Robert E. Kwinter

The plaintiffs and defendants both sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action regarding an alleged global price-fixing conspiracy in the lithium-ion battery industry.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal the denial of certification for claims relating to unlawful means conspiracy and umbrella purchasers.

The defendants sought leave to appeal the certification of the civil remedy claim under s. 36 of the Competition Act.

The Divisional Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions and that the issues merited appellate attention.

The defendants' motion for leave to appeal was denied, as they failed to establish conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the certification order.

The plaintiffs brought motions for settlement approval and fee approval in several class actions alleging price-fixing in the automotive parts industry.

The court certified the actions against Yazaki and Chiyoda for settlement purposes.

The court approved settlements with Yazaki and Chiyoda totaling over $11 million, noting that class counsel provided supplementary evidence demonstrating that the settlement amounts fell within the zone of reasonableness.

The court also approved class counsel's 25 percent contingency fee request.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against several manufacturers of lithium-ion batteries, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy that artificially inflated prices for direct and indirect purchasers in Canada.

The court certified the action solely for the statutory cause of action under section 36 of the Competition Act.

The court excluded 'umbrella purchasers' (those who bought from non-defendants) from the class, finding it plain and obvious they lacked a cause of action due to indeterminate liability and lack of restitutionary basis.

The court also declined to certify the common law claims for unlawful means conspiracy and unjust enrichment, holding that they were precluded by the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Competition Act.

The remaining certification criteria were met for the statutory claim.

In a proposed price-fixing class action involving lithium ion batteries, both sides brought refusals motions arising from cross-examinations conducted in advance of certification.

The court held that questions probing how class counsel came to act for the proposed representative plaintiffs, and requests for a retailer plaintiff’s business documents, were not relevant to the certification criteria.

However, questions to the plaintiffs’ expert about whether inclusion of contract phone purchasers complicated pass-through analysis were relevant to testing the expert’s methodology and had to be answered.

Questions to defence witnesses about alleged meetings and documents referenced in a related U.S. proceeding were refused as going to the merits rather than certification.

In a proposed class action alleging a conspiracy among DRAM manufacturers to fix prices, the plaintiffs brought a motion to certify the action for settlement purposes against one defendant following a settlement agreement.

The settlement required the defendant to pay $5.75 million for the benefit of class members in Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and determined that the criteria for certification were satisfied.

The court also approved the proposed notice and notice plan, which aligned with a similar approval in British Columbia.

The motion was unopposed and the orders were granted as requested.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a Letter of Request (LOR) from a US District Court seeking document production and examination of representatives in relation to a US antitrust class action.

The appellant argued the application judge failed to exercise independent discretion and merely accepted the LOR at face value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the Friction Division Products criteria, sought clarification from the US judge, and correctly concluded that the requested information was relevant, necessary, and not otherwise obtainable.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a bar order in a class proceeding.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act to make the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bar order appropriately limited the plaintiff's claim against non-settling defendants to their proportionate liability, in accordance with established principles.

The appellant challenged an order striking its amended statement of claim alleging that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and a related generic seller marketed pseudo-generic drugs through misleading origin representations and anti-competitive pricing practices.

The Court of Appeal held that the pleading could support a claim under s. 52 of the Competition Act, as well as related tort claims for unlawful interference with economic relations and conspiracy, because the alleged false statement of origin could have been made to promote a business interest and in a material respect.

The court agreed, however, that the double ticketing claim under s. 54 of the Competition Act and the Business Practices Act allegations were not viable on the pleaded facts.

The court also held that it was not plain and obvious that the Food and Drugs Act claim against the generic seller must fail.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs to the appellant.

The minority shareholder applicant brought an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act after being dismissed from the respondent corporation.

The shareholders' agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a specific mechanism for valuing and redeeming the shares of a departing employee.

The motions judge allowed the applicant's motion to have the dispute heard in court rather than by arbitration, relying on the Weber principle to avoid a potential deprivation of ultimate remedy.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the Weber principle does not generally apply to voluntary private arbitration agreements and that the parties must be held to their freely chosen dispute resolution mechanism.