Richard P. Quance

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable on a promissory note.

He argued there was an absence of consideration and relied on the defence of non est factum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that consideration existed due to the family relationship and benefit to the appellant's son, and that the appellant could not rely on non est factum because he carelessly chose not to read the document.

The award of pre-judgment interest was also upheld.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering him to pay $25,000 on a personal guarantee and $42,000 in costs.

He argued he was discharged from the guarantee because the lender failed to obtain confirmed future contracts as required by the loan commitment letter, constituting a material alteration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the requirement was satisfied by the receipt of contracts before the commitment letter was signed.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the trial costs award from $42,000 to $25,000 as a more reasonable amount for a one-day trial.

The tenants appealed a trial judgment finding their commercial lease invalid and terminating their month-to-month tenancy.

They argued the trial judge erred by excluding the female tenant from the courtroom while her husband testified.

The Court of Appeal held that while excluding a party violates rule 52.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice in this case.

The landlord's estate cross-appealed the dismissal of its claim for arrears of rent and taxes.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal in part, finding that while the landlord's course of conduct waived the rent arrears, the tenants' uncorroborated evidence regarding property and business taxes could not defeat the estate's claim under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved claims of conspiracy and unlawful interference against the defendants, who acted as opposing counsel in a prior oppression proceeding that settled.

The court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(ii), finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision due to a failure to provide sufficient reasons addressing whether the action was frivolous and vexatious, and determining the issue was of sufficient public importance.

The appeal concerned interpretation of an easement over a strip of land used for pedestrian and vehicular access, egress, and parking.

The appellants argued the easement granted them exclusive parking rights, while the respondent maintained residual rights to use the servient lands.

The court held that the easement did not confer exclusivity, but clarified that the servient owner must exercise its residual rights in a manner consistent with and respectful of the easement rights.

Because the matter was presented on a meager agreed factual record, the court declined to define the parties' rights more specifically.

The judgment was affirmed with a variation, and each party was ordered to bear its own appeal costs.