Peter T. Bishop

The accused, Sheldon Wynter, faced multiple drug trafficking and related charges.

A voir dire was held to determine alleged Charter breaches, specifically concerning a strip search (s. 8), right to counsel (s. 10(b)), and misleading evidence at a bail hearing (s. 7 and 11(d)).

The court found the strip search lawful and reasonable, and the initial s. 10(b) breach (due to medical emergency) did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

However, a significant s. 7 and 11(d) breach occurred due to the Crown's failure to disclose corrected drug weight information at the bail hearing, which misled the Justice of the Peace.

Consequently, the evidence of fentanyl and cocaine seized between February 21st and 25th was excluded.

Other charges will proceed to trial.

The accused was charged with sexual touching contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code involving a complainant under the age of sixteen years.

The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old complainant over a weekend.

The accused raised the defence of mistaken belief of age under section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, arguing he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and honestly believed she was at least sixteen years old.

The court found that the accused took reasonable steps to determine the complainant's age, including asking her multiple times, checking her Facebook profile, and making visual observations.

The court accepted the accused's evidence that the complainant appeared to be seventeen or eighteen years old and that her age was not disclosed on her Facebook profile.

The court also found that the complainant was a willing participant who pursued the accused, planned to stay overnight, and did not verbally or physically communicate discomfort or lack of consent.

The court acquitted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code, sexual interference with a person under 16 contrary to section 151, and sexual assault contrary to section 271.

The Crown withdrew the section 271 charge.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the accused's right to counsel was violated and whether statements should be excluded.

The court found a minor Charter breach regarding the right to counsel but admitted the statements into evidence, finding that exclusion would undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public peace, and assault with a weapon.

The incident occurred in a Subway restaurant parking lot in Ignace, Ontario, when the accused, a United States resident, became angry after nearly colliding with the complainant's large logging truck.

The accused pursued the complainant in her vehicle multiple times, displayed a Leatherman multi-tool knife, and made threatening statements.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving and possession of a weapon dangerous, but conditionally stayed the assault with a weapon charge under the Kienapple Principle.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred on July 27, 2016 in Sioux Lookout.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, who alleged that the accused forced him to perform oral sex near a church.

The court found that despite corroborating evidence of the complainant's distressed state and DNA evidence showing multiple contributors to samples, the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to significant credibility issues, timing inconsistencies, problematic identification evidence, and contradictions in the complainant's account.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the accused following his guilty plea to possession of weapons dangerous to the public peace and three counts of uttering threats.

The accused initially opposed the application but changed his position mid-hearing and consented to being declared a dangerous offender.

The court found that the accused's conduct, which began as an apparent suicide attempt but escalated into threatening behaviour toward police officers, constituted a predicate offence under the Criminal Code.

The court considered the accused's extensive criminal history including 34 prior convictions, pattern of threats, and psychiatric assessments indicating high risk of future offending.

The court declared the accused a dangerous offender and imposed a 6-year determinate sentence plus a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control while blood alcohol exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police observed the accused in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a hotel parking lot at 2:18 a.m.

The accused was extremely intoxicated.

The court found that although the accused had rebutted the presumption under section 258 of the Criminal Code, he did not have actual care and control of the motor vehicle.

The accused had given his keys to a friend while sober, had called a taxi, and entered the vehicle only to retrieve personal items.

The momentary activation of the turn signal and brake lights did not create a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

A police officer responded to a complaint of a possible impaired driver refused service at a beer store and located the accused sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a parking lot.

The officer observed signs of impairment including slurred speech, glossy eyes, strong odour of alcohol, and lack of coordination.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 100 mg and 90 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The defence argued Charter breaches under sections 8 and 9 regarding arbitrary detention and unlawful search, and that no authority existed to stop a vehicle in a parking lot.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, no Charter breach, and convicted the accused of care and control over 80 mg, with a conditional stay on the impaired care and control charge.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge and proceeded on the over .08 charge only.

Following a trial, the court found that the Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted of driving over .08.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

Following a trial held over three dates in 2016, the court found that the child was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health concerns, paranoid behaviour, inadequate supervision, and emotional harm to the child.

The child was ultimately returned to the mother's care on a voluntary basis.

The child protection agency sought costs against the mother, arguing that she had acted unreasonably by refusing to accept a statement of agreed facts and proceeding to trial despite two independent judicial findings of protection concerns.

The court awarded nominal counsel costs of $500 plus full disbursements of $2,569.40 against the mother.

An employer operating a sawmill was convicted of violating Section 75(b) of Ontario Regulation 851 under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to ensure that side cantors of an industrial saw machine were blocked as prescribed.

A worker suffered crushing injuries when side-heads moved during maintenance because hydraulic power was not shut off.

The trial Justice found that "blocked" requires a physical blocking mechanism, not merely shutting off hydraulic power.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Justice erred in interpreting "blocked" and that the sentence of $48,000 was excessive.

The appeal court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no palpable error in the trial Justice's interpretation of the legislation in the context of worker safety.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police officers observed a vehicle on Highway 105 near a R.I.D.E. checkpoint and followed it to a parking lot where they found the accused sleeping in a vehicle.

The officers detained the accused and administered an approved screening device and breathalyzer tests without proper Charter compliance.

The court found breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, both causing bodily harm.

The Crown and defence agreed that the only issue was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the front seat of a vehicle that had collided with a tree.

Two other occupants were also in the vehicle.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver and entered an acquittal on both charges.

Application for custody and access of a child born in 2012.

Both parents sought sole custody.

The applicant father, who had overcome a prescription drug addiction and held stable employment as a peacekeeper and band council member, sought custody citing concerns about the respondent mother's ongoing drug dependency and inadequate care.

The respondent mother, residing in a remote community and enrolled in a Suboxone treatment program, sought sole custody with extended access to the father.

The court awarded joint custody with day-to-day care and control to the father, finding that while both parents loved the child, the father's stability, financial resources, and drug-free status better served the child's interests, particularly given the child's upcoming school enrollment requiring consistency and continuity.

Two defendants were charged with unlawful confinement under section 279(2) of the Criminal Code for apprehending a suspect in connection with a break-in at a video store and bringing him to the police station.

The Crown alleged the defendants made an unlawful citizen's arrest without reasonable grounds and without lawful authority.

The defendants argued they had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was the perpetrator and that the police were not investigating the matter.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove forcible confinement beyond a reasonable doubt, citing the lack of physical force or restraints, the complainant's ability to leave at any time, the inadequate police investigation, and the defendants' reasonable belief in the complainant's guilt.

A child protection application under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child apprehended on June 5, 2015 from the mother on grounds of risk of physical and emotional harm.

The Society sought a three-month wardship order.

The trial addressed whether the child was in need of protection at the time of apprehension, with the disposition already agreed upon.

The court found the child was in need of protection based on the mother's untreated mental health concerns, paranoid ideation, lack of adequate supervision, and emotional instability.

The child has since been returned to the mother's care under a voluntary services agreement with conditions, and no further court order was required.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to stop at a red light contrary to Section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole issue was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict at the end of the Crown's case.

The Justice of the Peace took judicial notice of how traffic lights operate to infer that the light was red for the appellant.

The appellate court found that while the Justice of the Peace erred in taking judicial notice of traffic light operation without accounting for mechanical failure, there was sufficient evidence from the Crown witness and an admission by the appellant to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age, possession of child pornography, and production of child pornography.

The offences occurred between 2012 and 2014 and involved an eight-year-old child.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, less pre-trial detention and house arrest credits, resulting in 17 months incarceration.

The court considered Gladue principles, psychological assessment, victim impact, and sentencing principles emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences involving child abuse.

The Kenora Rainy River District Child and Family Services brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a further six-month Society Wardship Order for two children found to be in need of protection due to emotional harm.

The children had been apprehended in October 2014 due to mental health concerns including self-mutilation and suicide ideation.

They were placed in a specialized treatment foster home in Southern Ontario where they demonstrated significant improvement.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking return of the children to her care, but provided no clinical evidence or cooperation with the Agency.

The father agreed with the Agency's position and was noted in default.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial and granted the Society Wardship Order for six months, finding that the children's best interests required continuation of their specialized placement.

The child protection agency sought leave to withdraw its protection application for two children in a high-conflict custody and access dispute between separated parents.

The agency argued that its involvement was exacerbating the situation and was not in the children's best interests.

The father and children's counsel supported the withdrawal, while the mother opposed it, seeking continued agency involvement to establish parental alienation.

The court granted the agency's motion to withdraw, finding that the matter was fundamentally a custody and access dispute better suited to Superior Court, that the children were uncooperative with services, and that continued child protection involvement would be detrimental to their interests.