Real Estate Law - SCC

The Crown in right of Canada brought an action for possession of lands occupied by the appellant, claiming they were part of an Indian reserve.

The lands had been absolutely surrendered by the Indians to the Crown in 1895 to be sold, but were never disposed of.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the absolute surrender extinguished the Indian interest and removed the burden of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Consequently, the beneficial interest in the lands reverted fully to the Province, leaving the federal Crown with no enforceable interest or status to bring the action for possession.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant, a building contractor, entered into an agreement to complete a housing scheme and purchase lots.

To assist the development, the appellant advanced $52,500 to the respondent trustee earlier than required.

The respondent kept the funds for his firm's fees instead of forwarding them to the mortgagee as required by the agreement.

The appellant sued for conversion and breach of contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial judgment in favour of the appellant, finding no evidence of an unambiguous promise by the appellant that would estop it from enforcing its strict legal rights.

The appellants granted the respondent a lease with an option to purchase, as well as a second option to purchase abutting lands.

The lands were in an area of subdivision control.

When the respondent attempted to exercise the options, the appellants refused to close, arguing that the agreement violated s. 29 of The Planning Act because they retained the fee in the abutting lands subject to the unexercised option.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the grantor of an option does not retain the fee in the optioned lands, as they have bound themselves to dispose of the lands to the optionee and have no further control over their alienation.

The appeal was dismissed and specific performance was granted.

The appellants were joint tenants of land that the respondent city purported to expropriate by by-law.

One appellant, a non-resident, was not served with notice of the council meeting within the time limits prescribed by the Expropriation Procedure Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where a municipality exercises a statutory power to expropriate land, the statutory conditions for the exercise of that power must be strictly complied with.

The failure to properly serve the non-resident owner rendered the expropriation by-law void, not merely voidable, and beyond the reach of curative statutory provisions.

The appellant sought foreclosure on a mortgage executed by the respondents.

The respondents had signed the mortgage without reading it, relying on a third party's misrepresentation that it was a minor amendment to an existing mortgage.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the defence of non est factum is not available to a person who fails to exercise reasonable care in signing a document, as against an innocent party who relies on that document in good faith and for value.

The appeal was allowed and the previous Supreme Court decision in Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Cugnet was overturned.

The appellant church trustees applied to demolish a building on their property.

The City of Ottawa subsequently designated the property as a heritage building under The Ontario Heritage Act, which required the City's consent for demolition.

The Act provided that if the City failed to notify the applicant of its decision within ninety days, it would be deemed to have consented.

The City decided to refuse the application and expropriate the property within the ninety days, and the appellants knew of this decision, but the City failed to give formal notice as required by the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the notice provisions were substantive protections for the landowner and could not be ignored.

Because the City failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements, it was conclusively deemed to have consented to the demolition.

The appellants' mother, acting as their tutrix, sold immoveables in which her minor children owned an undivided two-thirds share to her own mother, who shortly thereafter gifted the property back to the tutrix.

The property was later sold to bona fide third party purchasers and subsequently expropriated by the province.

The appellants brought a direct action in nullity to annul the initial sale, the gift, and subsequent deeds, arguing the tutrix's purchase through an interposed party violated the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the sale was irremediably vitiated and that the apparent defect in title could be opposed to the bona fide third party purchasers.

A prior judgment authorizing confirmation of the voidable deeds was also annulled because it unlawfully authorized a confirmation during the minority of the pupils.

The appellants appealed a decision of the provincial appellate court regarding a land title dispute involving adverse possession.

The trial judge who originally heard the case had retired before rendering a judgment, resulting in another judge making the decision based on the transcript.

The appellate court subsequently allowed an appeal from that decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench.

The Court held that the circumstances of the case did not justify any interference with the judgment of the appellate court.

The appellant vendor and respondent purchaser were negotiating a real estate transaction.

The purchaser made a counter offer and requested the vendor to initial the changes and return the agreement 'as soon as possible'.

The vendor initialled the changes within the time limit but the mailed acceptance was received after the deadline.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the closing words of the purchaser's letter indicated that prompt return of the initialled document would satisfy any formal provision for acceptance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment finding a valid contract was restored.

The appellant lien claimant began work on the subject land before the respondent bank took a collateral mortgage on the property to secure past advances.

The bank registered its mortgage prior to the appellant registering its claim for lien.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the unregistered lien did not have priority over the subsequently given but prior registered mortgage.

The Court found that section 14(1) of The Mechanics' Lien Act did not apply to give the lien claimant priority, and under The Registry Act, priority is determined by the order of registration.

The respondent purchased a parcel of land from the appellant and occupied an area larger than what was described in the deed of sale.

After discovering the discrepancy, the respondent sought judicial recognition of ownership based on ten-year acquisitive prescription.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a party cannot rely on ten-year prescription for land possessed beyond the limits of their title; such excess land can only be acquired through thirty-year prescription.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Quebec affirming a Superior Court decision regarding an expropriation indemnity determined by the Public Service Board.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no basis in the appellants' grounds to intervene with the award or refer the matter to the Expropriation Tribunal.

The appellant contractor entered into a contract to build elevators for an owner.

The respondent subsequently acquired the buildings, transferred them back via an emphyteutic lease, and made a hypothecary loan with a giving in payment clause.

The respondent later became the owner retroactively by giving in payment.

The appellant registered a builder's privilege.

The respondent sought to strike the privilege, arguing it arose after the respondent acquired ownership.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the builder's privilege originates on the date of the work contract, not when work begins.

Therefore, the appellant's privilege originated before the respondent became the owner and could be set up against the respondent.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the calculation of interest on a mortgage.

The mortgage provided for interest at 13% per annum, payable monthly, but did not specify whether it was calculated in advance or compounded.

The respondent mortgagor argued for the application of the 'reinvestment principle', which would result in a lower effective interest rate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the reinvestment principle is not a rule of law and does not apply unless expressly invoked in the mortgage contract.

The mortgagee was entitled to interest calculated monthly at the nominal annual rate.

The appellant developer purchased lots in a subdivision but refused to assume the original subdivider's obligations to install municipal services.

After protracted negotiations failed, the respondent municipality passed a by-law without notice to the appellant, deeming the lots not to be a registered plan of subdivision.

The appellant sought judicial review to quash the by-law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the municipality's action was quasi-judicial and attracted the duty of fairness (audi alteram partem), the discretionary remedy of certiorari was denied because of the appellant's conduct in attempting to avoid its obligations and evade municipal regulation through checkerboarding.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding a contract for the sale of land.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that time was not of the essence in the contract and the vendor had accepted the conditions as terms imposing obligations upon him.

The Court held that the vendor was in default and guilty of premature repudiation, restoring the trial judge's award of damages to the purchasers.

The appellants sold a portion of surplus railway lands and applied for subdivision approval.

The Provincial Planning Board ruled that the 10% reserve requirement under the Planning Act should be calculated based only on the surplus lands, not the entire parcel.

The Alberta Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding the reserve applied to the entire parcel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, setting aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restoring the Board's order.

The appellant, an expropriated owner, had land taken for highway purposes by the respondent.

Arbitrators fixed compensation and awarded compound interest based on 90-day finance company paper rates.

The respondent argued that s. 3 of the Interest Act limited the rate to 5% simple interest.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia held the rate was limited to 5% but could be compounded.

The Court of Appeal held it was limited to 5% simple interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that where a statute provides for interest and remits the rate to an adjudicator, the rate is 'fixed by law' within the meaning of s. 3 of the Interest Act, and thus the 5% limit does not apply.

The arbitrators' award of compound interest was restored.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the ownership of silver tailings deposited on a parcel of land prior to the severance of the surface and mining rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the reasons delivered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant trust company sought to foreclose on a mortgage given by the respondent company.

The mortgage was used to finance the purchase of the respondent company's own shares by three individuals.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mortgage was void and unenforceable because it violated s. 96(5) of the Nova Scotia Companies Act, which prohibits a company from giving financial assistance in connection with the purchase of its own shares.

The appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed.