K. Hull

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after stabbing a convenience store clerk 17 times while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The unprovoked attack left the victim with a permanent disability in his hand.

The court accepted a joint submission, sentencing the accused to 3.5 years in custody, less 18 months of pre-sentence custody credit, leaving 2 years to be served in the penitentiary.

The applicant, previously convicted of child luring, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the undercover police officer's actions during an internet sting operation amounted to entrapment.

The applicant contended the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and engaged in random virtue testing when responding to a Craigslist ad.

The court dismissed the application, finding the officer had abundant objectively reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant was a predator based on the ad's contents and the unfolding conversation.

The court held that the police conduct did not constitute random virtue testing and was a bona fide inquiry.

The Crown applied for a warrant of committal for the imprisonment of the respondent, who had defaulted on paying a $288,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture and a $37,000 victim surcharge imposed for a prior fraud conviction.

The respondent, who was self-represented and on social assistance, argued he lacked the means to pay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent's limited discretionary spending did not demonstrate a wilful refusal to pay the fine without reasonable excuse under section 734.7(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

He argued that the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment request after the late disclosure of the arresting officer's complete handwritten notes, and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the officer's reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the late disclosure did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, as an adequate transcription had been provided months earlier and defence counsel lacked diligence in pursuing the original notes.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the officer had objective reasonable grounds to arrest based on the cumulative observations of the appellant's red eyes and slow, deliberate movements.

The Crown brought a voluntariness application to admit the accused's videotaped statement to police, while the accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his home and computer, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused was charged with child luring after communicating online with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The court found the videotaped statement was voluntary and admissible.

While the court found a s. 8 breach regarding the obtaining of subscriber information and a s. 10(b breach regarding pre-caution statements, it admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the prosecution.

The accused, charged with second degree murder following a vehicular confrontation with a pedestrian, applied for release on bail pending trial.

The Crown conceded that the accused met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on a $200,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including house arrest and supervision by named sureties, to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on multiple counts of possession and making available child pornography.

The trial judge had excluded computer evidence after finding that police breached s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code by failing to file a return of seized items as soon as practicable, concluding the breach violated s. 8 of the Charter and warranted exclusion under s. 24(2).

The appeal court held the trial judge committed reversible error by misapprehending the evidence regarding the seriousness and systemic nature of the breach and by misapplying the second stage of the Grant analysis.

The trial judge also erred by excluding the accused’s statement under s. 10(b) without notice to the Crown.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering a threat against his step-daughter, as well as his 5-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to reopen the trial to admit fresh evidence regarding taxi records, misapprehended evidence, and erred in principle on sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct test for fresh evidence, made credibility findings supported by the record, and imposed a fit sentence given the aggravating factors, including the vulnerability of the victim and the breach of trust.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for criminal harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded evidence regarding the content of prior communications between the accused and the complainant and then concluded that the complainant’s fear was not reasonable.

The Superior Court held that prior conduct evidence is presumptively admissible in criminal harassment cases because it provides the context necessary to assess reasonable fear and the accused’s intent or recklessness.

The court further held that the trial judge erred by excluding the evidence without considering less drastic remedies and that the resulting acquittal was unreasonable given the findings of repeated unwanted contact and continued behaviour after police warnings.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought a stay of a driving prohibition order pending appeal of a conviction for failing to provide a breath sample contrary to the Criminal Code.

The application was brought under s. 261 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the proposed appeal was not frivolous, which requires showing a viable ground of appeal that could justify appellate intervention.

Although the applicant demonstrated significant personal hardship arising from the continued prohibition, the court found the proposed unreasonable verdict argument did not disclose an arguable ground of appeal in light of the trial judge’s detailed credibility findings and application of R. v. W.(D).

The applicant failed to meet the burden of establishing that the appeal was not frivolous.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge unreasonably concluded he was in care or control of the vehicle.

The appellant had been seated in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle with the headlights and heater on while intoxicated, claiming he intended to walk to a friend’s house rather than drive.

Applying the principles from R. v. Boudreault, the court held that the trial judge reasonably found a realistic risk of danger because the appellant’s alleged alternate plan was vague and had been undermined by subsequent events.

The trial judge was entitled to conclude the appellant exercised care or control by unlocking, starting, and occupying the vehicle without a concrete plan.

The verdict was supported by the evidence and not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The appeal alleged errors of law including misapplication of the evidentiary burden under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code following the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux, improper reliance on earlier breath samples, and failure to assess the reliability of the breath technician’s evidence.

The court acknowledged that the trial judge overstated the evidentiary burden imposed on the accused but held that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The evidence supported the reliability of the final two breath samples obtained after the intoxilyzer testing sequence reset and ambient contamination was cleared.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault and one count of mischief under $5,000 following a judge-alone trial.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies among Crown witnesses and improperly assessed credibility.

He further contended that the trial judge failed to apply an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant, who had a history of substance abuse and criminal conduct.

The court held that credibility findings are owed deference and that the trial judge reasonably assessed the evidence and addressed inconsistencies.

The court also found that the Vetrovec caution is discretionary and that the trial judge sufficiently considered reliability concerns and corroborating evidence.

The accused applied in the nature of certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of administering a noxious substance under the Criminal Code.

The evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that the complainant had independently formed an intention to commit suicide and asked the accused to bring drugs and prepare a syringe for that purpose.

The court considered whether preparing a syringe and facilitating drug ingestion could constitute "administering" within the meaning of the offence.

Relying on appellate authorities interpreting the term, the court held that administering requires causing the substance to enter the complainant’s system.

Merely providing drugs or preparing them for voluntary ingestion by the complainant did not amount to administering.

The committal on that count was therefore quashed.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice for three counts of sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the burden of proof and presumption of innocence, misapprehended the evidence, and applied a different standard of scrutiny to Crown and defence witnesses.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the principles in R. v. (W.D.) and was entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence and reject the accused’s evidence.

No material misapprehension of evidence or error in credibility assessment was established.

The court also found no error in the nine‑month concurrent sentences imposed within the joint submission range.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever one count of sexual assault from four other counts involving different complainants.

The court considered the governing factors for severance, including the factual and legal nexus between the counts, potential prejudice to the accused, the possibility of similar fact evidence, and the desirability of avoiding multiple trials.

The allegations involved two related complainants within the accused’s family and shared similarities in circumstances, authority dynamics, and opportunity.

The court found a sufficient nexus between the counts and concluded that a single trial was necessary for completeness of narrative and context.

The accused failed to establish that the interests of justice required severance.

The offender, a bookkeeper, pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000 for stealing approximately $395,000 from her employers over several years.

The Crown sought 4 to 6 months of incarceration, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized general deterrence for large-scale employee thefts involving a breach of trust.

Applying the factors from R. v. Bogart, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 5 months of incarceration followed by two years of probation, along with restitution orders.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider relevant jurisprudence regarding the “last chance” doctrine where an accused initially refuses but subsequently offers to comply with an approved screening device demand shortly thereafter.

The court held that the refusal was clear, repeated, and unequivocal, and that the subsequent offer to comply minutes later did not negate the completed offence.

The trial judge properly applied the jurisprudence, including the principle that compliance must be immediate and not at a time chosen by the driver.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction decision that dismissed charges of impaired driving and driving with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The trial judge found that Intoxilyzer samples were not taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code due to an unexplained ten‑minute delay between the request for an approved screening device and the officer’s arrival at the scene.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the law, particularly the principles from appellate authority addressing the “forthwith” requirement for roadside screening device demands.

The appeal court held that the trial judge applied the correct legal test and reasonably assessed the circumstances in concluding that the delay was unexplained and rendered the breath samples non‑compliant with the statutory requirement.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s factual findings.