Property Tax Assessment - SCC

On a statutory appeal from a municipal assessment tribunal, the court addressed the standard of review and the tribunal's authority to increase an assessment at a municipality's request after a taxpayer complaint.

The majority held that reasonableness applied because the issue concerned interpretation of the tribunal's home statute and no correctness category displaced deference.

Interpreting the statute purposively, the majority concluded the tribunal could change an assessment upward in this procedural context and reinstated its decision.

The dissent would have applied correctness, found the tribunal exceeded the complaint's scope, and would have remitted for a new hearing.

The appeal was allowed with costs, with a four-judge dissent.

On a statutory interpretation appeal concerning reserve land taxation, the appellant argued that a bylaw clause permitting consideration of restrictions placed on land use “by the band” excluded a lease restriction created in a Crown lease.

The Court held that the assessor could consider the golf-club use restriction when valuing the leased reserve lands for assessment purposes.

Reading the bylaw text, purpose, and legislative context together, the Court found the 1996 amendment narrowed qualifying restrictions but did not bar this restriction.

The Court also held the Crown’s historical statutory role in reserve leasing did not negate that the restriction was placed by the band in context.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant municipality challenged the federal minister's valuation of lands at a national historic site for payments in lieu of municipal property taxes.

The Court held that, while the minister may form an independent opinion of property value, that opinion must reflect how an assessment authority would value the property under the applicable tax system and must remain consistent with the governing statute's fairness objectives.

The Court found the nominal valuation approach unreasonable because it lacked evidentiary grounding in assessment practice and effectively undermined the statutory scheme's inclusion of historic sites.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted for redetermination by the minister, with any new advisory panel required to be differently constituted.

The appellant applied for authorization to institute a class action against the municipality, alleging that property tax increases exceeded the statutory 5% ceiling.

He sought a declaration that the tax by-laws were inconsistent with the municipal charter and a refund of the overpayments.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the lower courts' refusal to authorize the class action, finding that the facts alleged did not justify the conclusions sought, as a simple declaration of inconsistency without quashing the by-laws could not legally ground a claim for a tax refund.

The appellant Indian band surrendered a portion of its reserve to the Federal Crown in 1966 for full market value to be used as a municipal airport, with a stipulation that the land would revert to the band if it ceased to be used for public purposes.

Following 1988 amendments to the Indian Act that brought lands surrendered 'otherwise than absolutely' into the definition of 'reserve' for taxation purposes, the band levied property taxes on the respondent municipality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that despite the sui generis nature of native land rights, the true intention of the parties was an absolute surrender for sale.

The Court concluded that the lands were not 'designated lands' under the Indian Act and thus not subject to the band's property tax jurisdiction.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of a municipal surtax on non-residential buildings imposed by the City of Montreal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the surtax is a direct tax raised for provincial purposes within the meaning of s. 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that the taxes fall into the category of true land taxes.

The appellant, a regional legal aid corporation, requested a business tax exemption for its legal aid bureau under the Act respecting Municipal Taxation.

The municipal commission refused the exemption, finding that professional legal services did not fall under the exemption for activities carried on mainly for social purposes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the commission's decision was patently unreasonable.

The Court found that the professional legal services offered by a legal aid bureau to economically underprivileged persons are inherently social in nature and clearly qualify for the business tax exemption under s. 236(5) of the Act.

The appellant's immovables were sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes and acquired by the respondent City.

The appellant brought an action to quash the tax by-laws and the sale.

While the action was pending, the City sold the immovables to a third party.

The courts eventually quashed the by-laws and the sale.

The appellant then brought a new action claiming damages and the monetary equivalent of the immovables, alleging a sale of another's property and unjust enrichment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant had a valid claim for the recovery of a thing not due, the subsequent action for damages and monetary reimbursement was prescribed under the six-month limitation period in the Cities and Towns Act.

The appeal concerned whether the exemption in s. 65(1) of the Act respecting Municipal Taxation for machines, apparatus and accessories used mainly for industrial production excludes all buildings within the meaning of the Civil Code.

The Court held that the provision must be interpreted in its own legislative context and that industrial production, not traditional civil law categories of immoveables, is the controlling consideration.

The introductory wording of s. 65 does not distinguish between immoveables by nature and moveable objects placed for permanency, and the terms land and building must be read through the statutory framework rather than rigid civil law classifications.

The Court restored the administrative decision that had excluded certain plant components from the assessment roll and allowed the appeal with costs throughout.

The appellant successfully appealed a municipal tax assessment and received a refund for the overpayment of taxes.

The appellant then claimed interest allegedly earned by the city on the overpayment, relying on the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment was not applicable because section 6(1) of the Municipal Interest and Discount Rates Act, 1982 gave the municipality the discretion to pass a by-law authorizing interest payments, which the city had not done.

The respondent sought a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal assessor to amend the 1980 real estate assessment roll to reflect the median proportion introduced by the new Act respecting municipal taxation.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the assessor had an automatic duty to amend the roll.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, concluding that the new Act did not require the assessor to take the median proportion into account when preparing the roll, but only to indicate it on the roll once prepared.

As the assessor did not fail to perform a statutory duty, mandamus was not available.

The appellant town appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding a business tax assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the Provincial Court's judgment that affirmed the Board of Revision's dismissal of the respondents' complaints.

The Court assumed, without deciding, that the Board had the required jurisdiction, as the issue was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and it would not be in the interests of justice to delay the proceedings further.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment in a property tax assessment dispute with the Regional Assessment Commissioner.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants applied to the Board of Revision to lower the 1981 assessment of their properties under The City of Winnipeg Act.

The respondent city obtained an order prohibiting the Board from considering the applications, arguing that provincial legislation froze assessments for 1981 and 1982 at 1980 levels.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the freeze legislation did not expressly repeal or amend the taxpayers' right to appeal an inequitable assessment.

Applying the principle of strict construction for taxing statutes, the Court concluded the Board of Revision retained jurisdiction to hear the complaints.

The appellant owned land that was leased to a third party for farming.

The municipal and school authorities valued and taxed the land as ordinary immovables, ignoring the special tax provisions for land under cultivation in s. 523 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The appellant brought direct actions in nullity to set aside the valuation and collection rolls and to recover the taxes paid in error.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the land was land under cultivation and that the authorities had acted ultra vires by ignoring the statutory exemption.

The Court allowed the direct actions in nullity, but found that the claim for recovery of municipal taxes for the first two years was prescribed by the five-year limitation period.

The respondent credit union was assessed for business taxation under s. 7(1)(b) of The Assessment Act.

The assessment was confirmed by the Assessment Review Court but set aside by the District Court, which found the credit union's preponderant purpose was to provide loans to members at low cost, not to make a profit.

The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the 'preponderant purpose' test and concluding that the credit union was not carrying on a business for the purpose of the Act.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding its business tax assessment.

The issue was whether leasing photocopiers constituted the sale of a 'service' under s. 7(1)(e) of the Ontario Assessment Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, holding that 'services' must bear its ordinary meaning as the product of the work of the person supplying it.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was found assessable under the catch-all provision in s. 7(1)(j) rather than s. 7(1)(e).

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Quebec regarding the municipal assessment and valuation of an industrial complex.

The appellants challenged the finding of the municipal assessor and the application of a sale subsequent to the assessment to establish the real value.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to intervene with the Court of Appeal's disposition of the matters.

The appellant property owner paid taxes under protest after the municipality assessed its unoccupied building.

The Assessment Act was retroactively amended to remove the authority to assess unoccupied buildings.

The appellant's initial administrative appeals were dismissed for being out of time.

The appellant then brought an action for a declaration that the assessment was void and for a refund.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the municipality had no authority to retain the taxes after the retroactive amendment.

The Court found that the action was not barred by res judicata or the limitation periods in the Assessment Act, and ordered the municipality to refund the taxes with interest.