Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, a dispute arose regarding the amount required to discharge the second mortgage and stop the power of sale.

The applicant tendered the amount in the Notice of Sale plus interest, but the respondents demanded all legal fees incurred to date pursuant to the mortgage terms.

The court clarified that payment of the Notice of Sale amount plus interest would stop the sale, and the issue of liability for the respondents' costs would be addressed in the requested costs submissions.

The defendant Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought $500,000 from the co-defendants for their alleged failure to respond to an application before the HRTO.

The court found that the notice of application lacked clarity, particularity, and a legal basis, failing to plead a cause of action against any of the defendants.

The court concluded the application was frivolous and vexatious and dismissed it.

The applicant sought an order under the Road Access Act to close an access road on her property used by the respondent to access his adjacent property.

The respondent opposed, claiming a legal right to use the road via a prescriptive easement, doctrine of lost modern grant, or easement by necessity.

The court found the respondent's historical use was permissive and that he had alternate access via an unbuilt road allowance.

The court granted the applicant's request to close the road but suspended the enforcement of the order until December 31, 2020, to allow the respondent time to construct a new driveway.

This decision addresses a motion to vary or set aside a publication ban initially issued ex parte in an application concerning the appointment of an Administrator and Inspector for a condominium corporation.

The ban was sought due to threats of physical harm against former board members and affiants.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) intervened, arguing for the complete setting aside of the ban, citing freedom of the press.

The court balanced the litigants' Charter rights to security of the person against the freedom of expression, applying the Dagenais/Mentuk test.

The court found a real and substantial risk of harm, concluding that the modified publication ban, which redacts names of the applicant and affiants, should remain in place to ensure the proper administration of justice and the safety of those involved.

At a case conference, the plaintiffs objected to the defendant serving a supplementary motion record for an upcoming summary judgment motion, arguing it breached a consent timetable and Rule 39.02(2).

The court found Rule 39.02(2) did not apply because no cross-examinations had taken place.

However, the court agreed the plaintiffs had the right to respond to the new material and cross-examine on it, necessitating an adjournment of the summary judgment motion to a new date.

Following a motion to vary an order concerning their mother's care and estate, the parties made submissions on costs.

The court found that the moving parties (two of the siblings) engaged in unreasonable litigation conduct that unnecessarily lengthened and delayed the proceedings.

Costs were awarded to the Public Guardian and Trustee, Section 3 counsel, BMO Trust Company, and the responding siblings.

To sanction the moving parties' conduct while recognizing the estate's ability to pay, the court ordered the costs to be paid from the mother's estate, with 50% of those costs to be set off against the moving parties' future inheritance.

The moving parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

The court considered whether to dismiss an action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged solicitor’s negligence against the Public Guardian and Trustee and sought to hold the province vicariously liable through the Attorney General.

The court held that claims asserting provincial liability for alleged wrongdoing by the Divisional Court were frivolous because a court is not a suable entity and dismissed that aspect of the claim.

However, the court declined to summarily dismiss the remaining claims concerning potential solicitor’s negligence and directed the registrar to provide the plaintiff’s submissions to the defendants for limited response under Rule 2.1.

The court considered whether an action should be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious on its face.

The plaintiff alleged financial institutions failed to pay funds supposedly held in secret trust accounts linked to shareholders of publicly traded securities.

After inviting written submissions, the court found the plaintiff’s responding materials unintelligible and incapable of establishing a viable legal claim.

The allegations concerning secret trust accounts and proxy voting forms disclosed no recognized cause of action.

The court concluded the claim was plainly incapable of success and appropriate for summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.

The defendant invoked Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking screening of a statement of claim alleging lawyer negligence.

The pleading consisted largely of annotated correspondence and failed to provide a concise statement of material facts as required by Rule 25.06(1).

The court found the materials raised concerns that the claim might be frivolous or vexatious.

Rather than immediately dismissing the action, the court directed the registrar to issue notice under Rule 2.1.01 and provided the plaintiff an opportunity to make written submissions and potentially file a draft amended statement of claim.

The action was stayed pending the outcome of the Rule 2.1 written hearing.

The plaintiff brought a motion requesting that the registrar issue a Rule 2.1 notice to strike the defendants’ counterclaim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The underlying action alleged fraud and misrepresentation in relation to entrepreneurial immigration investment opportunities and sought recovery of $30,000.

The counterclaim sought over $25 million in damages and injunctive relief for alleged defamation and business sabotage.

The court held that, despite drafting deficiencies and procedural irregularities, the counterclaim disclosed recognizable causes of action when read generously.

Rule 2.1 was therefore inappropriate because the pleading did not present the kind of clearly abusive claim warranting the rule’s abbreviated procedure.

Following dismissal of a motion for production of documents, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered allegations made by the moving party against opposing counsel and a physician defendant, including claims of document alteration and misleading the court.

The court found the allegations unsupported and characterized them as serious and scurrilous.

Applying the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that such unfounded allegations justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the physician defendant on a substantial indemnity basis and modest costs to another defendant.

The court considered whether a civil action should be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged disputes arising from services provided by a contractor and actions taken by the contractor’s lawyer in Small Claims Court, and also named the Law Society as a defendant.

The court found that the pleadings failed to articulate any viable cause of action and improperly attempted to re‑litigate issues already before another court.

The inclusion of opposing counsel and the Law Society without a proper legal basis further demonstrated the abusive nature of the claim.

The action was summarily dismissed under the Rule 2.1 procedure.

The plaintiff commenced an action for damages arising from the withdrawal of criminal charges laid against its travel agency business many years earlier.

The court issued notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that it was considering dismissing the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff responded with submissions attempting to revisit prior disputes and earlier dismissed malicious prosecution claims.

The court held that the doctrine of res judicata barred the action and that the claim was a clear attempt to re‑litigate matters already determined.

The action was dismissed under the abbreviated Rule 2.1 procedure.

The plaintiff commenced an action challenging a disciplinary decision made approximately 28 years earlier by the Law Society that required his resignation as a member.

The statement of claim contained brief allegations asserting unlawful conduct and fraud by the defendants but did not articulate a recognizable cause of action.

The court invoked Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to screen the proceeding as potentially frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Because the plaintiff could not be reached and the claim was plainly defective on its face, the court waived service of the Rule 2.1 notice and summarily dismissed the action.

Costs were made available to the defendants with assessment referred to an assessment officer if pursued.

Co-owners of a residential apartment complex brought a motion to stay a partition and sale application or, alternatively, to have it heard together with or consolidated with an earlier civil action involving related family disputes over the property and alleged financial dealings.

The court considered Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing consolidation of proceedings and the balance of convenience factors articulated in prior case law.

The court held that the two proceedings involved different legal issues and procedural postures, with the application proceeding on affidavit evidence and the action involving historical contractual and estate-related claims.

The court also found the motion was brought late and appeared designed to delay adjudication of the partition application.

The motion to stay, consolidate, or hear the matters together was dismissed.

The plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action regarding a Multiple Unit Residential Building (MURB) investment scheme.

The investors, who had signed powers of attorney in favour of the developer, alleged financial manipulation and breach of fiduciary duty.

Given the complex financial history, the lack of proper accounting by the mortgagee, and the overlapping shareholder oppression claims, the case management judge directed a reference to determine the mortgage accounting and related issues.

The judge also ordered a stay of the foreclosure action and oppression applications pending the reference.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 30.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking production of a statement prepared by a property manager shortly after a motor vehicle accident on a commercial parking lot.

The statement had been created following the accident after the property manager contacted the insurer and an adjuster and anticipated litigation.

The court held that litigation privilege attached because the dominant purpose of the investigation and statement was to prepare for potential litigation and assist the employer’s defence.

The court further held that privilege was not waived when the witness reviewed the statement prior to her examination for discovery.

The motion for production was therefore dismissed.

A former lawyer sought declarations that payments from Legal Aid Ontario to his solicitor account constituted “wages” under the Wages Act and were therefore largely exempt from garnishment to satisfy a judgment debt.

He also requested an accounting of funds remitted pursuant to a notice of garnishment and access to Legal Aid’s billing system.

The court held that payments made to a self‑employed lawyer for Legal Aid work are not “wages” within the meaning of the Wages Act, drawing an analogy to prior authority holding that physician payments from OHIP are not wages.

The applicant had not properly brought a motion to vary the garnishment and the statutory framework did not support the requested retroactive relief.

The court also found that Legal Aid Ontario had already provided a full and adequate accounting of payments applied toward the garnishment.

Following an unopposed motion striking a corporate plaintiff from a statement of claim due to lack of corporate capacity after dissolution, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against both the corporate and individual plaintiffs.

The court considered whether the conduct of the litigation justified elevated costs and whether the individual plaintiff should be personally liable.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for exceptional circumstances such as unproven allegations of fraud or litigation misconduct, and those circumstances were not present.

The evidence linking the individual plaintiff to the corporation was insufficient to impose costs against him personally.

Costs were awarded only against the corporate plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a construction defect claim on the basis that it was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action concerned alleged deficiencies in the installation of exterior stone veneer, which caused persistent efflorescence and latent moisture problems.

The court considered the discoverability principle and whether the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to the claim.

It held that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on earlier assurances from the contractor and manufacturer that the efflorescence was normal and did not discover the latent defect until a manufacturer’s representative suggested installation deficiencies in August 2010, followed by expert reports.

As the statement of claim was issued within two years of that discovery, the limitation period had not expired and the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.