Q.C.

The tenant's business premises were destroyed by a fire caused by a contractor retained by the landlord.

The tenant's insurer paid the policy limits and brought a subrogated claim against the landlord for the remaining uninsured losses.

The commercial lease required the tenant to insure its property against fire and to name the landlord as an additional insured, but also contained a clause requiring the landlord to indemnify the tenant for damage caused by the landlord's negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the tenant's covenant to insure constituted an assumption of the risk of fire damage, relieving the landlord of liability even for its own negligence.

The appeal was allowed and the tenant's action dismissed.

The plaintiff, a partner at the defendant accounting firm, was forced to retire after the firm's CEO decided to reduce the number of partners due to an economic downturn.

The firm's policy board subsequently voted to compel his resignation under a provision of the partnership agreement allowing expulsion in the best interests of the partnership.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the policy board did not genuinely determine the issue but merely rubber-stamped the CEO's predetermined decision.

The court held that the expulsion was invalid and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages for lost profits and retirement benefits, as well as aggravated damages for reputational harm.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action after a 2.5-day trial, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court found no conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs and no relevant offers to settle.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable in line with the losing party's expectations, the court noted the plaintiff's own costs outline was over $44,000.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The parties appeared on a motion to settle the terms of a judgment following a class action trial.

The court resolved three disputes between the plaintiff and the defendant law firm regarding the wording of the judgment.

The court held that the judgment should include a mechanism allowing for a potential reduction of the $45 million aggregate damages award, as the court had mistakenly assumed all 181 class members had retained the law firm.

The court also clarified that class members only needed to return a participation form or funding to create a retainer, and that this had to be done prior to the waiver of the Acceptance Threshold Condition.

Following a 41-day trial where the plaintiff succeeded against one defendant (Cassels) but failed against another (GMCL), the court determined the costs awards.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs against Cassels, apportioned at 40% of fees and 50% of disbursements to reflect the divided success of the action.

GMCL sought substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff, arguing the plaintiff made unfounded allegations of misconduct.

The court rejected this, finding the allegations were not reprehensible, and awarded GMCL partial indemnity costs, subject to a 10% reduction for duplication between its two law firms.

The plaintiff was also awarded costs for successfully defending GMCL's counterclaim.

On a criminal appeal concerning party liability for cocaine trafficking, the appellants challenged convictions entered after the appellate court set aside acquittals.

The court held that, on the trial judge's factual findings, aiding and abetting through protective conduct for the distribution operation was established.

The reasons accepted that the appellants' acts hindered interference and provided assistance and encouragement to the principal offender.

The court affirmed the appellate disposition and dismissed both appeals.

The applicant sought a declaration that Property Assessment Change Notices issued for the 2012 and 2013 taxation years were invalid.

The notices added the value of a newly constructed hotel to the property assessment, resulting in significant additional municipal and education taxes.

The applicant argued the assessment corporation could only issue revised assessments where an omission was inadvertent and not where the property was deliberately excluded.

The court held that the governing statute permits reassessment where property has been omitted from the tax roll regardless of the reason for the omission.

The court found the hotel had been omitted due to negligence, error, inadvertence or mistake and upheld the validity of the revised assessments.

The deceased left a will that expressly disinherited his daughter, stating she had had no communication with him for several years.

The daughter challenged the will, adducing extrinsic evidence that her father's actual motive was racially discriminatory because she had a child with a white man.

The application judge admitted the evidence and set aside the will on public policy grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that third-party extrinsic evidence of a testator's motive is inadmissible when the will is clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, the court held that the public policy doctrine cannot be used to void an unconditional, private testamentary bequest based on a testator's alleged discriminatory motive, affirming the principle of testamentary freedom.

The parties separated after a 20-year marriage during which the applicant worked as a bookkeeper for the respondent's construction business.

The court determined the value of the business at separation, rejecting the applicant's expert's inclusion of 'secured customer leads' as property under the Family Law Act.

The court also addressed retroactive and ongoing spousal and child support, imputing income to the respondent based on a three-year pattern and awarding the applicant high-range spousal support of $3,300 monthly due to strong compensatory and needs-based claims.

The deceased, Albert Latner, commenced two actions against his son Joshua and Joshua's company.

The first action sought payments owed under a written support agreement.

The second action sought the return of a $13 million payment, claiming it was held on a resulting trust.

The estate continued the actions after Albert's death.

The court allowed the first action, finding that an alleged oral waiver of the support payments violated the parol evidence rule and the agreement's entire agreement clause.

The court dismissed the second action, finding that the defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of resulting trust by proving the $13 million was intended as a gift to equalize financial treatment among the children.

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the confinement element required for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) was made out where the accused blocked the victim from escaping before the killing.

The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the forcible or unlawful confinement was distinct and independent from the act of killing.

The appellate intervention substituting second degree murder was therefore unwarranted.

The conviction for first degree murder was reinstated and the appeal was allowed.

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the confinement element required for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) was made out where the accused blocked the victim from escaping before the killing.

The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the forcible or unlawful confinement was distinct and independent from the act of killing.

The appellate intervention substituting second degree murder was therefore unwarranted.

The conviction for first degree murder was reinstated and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12.5 years for manslaughter.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider his self-induced intoxication and that the sentence was clearly unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the trial judge properly considered the intoxication and the sentence fell within the acceptable range for aggravated manslaughter.

However, based on the intervening Supreme Court decision in Summers, the court allowed the appeal solely to grant enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-sentence custody, reducing the net sentence to 10 years and 5 months.

The plaintiff brought an action against the estate of his deceased former common-law partner, seeking a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of two cottage properties registered in her name.

The parties had executed a cohabitation agreement in 1993 that established a separate property regime.

In 2010, the plaintiff directed that the properties be transferred into the deceased's name.

He alleged that she held them in trust for him, but no written declaration of trust was ever signed.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a trust on a balance of probabilities, noting conflicts in the evidence and the application of the Statute of Frauds.

The action was dismissed.

During a lengthy personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought a motion to determine whether the plaintiff required leave under section 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three 'participant experts' (treating doctors) who intended to proffer opinion evidence.

The court held that while treating doctors testifying strictly to history, treatment, diagnosis, and prognosis do not require leave, those offering broader opinion evidence must comply with Rule 53.03 and are subject to the three-expert limit.

The court emphasized its gatekeeper function and the need for proportionality, ruling that the plaintiff must seek leave to call more than one expert per medical specialty.

Following a successful partial summary judgment motion, the defendants sought costs of $700,000 plus disbursements payable forthwith.

The plaintiffs argued costs should be in the cause.

The court agreed with the plaintiffs that costs should be in the cause, as the trial was imminent and the trial judge would be in the best position to allocate liability for costs.

The court clarified that the costs would be in the cause of the specific plaintiff's action, not the consolidated action involving a receiver.

The applicant insurance company sought a mandatory injunction by way of application to compel the respondent construction company to pay funds into trust as security for construction lien bonds.

The respondent argued that an injunction cannot be the sole primary relief sought in an application under Rule 14.05(3)(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court agreed, holding that injunctive relief must be ancillary to other relief in a proceeding properly commenced by notice of application.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, the Attorney-General of Canada, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike the plaintiffs' claims for misfeasance in public office, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The claims arose from the federal government's alleged failure to enforce anti-smuggling laws regarding contraband tobacco on the Six Nations Reserve.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the correctness of the motion judge's decision was open to very serious debate and that the issues raised—specifically the extent to which government policy decisions and law enforcement discretion can be subject to private law duties—were matters of public importance warranting appellate review.