Robert E. Kwinter

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action alleging that the defendant financial institutions conspired to fix prices in the foreign exchange (FX) market.

The plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with three groups of defendants (Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Citi) totaling $39.25 million.

The plaintiffs moved for an order certifying the action as a class proceeding for settlement purposes against these settling defendants and approving the notice plan.

The court found that the criteria for certification under section 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were satisfied and granted the order.

The plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that numerous financial institutions conspired to manipulate the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs reached early settlements with three groups of defendants (UBS, BNP, and Bank of America) totaling $15,950,000.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of the settlements and Class Counsel's fee request.

The court approved the settlements, finding them fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, particularly given the litigation risks and the value of the settling defendants' cooperation.

The court also approved Class Counsel's fee request of $3,987,500 plus disbursements.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against the defendants for allegedly conspiring to fix prices of cathode ray tubes (CDTs) and colour picture tubes (CPTs).

The plaintiff asserted causes of action under the Competition Act and for common law unlawful means conspiracy, including claims on behalf of umbrella purchasers.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, an identifiable class existed, the claims raised common issues, a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and the litigation plan was workable.

The motion for certification was granted.

The plaintiffs and defendants both sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action regarding an alleged global price-fixing conspiracy in the lithium-ion battery industry.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal the denial of certification for claims relating to unlawful means conspiracy and umbrella purchasers.

The defendants sought leave to appeal the certification of the civil remedy claim under s. 36 of the Competition Act.

The Divisional Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions and that the issues merited appellate attention.

The defendants' motion for leave to appeal was denied, as they failed to establish conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the certification order.

The plaintiffs brought motions for settlement approval and fee approval in several class actions alleging price-fixing in the automotive parts industry.

The court certified the actions against Yazaki and Chiyoda for settlement purposes.

The court approved settlements with Yazaki and Chiyoda totaling over $11 million, noting that class counsel provided supplementary evidence demonstrating that the settlement amounts fell within the zone of reasonableness.

The court also approved class counsel's 25 percent contingency fee request.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a proposed class proceeding for settlement purposes and to approve a settlement agreement with certain defendants alleged to have participated in a conspiracy to fix prices in the cathode ray tube (CRT) industry.

The settlement provided for a payment of $4.15 million and additional non‑monetary cooperation.

The court held that the action met the certification requirements under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 for settlement purposes and that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The plaintiff also sought approval of contingency fees, disbursements, and taxes pursuant to the retainer agreement.

The court found the requested fees and disbursements reasonable given the complexity and risks of the litigation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against several manufacturers of lithium-ion batteries, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy that artificially inflated prices for direct and indirect purchasers in Canada.

The court certified the action solely for the statutory cause of action under section 36 of the Competition Act.

The court excluded 'umbrella purchasers' (those who bought from non-defendants) from the class, finding it plain and obvious they lacked a cause of action due to indeterminate liability and lack of restitutionary basis.

The court also declined to certify the common law claims for unlawful means conspiracy and unjust enrichment, holding that they were precluded by the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Competition Act.

The remaining certification criteria were met for the statutory claim.

In a proposed price-fixing class action involving lithium ion batteries, both sides brought refusals motions arising from cross-examinations conducted in advance of certification.

The court held that questions probing how class counsel came to act for the proposed representative plaintiffs, and requests for a retailer plaintiff’s business documents, were not relevant to the certification criteria.

However, questions to the plaintiffs’ expert about whether inclusion of contract phone purchasers complicated pass-through analysis were relevant to testing the expert’s methodology and had to be answered.

Questions to defence witnesses about alleged meetings and documents referenced in a related U.S. proceeding were refused as going to the merits rather than certification.

On a Crown application in a criminal price-fixing prosecution, the court considered whether factual information supplied by cooperating corporations to the Competition Bureau during immunity and leniency proffers was protected from disclosure by settlement privilege or solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that solicitor-client privilege was waived when the information was voluntarily provided to the prosecuting authorities for use against other accused persons.

It further held that settlement privilege did not extend to factual information given in circumstances where the providers knew the information would be used to prosecute others and were themselves no longer exposed to resulting criminal or civil jeopardy.

In any event, the accused's constitutional right to make full answer and defence would override settlement privilege, and the applicable disclosure standard was the first party Stinchcombe regime.

The representative plaintiff in a proposed class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the Canadian aftermarket oil and air filter market sought court approval of a settlement resolving the litigation.

The settlement provided for payment of $350,000, subject to an opt-out threshold, with a distribution protocol requiring significant purchase thresholds for direct recovery and a cy-près allocation to a consumer organization for remaining funds.

The court considered the risks of continuing litigation, including evidentiary issues, uncertainty regarding proof of conspiracy and price impact, and the pending Supreme Court of Canada decision concerning indirect purchaser rights.

Concluding that the settlement represented a fair, reasonable, and pragmatic resolution given the litigation risks, the court approved both the settlement and the reduced contingency fee arrangement.

In a proposed class action alleging a conspiracy among DRAM manufacturers to fix prices, the plaintiffs brought a motion to certify the action for settlement purposes against one defendant following a settlement agreement.

The settlement required the defendant to pay $5.75 million for the benefit of class members in Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and determined that the criteria for certification were satisfied.

The court also approved the proposed notice and notice plan, which aligned with a similar approval in British Columbia.

The motion was unopposed and the orders were granted as requested.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a Letter of Request (LOR) from a US District Court seeking document production and examination of representatives in relation to a US antitrust class action.

The appellant argued the application judge failed to exercise independent discretion and merely accepted the LOR at face value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the Friction Division Products criteria, sought clarification from the US judge, and correctly concluded that the requested information was relevant, necessary, and not otherwise obtainable.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a bar order in a class proceeding.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act to make the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bar order appropriately limited the plaintiff's claim against non-settling defendants to their proportionate liability, in accordance with established principles.

The appellant challenged an order striking its amended statement of claim alleging that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and a related generic seller marketed pseudo-generic drugs through misleading origin representations and anti-competitive pricing practices.

The Court of Appeal held that the pleading could support a claim under s. 52 of the Competition Act, as well as related tort claims for unlawful interference with economic relations and conspiracy, because the alleged false statement of origin could have been made to promote a business interest and in a material respect.

The court agreed, however, that the double ticketing claim under s. 54 of the Competition Act and the Business Practices Act allegations were not viable on the pleaded facts.

The court also held that it was not plain and obvious that the Food and Drugs Act claim against the generic seller must fail.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs to the appellant.

The minority shareholder applicant brought an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act after being dismissed from the respondent corporation.

The shareholders' agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a specific mechanism for valuing and redeeming the shares of a departing employee.

The motions judge allowed the applicant's motion to have the dispute heard in court rather than by arbitration, relying on the Weber principle to avoid a potential deprivation of ultimate remedy.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the Weber principle does not generally apply to voluntary private arbitration agreements and that the parties must be held to their freely chosen dispute resolution mechanism.