Richard Rudolphe George Marks

The respondents moved to stay the appellant's action and for an order for security for costs on the appeal, citing the appellant's failure to pay over $27,000 in costs awards from previous unsuccessful proceedings.

The appellant, who was suing for historical sexual and physical abuse, was impecunious and relied on a disability pension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions, finding that despite the unpaid costs and the respondents' valid concerns, the impecunious appellant should not be deprived of a final opportunity to have his case considered on the merits, as the appeal was not plainly devoid of merit.

The respondent in an appeal brought a motion to quash the portion of the appeal relating to a refusal to order the production of documents, and for an order requiring the appellant to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding the production order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

However, the Court dismissed the motion for security for costs, holding that such an order cannot be made against a defendant/appellant who was forced into court by the plaintiff.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant solicitor was retained by the respondent for medical malpractice lawsuits.

After a dispute over unpaid fees, the respondent granted mortgages on her properties as security.

When the respondent failed to pay, the appellant commenced power of sale proceedings.

The respondent obtained an injunction and a motions judge ordered the discharge of a $25,000 mortgage upon payment of funds into court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the mortgage should not be discharged unless principal, interest, and costs were paid, and clarified that the funds paid into court stand as security for the appellant.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent insured disability benefits, aggravated damages, and punitive damages following the denial of a disability claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, finding fatal defects in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

Specifically, the charge on aggravated and punitive damages was wholly inadequate, failing to explain the legal requirements or direct the jury to relevant evidence.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that a six-year limitation period applied for breach of contract rather than the one-year limitation period mandated by the insurance policy, and failed to instruct the jury on the discoverability principle.

The insured died during coronary bypass surgery due to the unexpected failure of a heart-lung pump.

The trial judge found the death was accidental and that the policy's exclusion for death caused or contributed to by medical treatment did not apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the clear language of the exclusion applied because the heart-lung pump was a necessary element of the surgical treatment, and its failure directly or indirectly caused or contributed to the death.

The appellant and respondent signed a cohabitation agreement in 1986 that included a mutual waiver of spousal support.

After their separation in 1997, the appellant sought to set aside the waiver under s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act and claimed spousal support.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, applying the stringent test for setting aside an entire domestic contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by not focusing on whether the waiver resulted in unconscionable circumstances at the time of the application.

Given the appellant's age, unemployability, and modest pension compared to the respondent's substantial wealth, the court found the circumstances unconscionable, set aside the waiver, and ordered spousal support of $3,500 per month.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of a medical malpractice action arising from the death of a patient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis.

The appeal focused on recusal, alleged negligence in the physician’s monitoring and follow-up system, and causation.

The court held that, although the trial judge had improperly received information caught by Rule 50.03, the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias requiring recusal.

The court further held there was no basis to disturb the findings that the follow-up system did not establish negligence on the physician’s part and that any failure of follow-up did not cause or contribute to the death, because the accepted evidence showed no signs of hepatitis at the critical January assessment.