SCJ 2025

The applicant sought to quash a warrant issued under s. 23(10) of the Food and Drugs Act authorizing Health Canada inspectors to enter a dwelling house and seize non-compliant health products, and to obtain the return of the seized goods.

The applicant argued the Superior Court had jurisdiction because the warrant was issued under Criminal Code provisions.

The court rejected this argument, finding the warrant derived from the FDA, not the Criminal Code, and that the inspectors constituted a federal board or tribunal under the Federal Courts Act.

The court held that the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the seizure and declined to hear the application.

The defendants moved to declare the plaintiff's construction lien expired, discharge the lien, vacate related registrations, and dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiff conceded lien expiry but opposed dismissal of its joined breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.

The court found that Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply in lien actions due to inconsistency with the Construction Act, but exercised its broad discretion under s. 47 of the Act to dismiss for delay.

The action had not progressed beyond the pleadings stage in over four years, the statement of claim had not been served, and no adequate explanation for the delay was provided.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendants.

The decision concerns a medical malpractice action brought by Scott Graham against Dr. Sheldon Berger and others, arising from care received at Bridgepoint Health following a motorcycle accident.

The plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to diagnose and treat osteomyelitis, resulting in prolonged recovery.

The court found that Dr. Berger met the standard of care, relying on expert evidence and the contemporaneous medical records, and that the infection was likely seeded before the plaintiff came under Dr. Berger’s care.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant sought a certificate of appointment as estate trustee with a will in respect of her deceased mother's estate.

The deceased had executed a will in Quebec in 1973 and a handwritten codicil in Ontario in 1998, with the estate consisting entirely of personal property.

The application was referred to a judge under Rule 74.14(4) to determine whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction to recognize a Quebec will amended by an Ontario holograph codicil.

Applying s. 36(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act and following Grillo Estate v. Grillo, the court found the deceased was domiciled in Ontario for over 35 years, the original Quebec will was valid, and the holograph codicil met Ontario requirements.

The application was granted and a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee was ordered to issue.

In competing family law motions, the moving party sought permission to move the children’s residence to another city, change schools, and change dentists, while the responding party sought dismissal and argued the move constituted a relocation engaging heightened statutory requirements.

Applying the Divorce Act framework, the court held the proposed move was a change in residence, not a relocation, because with schedule and transportation adjustments it was not likely to significantly impact the children’s relationship with the non-moving parent.

The court found written notice requirements were met and concluded the proposed parenting and care plan was in the children’s best interests.

Temporary terms were set for pickup/return logistics and weekday parenting end times.

The moving party’s requests were granted and the cross-motion was dismissed.

The moving parties sought relief from automatic striking of their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim after delivering a response for particulars two days late under a prior consent order.

The responding party opposed and pursued default judgment based on strict non-compliance.

Applying Rules 3.02 and 1.04, and guided by appellate authority on extensions and merits-based adjudication, the court granted a retroactive extension and reinstated the pleading.

The court characterized the breach as minor, found no prejudice to the responding party, and held the interests of justice favoured determination on the merits.

No costs were awarded.

In WURA proceedings concerning the wind-up of a foreign bank’s Canadian business, the court considered an unopposed motion by the court-appointed liquidator for approval of reports, fees, discharge of employee representative counsel, termination of proceedings, and related releases.

The court held the remaining tasks were administrative and that the affairs in Canada had been fully wound up subject to completion of those tasks.

The court approved the reports, activities, fees, and proposed releases, finding the releases appropriately limited and consistent with analogous third-party release principles developed under federal insolvency jurisprudence.

The court accepted that CCAA release principles could be applied by analogy in WURA proceedings.

The motion was granted and a discharge and termination order issued with immediate effect.

In CCAA proceedings, the moving parties sought approval of a transaction for sale of the Royal Charter conditional on immediate and irrevocable donation to designated public custodians, together with approval of monitor reports and an extension of the stay of proceedings.

The court held it had jurisdiction under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and applied the s. 36 sale-approval framework, including overlap with the Soundair principles.

The court found the auction and consultation process reasonable, well-publicized, and appropriately structured to preserve Canadian public access while maximizing creditor recovery.

The consideration was found fair and materially above appraised value, and the monitor’s recommendation was accepted.

The stay extension under s. 11.02 and approval of the monitor’s activities were also granted.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s proprietary estoppel claim, the defendant municipality sought substantial indemnity costs, or alternatively partial indemnity costs.

The court held the matter raised no novel legal issue and was decided largely on fact-specific findings, while finding no unreasonable litigation conduct by either side.

The court declined to apply enhanced offer-to-settle consequences under rule 49.10, treating the offer as effectively impracticable in the circumstances.

Applying proportionality and indemnity principles, the court awarded the successful defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $143,519.71 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable forthwith.

On an uncertified proposed class proceeding arising from a pension fund’s loss on an FTX investment, the moving party sought leave to discontinue under s. 29(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, with agreed non-monetary disclosure commitments in the plan’s annual reporting and payment of class counsel fees and disbursements from the fund.

The court applied the discontinuance approval framework, including whether class interests would be prejudiced by abandonment of a viable claim and whether the result was a practical resolution in light of litigation risk.

The court found the class would not benefit from continued litigation on the record, accepted that the settlement terms were objectively reasonable, and held that non-monetary relief could constitute a positive settlement outcome.

The court also approved the reduced fee amount and disbursements as reasonable.

In a criminal trial concerning an accused’s hidden-camera recording of a child, the court addressed whether the video met the definition of child pornography under s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the Crown had not proven explicit sexual activity under s. 163.1(1)(a)(i), but held the dominant characteristic of the video was depiction of the child’s sexual organs or anal region for a sexual purpose under s. 163.1(1)(a)(ii).

Applying the objective, contextual framework from appellate jurisprudence, the court concluded the recording was likely to stimulate sexual interest in some viewers.

The accused was found guilty of making child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(2) for the impugned period, with sentencing submissions adjourned.

On a temporary parenting motion, the moving party sought a graduated parenting-time order and related communication and counselling relief after a breakdown in parent-child contact following separation.

The responding party and the child’s counsel opposed compelled parenting time and asked that the child’s preferences govern contact.

Applying the best-interests framework under the Divorce Act and the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court declined to force parenting time immediately but imposed interim conduct, communication, and information-sharing terms designed to support eventual reconnection.

The order was made without prejudice and the motion was adjourned for review, with leave to vary without proving a material change if progress is insufficient.

No costs were ordered due to mixed success.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting use, in direct examination of the complainant, of materials disclosed by the defence during an in camera application for directions under the Criminal Code s. 278.93 framework.

The court held the materials were not “records” under s. 278.1 and had already been ruled outside the s. 278.93 regime.

It rejected the Crown’s reliance on R. v. J.J., finding that decision did not create a general disclosure obligation requiring advance defence disclosure of such material for trial use by the Crown.

The court emphasized that criminal disclosure obligations are not symmetrical and that penalizing defence counsel for responsibly seeking directions would be imprudent.

The Crown was prohibited from using the disclosed materials in direct examination, without affecting Crown re-examination at trial.

On a family law motion to vary interim spousal support, the moving party sought a mid-range SSAG amount while the responding party sought the high-range amount.

The court held that interim quantum is generally determined using an income-levelling approach under the SSAG rather than a detailed budgetary-levelling approach, subject to case-specific exceptions.

Although the court acknowledged that budgetary analysis may be useful in some interim contexts, it declined to apply that approach on the facts, including incomplete evidence regarding household cohabitation economics and comparative post-separation savings trends.

The court ordered spousal support at the high SSAG amount of $921 monthly commencing July 1, 2025.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

At a family settlement conference, neither side uploaded required conference materials to the proper Case Center bundle despite repeated prior non-compliance in the same proceeding.

After hearing submissions, the court applied Family Law Rule 24(11) and the governing practice directions requiring timely and correct uploading of materials.

The court held that counsel, not the court, bear responsibility for proper uploads and that repeated failures wasted scarce judicial resources and frustrated the primary objective under Rule 2.

The court made personal cost-consequence orders against both counsel, prohibiting them from charging specified fees and disbursements tied to the wasted conference date.

The moving party sought an extension of time under r. 53.03(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to serve a responding orthopaedic expert report after the pre-trial conference deadline.

The court applied r. 53.08(1), including post-amendment authorities emphasizing that late expert reports are not to be routinely permitted and that the moving party must show both a reasonable explanation and no non-compensable prejudice or undue trial delay.

The court found the missed deadline was caused by inadvertence in trial scheduling communications rather than inattentiveness to the file, and accepted that explanation as reasonable on the record.

The court also found any prejudice could be addressed by costs and that trial delay was not established.

The motion was granted, with the moving party required to pay reasonable costs of an expedited reply report, and no costs were ordered on the motion.

In a high-conflict family trial, the court determined parenting, child support, occupation rent, and related relief after property issues were settled mid-trial.

Applying s. 16 of the Divorce Act, the court held that despite serious parental conflict, both parents were capable and loving, but neither demonstrated sufficient cooperation to justify a material change in parenting time.

The existing parenting schedule was continued with detailed holiday, communication, and travel-notice terms, and joint decision making was ordered with use of Our Family Wizard.

The restraining order request was denied, occupation rent was allowed in a quantified amount, and ongoing table child support was fixed effective January 1, 2026, with retroactive support left for confirmation and potential further submissions.

Following trial, the court determined costs in a boundary and related damages dispute involving highly disproportionate litigation expense relative to the nominal value of the land in issue.

Although the plaintiffs succeeded on the principal boundary issue and in resisting the counterclaim, the court found both sides responsible for inefficient and unreasonable conduct, and specifically found delay and cost consequences attributable to the plaintiffs’ litigation choices.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 considerations, the court declined to award any counsel fees.

The court awarded only partial disbursements, ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay $25,000.00 plus HST.

On a family law motion, the moving party sought to set aside temporary orders that had restricted him to supervised parenting time and had shifted decision-making authority and primary residence to the responding party.

The court held that the temporary safety concerns underlying those orders had materially changed, relying in particular on child protection communications indicating no ongoing involvement regarding the parties’ children and permitting unsupervised caregiving in the moving party’s household.

The court found the temporary orders did not establish a new status quo deserving deference where the original rationale had dissipated.

The motion was granted, the temporary orders were vacated, and the prior equal parenting regime was reinstated with a short transition period of interim unsupervised parenting time.

The moving parties sought a final parenting order granting primary care, decision-making responsibility, and related tax-benefit relief for two children.

The court declined to grant the requested final order, finding concerns about the validity and informed nature of the consent, the responding party’s apparent capacity, service and party-composition deficiencies, and insufficient evidence on child support and financial arrangements.

The court held that legal representation must be appointed for the responding party as a potential special party under the Family Law Rules.

The matter was directed to return promptly, with additional service and evidentiary steps ordered.