Philip Patrick Healey

The successful appellants sought costs of their appeal and the application for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party.

The court noted that both parties contributed to the jurisdictional error below, the appeal raised a novel and complex issue regarding the interplay between the Libel and Slander Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the appellants' conduct throughout the proceedings justified the case management judge's initial concerns about abuse of process.

The appellants, plaintiffs in a defamation action against a newspaper and others, appealed an order requiring them to post security for costs under Rule 56.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in law by not applying section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court held that section 12 provides a specific, more onerous procedure for security for costs in libel actions involving newspapers, which takes precedence over the general provisions of Rule 56 pursuant to Rule 1.02(1)3.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The court found that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity basis, but determined that the amounts sought by the respondents were excessive.

Costs were fixed at $17,500 for the main group of respondents and $10,000 for the respondent Hemming.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim of conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conclusion was available on the record despite gaps and contradictions in the evidence.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignment and Preferences Act, as they were raised for the first time on appeal and lacked the trial judge's review.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a defamation judgment arising from a series of newspaper articles alleging that a municipal engineering commissioner arranged an improper land payment to a developer friend while withholding planning information from council.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege, finding ample support for malice based on a sensationalized, one-sided reporting purpose undertaken without regard for the facts, although one branch of the trial judge’s malice reasoning was set aside because the journalist had been unfairly restricted from explaining his intended meaning.

The court also upheld special damages for loss of employment and substantial general damages, finding a sufficient causal link between the defamatory publication and the respondent’s dismissal.

Punitive damages were set aside because the compensatory award was already sufficient to punish and deter.

The cross-appeal seeking increased damages was dismissed.

The appellants conceded that their appeal was moot.

The Supreme Court of Canada declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal notwithstanding its mootness and quashed the appeal.

However, because the Crown failed to move to quash with due diligence, the Court awarded costs of the appeal to the appellants on a party to party basis.