue for a lower presumptive ceiling of 12 to 15 months for youth matters.

The court declined to adopt a lower presumptive ceiling for youth matters, finding that such a determination should be made by appellate courts or Parliament.

The application was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish that the delay constituted a clear case of unreasonable delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in crack cocaine, methamphetamine, powdered cocaine, and hydromorphone, as well as breach of bail conditions.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3.5 to 4 years, while the defence sought an upper reformatory sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day, followed by three years of probation, with a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The sentencing decision balanced the serious nature of the drugs involved, particularly hydromorphone, against the accused's status as a first offender, his youth, his addiction, and his demonstrated commitment to rehabilitation while in custody.

The defendant was charged with multiple drug trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, including trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine for trafficking, possession of heroin for trafficking, possession of hydromorphone for trafficking, possession of cannabis for trafficking, possession of hashish for trafficking, and possession of hashish oil for trafficking, as well as failing to comply with a probation order.

The Crown conceded counts 1 and 3.

The central issues were whether the police had reasonable grounds to arrest the defendant, whether the strip search was conducted lawfully, and whether the evidence obtained should be excluded under the Charter.

The court found that while the police had reasonable grounds to arrest and the strip search was justified, it was not conducted in a reasonable manner, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence from the strip search was excluded.

The defendant was convicted of the included offences of simple possession of marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil, and failing to comply with probation.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

They were charged with importing cocaine following their arrival at Toronto Pearson Airport with suitcases containing several kilograms of cocaine concealed in altered luggage.

Applying the analytical framework from Morin and related jurisprudence, the court assessed the total delay of approximately 30 months and deducted periods attributable to inherent intake, preparation, and scheduling requirements.

The remaining delay attributable to Crown and institutional causes was calculated at approximately 13 months, below the Morin guideline range of 14 to 18 months.

Although the applicants experienced stress and hardship while on bail, the court found the prejudice largely flowed from the charges themselves rather than delay.

Balancing all factors, including the seriousness of the allegations and societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court dismissed the s. 11(b) applications.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual exploitation contrary to section 153.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant sought to exclude a statement provided to police on the grounds of a Charter violation under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, asserting that he was detained at the time of the statement.

The applicant conceded the voluntariness of the statement.

The Crown argued that the applicant was not detained and therefore no obligation to provide rights to counsel arose.

The court applied the detention test from R. v. Grant and found no significant physical or psychological restraint.

The applicant voluntarily attended the police station, was treated respectfully and politely, was informed he could leave at any time, and was interviewed in a comfortable witness room rather than an interrogation room.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the statement admissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault with a weapon against his girlfriend.

At trial, the judge accepted the complainant's evidence that the appellant smashed a beer glass over her head, rejecting the appellant's denial.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, no misapprehension of evidence, no bias, and rejecting the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the four-month custodial sentence and probation as fit for an act of domestic violence.

The Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario held a pre-hearing teleconference regarding a Notice of Proposed Order to revoke the registration of the respondent.

The Board ordered both the respondent and the Registrar to exchange witness lists, detailed summaries of witness evidence, and any further disclosure at least 10 days prior to the scheduled hearing date.