R. Smith

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim against him on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant republished a defamatory email by replying to the original sender and potentially blind copying others.

The court held that replying only to the sender does not constitute publication or republication in defamation law.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to plead material facts supporting the bald allegation that the email was blind copied to third parties.

The motion was granted and the claim against the defendant was struck without leave to amend.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for damages arising from a slip and fall in a hotel lobby.

The plaintiff slipped on a wet tile floor that had just been mopped behind him while he was checking in.

The court found that the hotel cleaner and desk clerk failed to verbally warn the plaintiff of the hazard, and the wet floor sign was placed behind him out of his sightline.

The court held that the defendants failed to meet their duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act and found them liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

The defendants, the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa and the police, brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' action under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The self-represented plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent and breached their duties by failing to investigate an assault by his ex-wife in 1995.

The court found that the plaintiff was aware of the assault and the police's refusal to lay charges by 2002 at the latest.

Consequently, the limitation period had expired long before the action was commenced in 2016.

The court struck the statement of claim without leave to amend, concluding it was plain and obvious the claim had no chance of success and was an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs sued three lawyers who represented them in a condominium purchase, alleging negligence for failing to rescind the transaction after the plaintiffs discovered water damage upon taking possession.

The defendant lawyers brought motions to strike the claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(d).

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead any material facts establishing a breach of the standard of care or causation of damages, as a completed real estate transaction cannot be unilaterally rescinded without the vendor's consent.

The court struck the claims against the three lawyers without leave to amend, finding them frivolous, vexatious, and disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The children's aid society sought an order making a two-year-old child a Crown Ward.

The child was apprehended when the mother, who was fifteen at the time of birth, left her father's home and moved to a shelter.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's lack of parenting skills, failure to attend parenting programs, and the grandfather's interference with medical and childcare advice.

Finding no viable less intrusive options, the court ordered Crown Wardship without access for the mother or grandfather, concluding that access would not be meaningful or beneficial and could impair future adoption opportunities.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender following his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and robbery.

The offender broke into the victims' home, stabbed one victim 18 times, and slashed the other victim's throat three times while she was tied to a chair.

The court found that the offender's behaviour was of an extremely brutal nature and that he constitutes a threat to the life and safety of others.

The court designated the offender as a dangerous offender and imposed a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period.

The accused, charged with second degree murder and attempted murder following a fatal stabbing over a drug dispute, applied for bail pending trial.

The court evaluated the proposed release plans, which included sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found the proposed sureties to be weak and unreliable, failing to satisfy the secondary ground that there was no substantial likelihood of further offences.

Furthermore, given the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and the violent circumstances, the court held that detention was necessary under the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was denied.

The defendant police board and officers brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for false detention, false arrest, negligent investigation, and breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The claims arose after a search warrant was executed at the plaintiffs' residence, leading to the discovery of cocaine and evidence of importing prohibited stun guns.

The criminal charges were previously dismissed after the search was found to violate section 8 of the Charter.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for false arrest, false detention, and Charter breaches, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the cocaine found, and that Charter damages were inappropriate as the exclusion of evidence in the criminal trial was a sufficient remedy.

However, the court dismissed the summary judgment motion regarding the negligent investigation claim, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial to determine whether the plaintiff bears the burden of proving factual innocence to recover damages.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the defendants from terminating a cobalt irradiation services agreement and requiring continued supply of irradiated Cobalt‑60 pending arbitration.

The defendants terminated the agreement after the plaintiff failed to pay approximately $4 million in overdue invoices despite a contractual requirement that invoices be paid within 30 days.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court held that although a limited serious issue existed regarding whether providing only 30 days’ notice to cure default complied with the duty of good faith, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience strongly favoured the defendants.

The court found that cancer treatment supply would not be disrupted because the product could be sourced elsewhere and existing supplies remained usable.

The motion for an injunction was denied.

In a criminal prosecution for robbery, the Crown brought a voir dire application seeking to admit recognition evidence from two civilian witnesses who identified the accused in surveillance video.

The defence conceded the admissibility of one witness but objected to the other on the basis that the probative value was low and the prejudicial effect outweighed it.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test articulated in Berhe and Brown, the court found the witness had sufficient prior familiarity with the accused from frequent interactions as a store customer.

The court concluded the witness was in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused on the video and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice.

The recognition evidence was admitted on a threshold basis, with issues of reliability left for the jury’s assessment of weight.

During an ongoing civil trial involving dealership market allocation disputes, the defendant sought permission to rely on a second supplemental expert report and to introduce maps and charts derived from previously discovered market study data.

The plaintiff argued the late expert report constituted trial by ambush and violated prior scheduling orders.

The court held that the supplemental expert opinion properly responded to new expert evidence and newly discovered data introduced during the proceedings, and its admission would not cause unfair prejudice.

The court also permitted the introduction of charts and maps derived from historical data for explanatory purposes, while refusing to authorize a new expert report from a non-designated witness responding to the opposing expert.

The respondent wife brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicants' claims for the return of a 50% interest in a property, wedding expenses, and wedding gifts following the parties' separation after a short marriage.

The applicants alleged the property transfer was conditional, fraudulently induced, and signed under duress.

The court applied the expanded fact-finding powers for summary judgment and found that a valid, unconditional gift of the property had been made, with no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding fraud, duress, or oral conditions.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the applicants' claims were dismissed.

The accused brought a voir dire challenging the voluntariness of statements made during a video-recorded police interview in a prosecution for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The accused argued that the interviewing officer improperly induced cooperation by suggesting possible release, undermined legal advice to remain silent, and reversed the onus by presenting a narrative and inviting correction.

Applying the contextual voluntariness analysis from the confessions rule, the court held that the accused was aware of his rights, had consulted counsel, and maintained his right to silence when confronted with incriminating allegations.

The court concluded that the questioning was not oppressive and did not overbear the accused’s will.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The applicant sought relief from the statutory penalty imposed for failing to file an audited municipal campaign financial statement by the deadline under the Municipal Elections Act.

The financial statement had been filed three minutes late and without the required audit due to financial hardship, though the audited version was later filed and materially identical.

The municipality argued that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to waive the statutory penalty barring the applicant from running in the next municipal election.

The court held that relief could be granted by applying the good‑faith and inadvertence criteria in s. 92(6) of the Act, even where no prosecution had been initiated.

Finding the applicant acted in good faith, committed an error in judgment, and caused no prejudice, the court waived the penalty.

Following a family law motion involving parenting issues, the applicant sought costs of $3,710 on a partial indemnity basis, representing approximately 60 percent of legal fees incurred.

The respondents argued that the motion result was mixed because the applicant sought supervised access for the father with the younger child, which the court did not order.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs along with factors such as the reasonableness of the parties’ behaviour and the divided success on the motion.

The court concluded that the success on the motion was shared.

As a result, no costs were awarded.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a class proceeding against a bank and a former employee who improperly accessed customers’ confidential financial information and disclosed it to third parties, leading to identity theft and fraud affecting numerous customers.

The court considered the requirements for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including whether the pleadings disclosed causes of action such as negligence, breach of contract, intrusion upon seclusion, vicarious liability, and waiver of tort.

The court held that several pleaded claims disclosed viable causes of action and that the proposed class of 643 customers whose information had been accessed constituted an identifiable class.

The court further found that the issues of negligence, breach of contract, vicarious liability for intrusion upon seclusion, and waiver of tort raised common issues and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure for resolving them.

The proposed representative plaintiffs were found to be suitable and capable of advancing the litigation.

Following a family law motion concerning arrears of child support and spousal expenses, the successful party sought substantial indemnity costs of $10,000.

The responding party argued success was divided and proposed a reduced costs award.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including relative success, settlement offers, financial disclosure conduct, reasonableness of counsel’s rates and time, and the losing party’s reasonable expectations.

The court found the moving party was substantially successful and had made a reasonable offer to settle, but not one warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 inclusive of HST plus disbursements.

The respondent beneficiary brought a motion seeking an order to compel the estate trustees to make an interim distribution of the estate's assets before the passing of accounts.

The estate trustees had refused to make the distribution after the respondent objected to their compensation and threatened litigation over the sale of the deceased's residence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the estate trustees had not acted with mala fides and reasonably exercised their discretion to withhold distribution until their accounts were approved by the court.

Following a family law motion involving exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and support issues, the court addressed the question of costs.

The successful party sought modest costs calculated at the legal aid rate.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered success, the reasonableness of the parties’ behaviour, and the expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The court found the amount requested reasonable in light of the outcome and the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs.

Costs were awarded against the unsuccessful party.

Following a motion regarding parenting time for an infant child, the court determined costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party father had sought a rapid progression to a 50/50 access schedule, while the responding mother sought a gradual increase in parenting time.

The court found the mother was largely successful on the motion because the ordered access schedule closely resembled her proposal.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, the complexity of the matter, and proportionality, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful party.