Russell Leigh Youd

A cheque‑cashing company sought to recover losses arising from a fraudulent mortgage scheme and the negotiation of a bank draft bearing a forged endorsement.

The plaintiff alleged negligence and fraud against multiple parties involved in the mortgage transaction, including the property owner, a lawyer, a lender, and a relative of the homeowners.

The court found that the homeowners were not involved in the fraud and dismissed claims against them and other defendants, including the lawyer and lender.

The court declined to recognize a novel duty of care owed by the drawer of a bank draft to a subsequent negotiator and held that the plaintiff’s loss arose from the strict liability tort of conversion when the draft with a forged endorsement was negotiated.

Liability was established only against the relative who participated in the mortgage fraud.

The applicant purchaser sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment for non-developable land reduced the balance to zero.

The agreement of purchase and sale required the calculation of non-developable land to occur at the five-year anniversary of the mortgage, but the applicant missed this deadline, claiming it was impossible to determine due to ongoing environmental studies regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the unpredictable nature of the development approval process did not excuse the failure to adhere to the contractually stipulated timeline.

The respondent vendors' cross-application for payment of the outstanding mortgage balance was granted.

The applicant sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale reduced the outstanding balance to zero.

The agreement stipulated that the price adjustment, based on the ratio of non-developable land, was to be calculated at the end of the fifth year of the mortgage term.

The applicant missed this deadline, arguing it was impossible to determine the non-developable land due to ongoing environmental consultations regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the failure to invoke the price adjustment mechanism at the stipulated time precluded any adjustment.

The plaintiffs commenced an action for professional negligence and breach of contract arising from a commercial real estate transaction.

After two years, a status notice was issued, and the plaintiffs requested a status hearing to prevent the action from being dismissed for delay.

The defendants opposed the continuation of the action, arguing the plaintiffs failed to adequately explain the delay or demonstrate an absence of prejudice.

The Master reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on status hearings and concluded that, while the delay was problematic, the plaintiffs provided a sufficient explanation and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The action was allowed to proceed subject to a strict timetable.

A land developer sought a declaration that a municipality could not impose future development charges on undeveloped land because of a prior development agreement from 1980.

The municipality refused to recognize a credit for development charges previously paid, and the developer’s appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board was dismissed as out of time under Ontario Regulation 82/98.

The court held that the regulation required developers to apply for recognition of development charge credits before the October 31, 1999 sunset deadline.

Paragraph 17.2 of the regulation did not create a separate process for resolving conflicts between development agreements and development charge by-laws.

The application was also barred by issue estoppel because the same issue had been determined by the tribunal.

The plaintiff moved on the eve of trial for leave to amend its statement of claim and to add a new defendant alleged to have perpetrated a fraud involving a mortgage loan and bank draft transaction.

The proposed amendments also sought to introduce new allegations of conspiracy and fraud against existing defendants.

The court held that while the proposed new defendant was a proper and potentially necessary party to the litigation, the amendments asserting conspiracy against the existing defendants constituted new causes of action that were statute‑barred and inadequately pleaded.

The court permitted joinder of the new defendant with limited amendments alleging direct fraud but refused the broader conspiracy amendments against the existing defendants.

The motion was therefore granted only in part.

The court addressed a motion concerning the handling of surplus proceeds from the sale of a property subject to litigation.

The parties were ordered to deliver signed directions to the mortgagee instructing that any surplus proceeds remaining after discharge of the mortgage be paid into court to the credit of the action.

The court further ordered that if the mortgagee instead paid the funds directly to either party, those parties must pay the surplus received into court.

The order was made without prejudice to any future motion seeking payment of funds out of court, and the court approved a consent litigation timetable.

The appellants appealed an application judge's decision finding that the pylon sign in the engineering drawings accorded with the terms of the commercial lease.

The appellants argued the drawings showed a much larger footprint than the lease specified and placed the sign in a different location.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the lease terms were imprecise and subject to change upon completion of engineering drawings.

The Court also upheld the decision to order a trial of an issue regarding the remedy of specific performance, despite it not being pleaded, as there was no prejudice to the appellants.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent lawyer, acting for a purchaser, sought to enforce an agreement of purchase and sale for the appellant's property.

The appellant had signed back an offer with a three-year rent-free occupancy clause.

The respondent delivered an accepted offer along with a letter and an amending agreement proposing a one-year occupancy.

The trial judge found a binding agreement for the three-year occupancy.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the delivery of the accepted offer alongside the amending agreement and letter did not constitute a clear and unequivocal acceptance of the counter-offer.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's disposition of its claim, and the respondent cross-appealed on the issue of costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and that the trial judge's findings of fact were fully supported by the evidence.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as there was no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding costs.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $15,000.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a consent order regarding the sale of a jointly owned property.

The motion judge interpreted the order as giving the respondent the election to either sell the property to a third party or acquire the appellant's interest directly, rather than requiring an open market sale where the respondent would have to bid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's interpretation of the consent order was reasonable, made sound commercial sense given the breakdown of the parties' relationship, and was entitled to deference.