R. MacKinnon

Following a decision on five motions where success was evenly divided, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and the settlement correspondence between counsel, which did not constitute formal Rule 49 offers.

Finding that success remained evenly divided and both parties made good faith attempts to resolve the issues, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The parties brought multiple interlocutory motions in a construction dispute regarding the supply of equipment.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to discharge a PPSA registration, finding a valid security agreement existed.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion for security for costs, finding insufficient evidence of impecuniosity.

The court granted the defendant's motion for particulars, as the statement of claim contained bare allegations.

The court partially granted the plaintiff's motion to compel answers to refusals from an examination.

The motion to transfer venue was deferred to the Regional Senior Judge.

The defendant brought a motion seeking dissolution of an ex parte Mareva injunction that prohibited dealings with several real estate properties.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant participated in fraud and conspiracy relating to real estate transactions and argued that there was a real risk the defendant would dissipate assets to avoid judgment.

The court reviewed evidence of multiple property sales, inconsistencies in the defendant’s affidavit evidence, and delays in cooperating with discovery.

Applying the test for Mareva relief, the court found the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case and a real risk of asset dissipation.

The court held that the criteria for maintaining the injunction were satisfied and dismissed the defendant’s motion.

The applicant and respondent dentists operated a joint venture general dentistry practice.

The respondent returned to school to become a specialist, reducing his hours but maintaining his draw.

The applicant gave 90 days' written notice to terminate the joint venture.

When the parties could not agree on the mechanics of separation, the applicant sought a declaration of termination and sole ownership.

The court granted the application, declaring the joint venture terminated effective June 30, 2014, ordering the respondent to vacate the practice, and directing the parties to proceed with a valuation and buyout of the respondent's interest.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, arguing that the transitional provisions of the Abolition of Early Parole Act violated Charter rights by depriving him of accelerated parole review.

The applicant had committed the offence before the repeal of the accelerated parole regime but was sentenced after the repeal came into force.

The court considered whether the repeal constituted a change in punishment contrary to s. 11(i) of the Charter and whether the applicant had a settled expectation of liberty based on the earlier regime.

The court held that an offender’s expectation of liberty crystallizes at sentencing, not at the time of the offence.

Because the applicant was sentenced after the repeal of accelerated parole review, the prospective application of the repeal did not constitute punishment or violate the Charter.

A federal inmate applied for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, alleging that the abolition of accelerated parole review under the Abolition of Early Parole Act violated rights under ss. 7, 10, 11(i), and 24(1) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his eligibility for accelerated parole review should be determined by the date of the offence rather than the sentencing date.

The court declined to review decisions of the Correctional Service of Canada and the Parole Board, holding that a comprehensive statutory review mechanism already existed.

It further found that the repeal of accelerated parole review did not violate the applicant’s Charter rights because parole eligibility does not constitute punishment and the applicant had no constitutionally protected expectation of liberty based on the repealed regime.

The application for habeas corpus and related relief was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction restraining them from dealing with their assets in connection with allegations of fraud and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced the transfer of $750,000 USD to a numbered company controlled by his common-law partner and that the funds were used for personal expenses and property renovations.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud against the individual defendant and unjust enrichment against the other defendant, and held there was a real risk of asset dissipation.

The court rejected arguments that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure on the ex parte motion and declined to require the plaintiff to post security for its undertaking in damages.

The Mareva injunction was continued and the defendants’ motions were dismissed.

A former spouse brought a motion seeking interim and permanent spousal support more than two decades after separation and many years after divorce.

The applicant was disabled, dependent on social assistance, and unable to work, while the respondent was retired with modest pension income and had reorganized his finances following remarriage.

The court held that delay in pursuing support does not bar relief under the Divorce Act, but extreme and unexplained delay may significantly affect entitlement and quantum.

Although the applicant established need and entitlement due to disability following a long marriage, the court found the delay unreasonable and reduced support substantially below the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Interim spousal support of $300 per month was ordered with no retroactivity and no indexation.

The applicant sought reimbursement of defence costs and a declaration that the respondent insurers owed a duty to defend an underlying action alleging damages from an oil spill at a residence.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a contractors’ pollution liability policy requiring that covered operations commence on or after the retroactive date to trigger coverage.

The court held that the policy language unambiguously tied coverage to the timing of the insured’s operations rather than the pollution incident.

Because the alleged operations occurred before the retroactive date, the insured failed to establish that the claim fell within the grant of coverage.

The application was dismissed and the insurers were found to have no duty to defend.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a prior order certifying a class proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act.

It argued that the certification judge erred in finding the pleadings disclosed a cause of action and in determining that common issues existed, particularly regarding an alleged duty of a custodial trustee to warn investors about an investment scheme.

The court held that the certification judge properly applied the test under the Class Proceedings Act and that it was not plain and obvious the claim had no chance of success.

The alleged “super-added duty” was properly characterized as part of the broader tort duty of care that could arise depending on factual findings at trial.

The court also rejected arguments that the certification process or authorities relied upon created conflicting jurisprudence warranting appellate review.

Following trial and earlier reasons on costs, the defendants by counterclaim brought a motion seeking entry of judgment reflecting the court’s costs rulings and directing payment of their costs by the opposing party’s insurer to their own insurer.

The responding party brought a preliminary motion to strike an affidavit filed in support of the motion.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, holding the affidavit was relevant to the issue of payment of costs.

The court further corrected an accidental slip in earlier reasons concerning costs and amended the costs award to clarify that only one plaintiff was liable for partial indemnity costs.

The court ordered that costs awarded to the successful defendants by counterclaim be paid by the opposing party’s insurer directly to their insurer, with post‑judgment interest.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(d) to dismiss or stay an action alleging breach of trust, bad faith, and unjust enrichment arising from the termination of a real estate Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The plaintiffs had previously brought an application concerning the same agreement, in which the court determined after trial that the vendor lawfully terminated the agreement due to the purchasers’ default.

The court held that the present action was fundamentally premised on the allegation that the termination was wrongful, an issue already adjudicated in the earlier proceeding.

Applying the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process, the court found the action sought to relitigate matters previously determined and was therefore frivolous and vexatious.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

Following a family law trial involving child support, spousal support, and net family property equalization, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court assessed which party achieved greater success and evaluated the parties’ settlement offers and litigation conduct.

The applicant obtained more favourable results on child support and s.7 expenses, while spousal support was not ordered due to her inability to pay.

Although success on property equalization was somewhat mixed, the applicant’s offer to settle was substantially closer to the trial outcome and the respondent’s offer was found unreasonable, particularly given his failure to propose any child support.

The court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action, the defendant sought costs of both the motion and the underlying proceeding.

The plaintiff argued that costs should be limited because the defendant delayed bringing the summary judgment motion until shortly before trial despite participating in discovery and other litigation steps for years.

The court rejected this argument, finding the defendant acted reasonably in defending the claim and that evolving jurisprudence after amendments to Rule 20 justified bringing the motion after discoveries were completed.

Substantial indemnity costs were refused because the defendant’s settlement offers did not trigger Rule 49 consequences.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed by the court, including fees and disbursements, payable forthwith.

A condominium developer sought declarations that purchasers of two commercial hotel condominium units were bound by their agreements of purchase and sale and that their notices of rescission were invalid.

The purchasers argued that a revised disclosure statement contained several undisclosed material changes, including cost allocation shifts, lack of PATH access, kitchen configuration changes, ownership changes in certain units, and a reduction in the building’s overall height.

Applying the objective test for material change under the Condominium Act, the court found that none of the alleged changes—individually or cumulatively—would have caused a reasonable purchaser to rescind the transaction.

The developer established that the changes did not materially affect the investment value or income potential of the units.

The court therefore held that the purchasers’ rescission notices were ineffective and that the agreements remained binding.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims arising from the premature deterioration of pine roof shingles installed on the plaintiff’s home.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contractual warranty, breach of statutory warranties under the Sale of Goods Act, and negligent misrepresentation relating to representations that the roof would last 50 years.

The court found the plaintiff had discovered the alleged defects and the basis of her claims by November 2005, yet did not commence the action until March 2008.

Applying the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, the court held the claims were statute‑barred.

The court also concluded there was no evidence the retailer provided a contractual warranty or representation guaranteeing the shingles for 50 years.

Following a personal injury jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court determined costs after the parties failed to agree.

The jury awarded modest damages, but the plaintiff’s general damages and Family Law Act damages were unrecoverable due to the Insurance Act threshold.

The plaintiffs obtained judgment less favourable than the defendant’s Rule 49 offer to settle, triggering cost consequences under Rule 49.10(2).

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs up to the date of the defendant’s offer and awarded the defendant substantial partial indemnity costs thereafter.

Separate costs were also awarded to the defendants-by-counterclaim who successfully defended a Negligence Act contribution and indemnity claim.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice for three counts of sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the burden of proof and presumption of innocence, misapprehended the evidence, and applied a different standard of scrutiny to Crown and defence witnesses.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the principles in R. v. (W.D.) and was entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence and reject the accused’s evidence.

No material misapprehension of evidence or error in credibility assessment was established.

The court also found no error in the nine‑month concurrent sentences imposed within the joint submission range.

Following a family law trial concerning spousal and child support obligations, the parties were unable to agree on the calculation of a support overpayment and on costs.

The court determined that the payor had overpaid support by $233 per month for 15 months following the trial order, totaling $3,495, and ordered repayment unless the parties agreed to resolve the issue through income tax filings.

On the issue of costs, the court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and concluded that the respondent wife was the more successful litigant, particularly regarding the continuation of spousal support despite the husband's request for retroactive termination.

After considering the parties’ settlement offers, litigation conduct, complexity of the matter, and the reasonableness of counsel’s fees and disbursements, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent wife was awarded total costs of $23,695.16 payable forthwith.

Following separation and a review clause in a separation agreement, the parties disputed the continuation and quantum of spousal support, child support obligations under a shared parenting arrangement, life insurance security for support, and whether post-separation income should be shared.

The court assessed the parties’ respective incomes, imputing income to the respondent due to underemployment.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and the objectives of s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act, the court determined that the respondent remained in need of support but that a time-limited, step‑down order was appropriate.

Child support was recalculated using the set‑off method under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court also ordered life insurance to secure support obligations and declined to require the respondent to share her post‑separation income.