Real Estate Law - SCC

The appellant bank loaned money to the respondent's wife, secured by a mortgage and guaranteed by the respondent.

When the mortgage matured, the bank and the mortgagor renewed it at a higher interest rate without notice to the respondent.

The mortgagor defaulted, and the bank obtained summary judgment against both.

The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment against the respondent, finding he was released from the guarantee.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bank's appeal, holding that the renewal agreement constituted a material alteration of the principal contract without the surety's consent, thereby discharging the guarantor.

The appellant and a mutual life insurance society were undivided co-owners of two immovables, subject to indivision agreements that included a waiver of partition and a mandatory sale clause if one party became insolvent.

When the society was ordered wound up, the appellant sought to enforce the mandatory sale clause to purchase the society's share at 75 percent of its market value.

The liquidator refused, arguing the agreements could not be set up against it.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the indivision agreements were valid and could be set up against the liquidator, as the liquidator acts for the insolvent company rather than as a third party.

The Court concluded that the mandatory sale clause must be complied with, provided it does not create an unjust preference prejudicial to other creditors.

The appellant appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal regarding whether a broker's fee paid by mortgagors constituted interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the broker's fee was not interest and the resulting interest rate was not criminal.

The appellants and respondents disputed ownership of a five-foot strip of land due to a historical surveying error.

The respondents claimed title under the Registry Act, arguing that title searches need only go back forty years, which allowed them to rely on their predecessors' title and ignore the appellants' 1941 registered claim.

The trial judge ruled in favour of the appellants, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal in their entirety.

The appellant and respondents held competing claims to mineral rights in a parcel of land under the Torrens system.

The appellant claimed priority through a lease caveated in 1976, which he acquired by assignment in 1979.

The respondents claimed through a chain of interests originating from an agreement of sale caveated in 1969, but that caveat had lapsed in 1978.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the lapse of a caveat results in the loss of priority for the underlying interest vis-à-vis other encumbrancers.

Furthermore, the appellant, as an assignee, stepped into the priority position of the original 1976 caveat, undiminished by the respondents' intervening caveats.

The appeal was allowed and the non-suit order was quashed.

The appellant condominium corporation, a subsequent purchaser of a building, discovered severe structural defects in the exterior cladding after a large section fell off.

The appellant repaired the building at its own expense and sued the original general contractor in tort for negligence to recover the pure economic loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a contractor owes a duty of care in tort to subsequent purchasers of a building to take reasonable care in construction and to ensure the building does not contain defects that pose a foreseeable and substantial danger to health and safety.

The Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the reasonable cost of repairing dangerous defects is recoverable in tort, and ordered the matter to proceed to trial.

The appellant's immovables were sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes and acquired by the respondent City.

The appellant brought an action to quash the tax by-laws and the sale.

While the action was pending, the City sold the immovables to a third party.

The courts eventually quashed the by-laws and the sale.

The appellant then brought a new action claiming damages and the monetary equivalent of the immovables, alleging a sale of another's property and unjust enrichment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant had a valid claim for the recovery of a thing not due, the subsequent action for damages and monetary reimbursement was prescribed under the six-month limitation period in the Cities and Towns Act.

The appellants challenged a municipal tax sale of an island they had mistakenly occupied and improved, arguing the municipality had confused two islands and that no meaningful tax arrears existed on the occupied property.

The majority held that tax arrears on the registered parcel triggered the Municipal Tax Sales Act, 1984, that any assessment invalidity was insulated by s. 13(1)(a), and that the appellants' adverse possession claim failed because they were not abutting landowners within s. 9(5)(c).

The dissent would have applied a purposive interpretation to avoid an absurd and unjust result, concluding that the substantive trigger of tax arrears never truly arose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant mortgage company agreed to lend money to a client of the respondent lawyers, on the condition that the mortgage would be a first charge.

The respondents acted for both the borrower and the appellant but failed to advise the appellant of outstanding judgments against the borrower or to obtain postponements.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial judge's finding that the respondents were retained by the appellant, owed a duty of care, and were negligent in failing to secure a first charge or advise the appellant of the risks.

The respondents were held liable for damages, including the costs of lawsuits brought by the appellant to maintain priority.

The appellant entered into a mortgage agreement that included a profit-sharing scheme.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the scheme constituted a criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that s. 347 is intra vires the Parliament of Canada and does not unconstitutionally infringe on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The appellant loaned money to limited-dividend housing companies to build low-rental housing, secured by first mortgages and operating agreements prohibiting sale or encumbrance without consent.

The companies granted second mortgages and later sold the properties without consent.

The second mortgagee sought a judicial sale in a foreclosure action, and the purchasers sought a declaration that they were not bound by the operating agreements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transactions were not illegal under the National Housing Act, nor were they ultra vires the companies' powers.

The equitable 'clean hands' doctrine did not bar relief.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the purchasers were not entitled to prepay the mortgages because the unauthorized sales constituted a default under the mortgages.

The respondent defaulted on a loan secured by a hypothec on three lots.

Before the sheriff's sale, the respondent waived its right to a discharge under the Civil Code of Lower Canada in exchange for the appellants agreeing to sell the lots in two stages.

After the first sale of two lots, the appellants bought the third lot at a second sale.

The respondent sued for a discharge based on the first sale's value and sought to vacate the second sale.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the discharge provisions are of public order and the premature waiver was null, the respondent failed to follow the proper procedure to claim its discharge before the second sale occurred.

The Court also found no grounds to vacate the second sale, and the issue was res judicata.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent's action dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the possession of a lot, claiming adverse possession.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the appellant's possession of the property was by virtue of a lease.

Consequently, the appellant did not hold the property adversely to the respondent.

The appellants purchased property and entered into a joint venture, unaware that a third party was making a secret profit.

The solicitor acting for the purchasers knew of the secret profit but failed to disclose it, breaching his fiduciary duty.

The purchasers subsequently suffered massive losses when a warehouse built on the property subsided due to the negligence of soils engineers and pile-drivers.

Unable to recover fully from the negligent parties, the purchasers sued the solicitor for the shortfall.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the solicitor breached his fiduciary duty, equitable compensation does not extend to losses caused by the independent and unrelated negligence of third parties.

The appellant owned an auto body shop in the respondent municipality.

The municipality adopted a resolution to expropriate the appellant's property for the purpose of creating a land reserve, after attempts to purchase it failed.

The appellant challenged the expropriation, arguing the municipality lacked the power to expropriate solely for a land reserve and that the notice lacked precision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Cities and Towns Act permits municipalities to expropriate for land reserves, as it constitutes a valid municipal purpose.

The Court also found that stating the expropriation was 'for purposes of a land reserve' satisfied the Expropriation Act's requirement for a precise statement of purpose.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision allowing the respondents' motion for relief from their failure to contest the right of expropriation within the 30-day time limit.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents were misled regarding the existence and nature of their rights through the fault of the appellant, which suspended the start of the time limit.

The City of Longueuil negotiated to purchase the appellant's land and accepted an offer of sale for $500,000.

Knowing the appellant could not deliver clear title due to pending litigation, the City expropriated the land instead of executing the sale.

The Expropriation Tribunal awarded $1,714,936 plus an additional indemnity, finding no binding agreement on the expropriation indemnity.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the $500,000 agreement bound the parties.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the Tribunal's finding that no transaction or agreement governed the expropriation indemnity, but modified the additional indemnity calculation to deduct the provisional indemnity already paid.

The Director of Soldier Settlement appealed a decision regarding the ownership of mines and minerals in a parcel of land in Alberta.

The land was originally sold by the Soldier Settlement Board in 1928, with the Soldier Settlement Act reserving mines and minerals to the federal Crown.

However, the transfer was registered under the provincial Land Titles Act without the reservation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mines and minerals were transferred to the Province of Alberta under the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement.

As a result, the respondent executors, as bona fide purchasers for value, held valid title to the mines and minerals under the provincial Land Titles Act, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the partial expropriation of immovable property.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, setting aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restoring the decision of the Court of Quebec, Expropriation Division, essentially for the reasons given by that court.

The respondents retained the appellant notary to conduct a title search for a property they intended to purchase.

The notary discovered that a previous hypothec on the property had been granted by someone other than the registered owner, though a subsequent default judgment on a giving in payment clause had declared the hypothecary creditor the absolute owner.

The notary advised the respondents that the title was defective because the original hypothec was void, ignoring the effect of the default judgment.

The respondents refused to close the transaction and were sued by the vendor.

They brought a recourse in warranty against the notary.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the default judgment had acquired the authority of res judicata and cured the title defect.

The Court found that the notary's failure to recognize the effect of res judicata was an unreasonable error of law that constituted a fault, even though his advice aligned with common notarial practice at the time.

The notary was held liable for the damages suffered by the respondents.