Maria N. Sirivar

Family law trial concerning child support and section 7 childcare expenses for two children after all other issues were resolved.

The court found there was no 50-50 parenting arrangement after separation until January 2025, and that the respondent's parenting time again fell below the 40% threshold when he relocated, so the presumptive table amount applied for those periods.

The court rejected the respondent's evidence about unemployment, job search efforts, and finances, found him intentionally underemployed or unemployed, and imputed income based on prior earnings.

Although the parties later resumed shared parenting, the court held a set-off under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines was inappropriate given the parties' circumstances and the respondent's conduct.

Retroactive child support and proportional contribution to childcare expenses were ordered.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against their former lawyer and his professional corporation after he misappropriated $313,333 in trust funds intended for a real estate transaction.

The lawyer admitted to withdrawing the funds for his own purposes and was subsequently charged criminally.

After recovering a portion of the funds from LawPRO, the plaintiffs sought the remaining balance, general damages, punitive damages, and costs.

The court granted liquidated damages for the unrecovered balance and awarded $30,000 in punitive damages due to the egregious nature of the lawyer's breach of trust, but dismissed the claim for general damages due to a lack of evidence.

Substantial indemnity costs were also awarded.

Following a Binding Judicial Dispute Resolution hearing regarding child and spousal support, the applicant sought costs of $26,567.02.

The respondent argued each party should bear their own costs due to a mixed outcome.

The court found the applicant was substantially successful and that her offer to settle was more favourable than the final order.

The court awarded the applicant her full requested costs, payable within 90 days, and ordered that the costs be enforceable as a support order through the Family Responsibility Office.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside a default child support order that imputed an annual income of $50,000 to him.

He argued that he missed the court date due to inadvertence caused by cognitive challenges and that his actual income was much lower, consisting primarily of ODSP benefits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent had adequate notice of the proceedings and failed to provide a satisfactory reason for his non-attendance.

Furthermore, the court noted that the respondent remained in breach of previous disclosure orders and failed to provide full disclosure of his income from all sources.

The parties separated after an 18-year relationship during which the applicant wife stayed home to care for the children and support the respondent husband's military career.

The court found their separation agreement only resolved spousal support on an interim basis.

The court awarded the wife spousal support at the high end of the SSAG range for a duration of 15 years, based on strong compensatory and non-compensatory claims, and allowed her to share in the husband's post-separation income increase.

The husband was also ordered to pay spousal support arrears of $104,579, child support arrears of $9,873, and was only permitted to offset a small portion of his claimed section 7 expenses.

Following a successful motion for the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation, the applicant residual beneficiary sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis personally against the named estate trustee.

The estate trustee had failed to apply for a certificate of appointment, failed to provide information to beneficiaries, failed to file responding materials on the motion, and failed to attend the hearing.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $20,708.74 payable personally by the estate trustee, finding that his conduct as a fiduciary warranted an elevated cost order and that an award from the estate would unfairly burden the beneficiaries.

The respondent's informal, late, and analytically deficient cost submissions were rejected entirely.

The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary care and custody order for three Indigenous children, citing concerns about neglect, developmental delays, and parental conflict.

The parents opposed the motion, seeking the return of the children subject to a supervision order.

The court found that the Society failed to establish reasonable grounds that the children were likely to suffer harm that could not be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The court noted that many of the protection concerns stemmed from poverty and factors outside the parents' control, and emphasized the importance of cultural continuity and family preservation for Indigenous children.

The children were ordered returned to the parents' care subject to Society supervision.

The moving parties sought a final parenting order granting primary care, decision-making responsibility, and related tax-benefit relief for two children.

The court declined to grant the requested final order, finding concerns about the validity and informed nature of the consent, the responding party’s apparent capacity, service and party-composition deficiencies, and insufficient evidence on child support and financial arrangements.

The court held that legal representation must be appointed for the responding party as a potential special party under the Family Law Rules.

The matter was directed to return promptly, with additional service and evidentiary steps ordered.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add a maternal aunt as a party to a child protection proceeding, arguing that a Court of Appeal decision made it mandatory.

The child had been placed in the maternal aunt's temporary care.

The child's mother opposed the motion, expressing concerns about family division.

The maternal aunt tearfully withdrew her consent, stating she had not received independent legal advice and felt pressured by the Society.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society's application of the cited case could have constitutional implications and that the process for adding parties must ensure procedural fairness, including proper notice, opportunity to respond, and independent legal advice for the proposed party.

The court also rejected the Society's argument that the temporary order should be deemed "with prejudice" due to the passage of time.

The Respondent Mother brought a motion seeking police enforcement of a final order and supervised parenting time for the Applicant Father.

She alleged the Applicant Father overheld the child in Montreal, contrary to a previous order, and has a history of disobeying court orders, including a restraining order and prior parenting time orders that required police intervention.

The Applicant Father argued his actions were justified by concerns about the child being taken to Cambodia and that his past breaches were irrelevant or excusable.

The court found the Applicant Father's history of non-compliance and threatening behaviour constituted family violence, demonstrating a pattern of coercive and controlling conduct.

The motion was granted, ordering supervised in-person parenting time for the Applicant Father due to concerns about his trustworthiness, the child's emotional safety, and threats made.

The young person was found guilty of multiple offences, including possession of a fentanyl mixture for the purpose of trafficking and assaulting a peace officer.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence, arguing the offences were exceptional under s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found the gateway to custody was open due to the gravity of the offences, including weaponizing the drugs against police.

However, considering the young person's significant trauma, mental health diagnoses, and a Charter breach regarding the right to counsel during arrest, the court imposed a non-custodial sentence of 24 months' probation and a fine.

The Respondent Mother moved to set aside the financial terms of a separation agreement, alleging unconscionable circumstances, lack of financial disclosure, material misrepresentation of income, and undue pressure by the Applicant Father.

The Applicant Father resisted, arguing the agreement was valid and enforceable.

The court found that the Respondent Mother had, with the assistance of experienced counsel, bargained away her right to financial disclosure and failed to establish unconscionability or exploitation of vulnerabilities.

The motion was dismissed.

The Applicant grandmother sought a contact order with her grandson, Mason, following the tragic deaths of his father and paternal uncle by suicide.

The Respondent mother, though noted in default, had engaged with the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL), which produced a Voice of the Child (VOC) report.

The VOC indicated Mason did not have a close relationship with his grandmother and did not express a desire for contact.

Applying the "best interests of the child" principle under the Children's Law Reform Act and the principle of parental autonomy from Chapman v. Chapman, the court found the Applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the mother's decision regarding contact should be respected.

The court noted the lack of detailed evidence regarding the grandmother's pre-existing relationship with Mason and the absence of information about the relationship between the parties.

Consequently, the application for a contact order was dismissed.

The Applicant Father sought decision-making responsibility for the parties' child's vaccinations.

The Respondent Mother opposed, arguing she was uniquely suited due to her chiropractic background and research, and raising concerns about the child's genetics and potential adverse reactions.

The court qualified the Applicant's medical experts (pediatrician/geneticist and pediatric infectious disease specialist) but rejected the Respondent's proposed experts due to lack of relevant expertise, novel science reliability issues, and bias.

The court found the child to be in good health with no contraindications to vaccination and determined the Applicant's approach of consulting medical professionals was in the child's best interest.

The Applicant Father was granted sole decision-making responsibility for all vaccinations, including the Covid-19 vaccine.

The Native Child and Family Services of Toronto brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three children (Au.

B., Aa.

B., and M.P.) due to chronic neglect, poor home conditions, hygiene issues, and the mother's inability to manage her mental health and parenting.

The mother (A.B.) opposed, seeking the children's return.

The court granted the Society's motion, placing Au.

B. and Aa.

B. in the Society's temporary care and custody, and M.P. in his father's (L.P.) temporary care subject to Society supervision.

The court emphasized the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in foster care and the need for culturally appropriate support, finding that the children could not be adequately protected by a supervision order alone given the complex issues and the Society's past ineffective supervision.

The Applicant Mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) brought motions for restraining orders against the Respondent Father under s. 46 of the Family Law Act.

The motions sought to restrain the father from coming within 500 metres of the mother's home and the children's locations, and from communicating with them.

The court reviewed the history of family violence, including the father's criminal charges and breaches of recognizance, and a period of attempted reconciliation.

The court accepted the children's expressed views and preferences, which indicated fear and distress regarding the father.

The court found that the father's repeated breaches constituted a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, amounting to family violence, and that there were reasonable grounds to fear for the safety of the mother and children.

The motions were granted.

In an uncontested trial, the applicant mother sought sole decision-making responsibility, a restraining order, and supervised parenting time for the respondent father.

The father had been noted in default and had a history of substance misuse, mental health instability, and family violence, including breaching a temporary restraining order.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and a final restraining order.

The court declined to order any parenting time for the father, finding that unsupervised time posed a risk of emotional harm to the child and that there was no viable plan for supervised time before the court.

The applicant mother sought an order for substitute service of an application for sole custody on the respondent father, who resides in Saudi Arabia.

The applicant sought to serve the respondent by email, citing financial constraints as a legally aided litigant and her inability to hire a process server.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to satisfy the evidentiary requirements under the Family Law Rules.

The court held that legally aided litigants are not relieved of their obligations to comply with service requirements and that the applicant did not provide detailed evidence of steps taken to serve the respondent or demonstrate that email service would reasonably bring the application to the respondent's attention.

The applicant father sought leave to bring a motion to change a final custody and access order that prohibited him from having access to his two youngest children and from coming within 100 meters of their residence, school, or daycare.

The father argued that his criminal proceedings had ended and he had completed an anger management course.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father failed to establish either an arguable case of material change in circumstances or that allowing the motion would not constitute an abuse of process.

The father continued to engage in the conduct that formed the basis of the original order, including posting derogatory comments about the mother on social media, breaching multiple court orders, and displaying hostile and aggressive behavior in court.

A young person was charged with multiple firearms offences following the discovery of a loaded semi-automatic firearm and ammunition in a satchel upon his person.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the firearm on the basis that it was obtained in violation of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Crown and defence agreed that if the evidence was admitted, the accused would be found guilty; if excluded, he would be acquitted.

The court found that the investigative detention was arbitrary, the searches were unlawful, and the accused was denied his right to counsel.

The court concluded that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the firearm, resulting in acquittal on all counts.